Today's Passage
This passage describes the fall of Potidaea in 430/429 BCE, a crucial event early in the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The same winter the Potidæans at length found themselves no longer able to hold out against their besiegers. The inroads of the Peloponnesians into Attica had not had the desired effect of making the Athenians raise the siege. Provisions there were none left; and so far had distress for food gone in Potidæa that, besides a number of other horrors, instances had even occurred of the people having eaten one another. In this extremity they at last made proposals for capitulating to the Athenian generals in command against them—Xenophon, son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus, son of Callimachus. The generals accepted their proposals, seeing the sufferings of the army in so exposed a position; besides which the state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege. The terms of the capitulation were as follows: a free passage out for themselves, their children, wives and auxiliaries, with one garment apiece, the women with two, and a fixed sum of money for their journey. Under this treaty they went out to Chalcidice and other places, according as was their power. The Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting terms without instructions from home, being of opinion that the place would have had to surrender at discretion. They afterwards sent settlers of their own to Potidæa, and colonized it. Such were the events of the winter, and so ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides was the historian.
Third Year of the War—Investment of Plataea—Naval Victories of Phormio—Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces
Modern Translation
That same winter, the Potidaeans finally reached the point where they could no longer withstand the siege. The Peloponnesian invasions of Attica had failed to achieve their intended purpose of forcing the Athenians to abandon the siege. Food supplies were completely exhausted, and the famine in Potidaea had become so severe that, among numerous other horrors, there were even cases of cannibalism. In this desperate situation, they finally offered to negotiate surrender terms with the Athenian generals commanding the siege forces—Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus. The generals accepted their offer, considering the hardships their own army was enduring in such an exposed position, and aware that Athens had already spent two thousand talents on the siege. The surrender terms were as follows: safe passage for the inhabitants, their children, wives, and foreign troops, with each person allowed one garment (women could take two), plus a specified amount of money for their journey. Under these terms, they departed for Chalcidice and other destinations, wherever they could manage to go. The Athenians, however, criticized the generals for agreeing to terms without authorization from Athens, believing the city would have surrendered unconditionally. Athens later sent its own colonists to resettle Potidaea. These were the events of that winter, marking the end of the second year of this war recorded by Thucydides.
Historical Context
This passage describes the fall of Potidaea in 430/429 BCE, a crucial event early in the Peloponnesian War. Potidaea, a Corinthian colony but Athenian tributary, had revolted in 432 BCE, helping precipitate the war. The Athenians had besieged it for over two years at enormous cost. The passage reveals the brutal reality of ancient siege warfare, including starvation and cannibalism. The generals' decision to accept negotiated terms rather than unconditional surrender reflects the practical difficulties of maintaining the siege. The Athenian criticism of this decision demonstrates the tension between military commanders in the field and democratic decision-making at home. The subsequent colonization of Potidaea shows Athens' imperial policy of replacing rebellious populations with loyal settlers.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Ancient Siege Warfare
Siege warfare in antiquity was primarily a contest of endurance. Without effective siege engines, attackers relied on blockade and starvation. The mention of cannibalism illustrates the extreme desperation that could result from prolonged sieges, a horror occasionally documented in ancient sources.
Learn more →Athenian Military Finance
The 2,000 talents spent on Potidaea represents an enormous sum—roughly equivalent to four years of tribute from the entire Athenian empire. This massive expenditure early in the war would strain Athenian finances and demonstrates the high cost of maintaining imperial control.
Learn more →Cleruchy System
The settlement of Athenian colonists (cleruchs) in Potidaea was a standard imperial practice. These settlements served multiple purposes: rewarding Athenian citizens with land, ensuring loyalty in strategic locations, and demonstrating the consequences of rebellion to other subject states.
Learn more →Democratic Oversight of Generals
The criticism of the generals for exceeding their authority reflects a key tension in Athenian democracy. While generals (strategoi) needed flexibility in the field, they remained accountable to the assembly. This case shows how military necessity could conflict with democratic control.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.46)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the siege of Potidaea, offering additional details about the cost and duration of the siege, though his chronology sometimes differs from Thucydides.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (Chapter 35)
Plutarch mentions the siege of Potidaea in connection with Pericles' strategy and the financial burden it placed on Athens, providing context for understanding Athenian war policy.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 2.2.3)
While not directly about Potidaea, Xenophon describes the similar fate of Athens itself under siege in 404 BCE, including negotiations for surrender terms, providing an ironic parallel.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- What does the Athenian criticism of their generals reveal about the relationship between democratic accountability and military effectiveness? How might this tension affect war strategy?
- The passage mentions cannibalism as one of the 'horrors' of the siege. How does Thucydides' matter-of-fact reporting of such extremes contribute to his historical method and what he wants readers to understand about war?
- Compare the terms given to Potidaea with what the Athenians thought should have happened. What factors might have influenced the generals' decision, and were the Athenians at home being realistic?
- What does the cost of the siege (2,000 talents) tell us about Athenian priorities and the economics of maintaining an empire? Was Potidaea worth this investment?