Today's Passage
This passage is from the famous Mytilenean Debate (427 BCE), where the Athenian Assembly reconvenes to reconsider their decision to execute all adult males in Mytilene after the city's failed revolt.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is suspected of giving advice, however good, from corrupt motives, we feel such a grudge against him for the gain which after all we are not certain he will receive, that we deprive the city of its certain benefit. Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the advocate of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than the best counsellor is to lie in order to be believed. The city and the city only, owing to these refinements, can never be served openly and without disguise; he who does serve it openly being always suspected of serving himself in some secret way in return. Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a little farther than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. For if those who gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you would judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which the whim of the moment may have led you upon the single person of your adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error.
“However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is not their guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so guilty, I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be expedient; nor though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I recommend it, unless it be dearly for the good of the country. I consider that we are deliberating for the future more than for the present; and where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent effects that will follow from making rebellion capital, I, who consider the interests of the future quite as much as he, as positively maintain the contrary. And I require you not to reject my useful considerations for his specious ones: his speech may have the attraction of seeming the more just in your present temper against Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the Mitylenians useful to Athens.
Modern Translation
This is not how we operate. Moreover, whenever someone is suspected of offering advice—no matter how sound—for personal gain, we resent him so deeply for the profit he might receive (though we cannot be certain he will get it) that we deny our city the clear benefits of his counsel. Thus honest, straightforward advice has become as suspect as dishonest counsel. The person advocating the most outrageous policies must employ deception to win over the people, just as the most well-intentioned advisor must resort to lies to gain credibility. Our city alone, because of these sophisticated suspicions, cannot be served openly and transparently. Anyone who tries to serve it honestly is immediately suspected of secretly pursuing personal advantage. Nevertheless, given the gravity of the matters at stake and our current circumstances, we who speak before you must look beyond immediate concerns—unlike you who make snap judgments. This is especially important because we advisors bear responsibility for our counsel, while you, the listeners, do not share accountability. If both those who gave advice and those who followed it suffered equally when things went wrong, you would deliberate more carefully. As things stand, when disaster strikes due to a momentary impulse, you punish only your advisor while exempting yourselves, despite being his many accomplices in the mistake.
I have not come forward to oppose or prosecute anyone regarding Mytilene. For sensible people, the issue is not their guilt but our advantage. Even if I could prove them utterly guilty, I would not recommend execution unless it serves our interests. Conversely, even if they deserve mercy, I would not advocate for it unless it clearly benefits our state. I believe we are deliberating about the future more than the present. Where Cleon confidently asserts that executing rebels will serve as a useful deterrent, I—equally concerned with future consequences—firmly maintain the opposite view. I ask you not to dismiss my practical arguments in favor of his appealing ones. His speech may seem more just given your current anger toward Mytilene, but we are not sitting in a court of law—we are in a political assembly. The question is not what is just, but how to make the Mytileneans useful to Athens.
Historical Context
This passage is from the famous Mytilenean Debate (427 BCE), where the Athenian Assembly reconvenes to reconsider their decision to execute all adult males in Mytilene after the city's failed revolt. The speaker is Diodotus, opposing Cleon's harsh stance. The debate occurs during a critical phase of the Peloponnesian War when Athens is asserting control over its empire. Diodotus argues against Cleon's motion for mass execution, not on moral grounds but through pragmatic political reasoning. This debate exemplifies the tension between justice and expediency in Athenian imperial policy and showcases the sophisticated rhetorical culture of democratic Athens. The passage reveals deep anxieties about political discourse in democracy, where speakers are suspected of hidden motives and must use indirect arguments to be believed.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Democratic Discourse
Diodotus reveals a paradox in Athenian democracy: citizens' suspicion of speakers' motives corrupts political discourse, forcing even honest advisors to use deception. This reflects tensions between democratic ideals of open debate and the reality of political manipulation in the assembly.
Learn more →Political Accountability
The passage highlights an asymmetry in democratic decision-making: advisors bear responsibility for bad outcomes while the voting citizens escape blame. This critique of collective irresponsibility remains relevant to modern democratic theory.
Learn more →Rhetoric vs. Justice
Diodotus explicitly separates justice from political expediency, arguing that the assembly is not a law court but a political body that must prioritize Athens' interests over moral considerations. This represents a key moment in political realism.
Learn more →Imperial Management
The debate concerns how Athens should manage rebellious allies. Diodotus advocates for calculated clemency as more effective than harsh punishment, reflecting sophisticated thinking about imperial control through calibrated responses rather than pure force.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Aristotle: Rhetoric (Book 1, Chapter 3)
Aristotle discusses deliberative rhetoric in political assemblies, distinguishing between arguments about justice and arguments about expediency, directly echoing Diodotus's distinction between law courts and political assemblies.
Read passage →Xenophon: Memorabilia (Book 3, Chapter 5)
Xenophon records Socrates discussing how democratic assemblies often make poor decisions due to passion and the influence of demagogues, similar to Diodotus's critique of emotional decision-making.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 8)
Plutarch describes how Nicias, like Diodotus, had to navigate Athenian suspicions about speakers' motives, often using reverse psychology to achieve his political goals in the assembly.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Diodotus's claim that honest advisors must lie to be believed reflect on the health of democratic discourse? Is this paradox inevitable in democracy?
- What are the implications of separating justice from political expediency? Can a state maintain legitimacy while explicitly prioritizing interest over justice?
- How does the problem of accountability that Diodotus identifies—where advisors bear responsibility but voters do not—manifest in modern democracies?
- Is Diodotus himself guilty of the manipulation he describes, given that he claims to argue from expediency while possibly concealing humanitarian motives?