Today's Passage
This passage describes a crucial naval engagement during the Corcyraean civil war (427 BCE), part of the larger Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
At this stage in the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the removal of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived from Cyllene where they had been stationed since their return from Ionia, fifty-three in number, still under the command of Alcidas, but with Brasidas also on board as his adviser; and dropping anchor at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland, at daybreak made sail for Corcyra.
The Corcyraeans in great confusion and alarm at the state of things in the city and at the approach of the invader, at once proceeded to equip sixty vessels, which they sent out, as fast as they were manned, against the enemy, in spite of the Athenians recommending them to let them sail out first, and to follow themselves afterwards with all their ships together. Upon their vessels coming up to the enemy in this straggling fashion, two immediately deserted: in others the crews were fighting among themselves, and there was no order in anything that was done; so that the Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, placed twenty ships to oppose the Corcyraeans, and ranged the rest against the twelve Athenian ships, amongst which were the two vessels Salaminia and Paralus.
While the Corcyraeans, attacking without judgment and in small detachments, were already crippled by their own misconduct, the Athenians, afraid of the numbers of the enemy and of being surrounded, did not venture to attack the main body or even the centre of the division opposed to them, but fell upon its wing and sank one vessel; after which the Peloponnesians formed in a circle, and the Athenians rowed round them and tried to throw them into disorder. Perceiving this, the division opposed to the Corcyraeans, fearing a repetition of the disaster of Naupactus, came to support their friends, and the whole fleet now bore down, united, upon the Athenians, who retired before it, backing water, retiring as leisurely as possible in order to give the Corcyraeans time to escape, while the enemy was thus kept occupied. Such was the character of this sea-fight, which lasted until sunset.
The Corcyraeans now feared that the enemy would follow up their victory and sail against the town and rescue the men in the island, or strike some other blow equally decisive, and accordingly carried the men over again to the temple of Hera, and kept guard over the city. The Peloponnesians, however, although victorious in the sea-fight, did not venture to attack the town, but took the thirteen Corcyraean vessels which they had captured, and with them sailed back to the continent from whence they had put out. The next day equally they refrained from attacking the city, although the disorder and panic were at their height, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas, his superior officer, to do so, but they landed upon the promontory of Leukimme and laid waste the country.
Modern Translation
By the fourth or fifth day after the oligarchs had been transferred to the island, the revolution had reached this critical point when the Peloponnesian fleet arrived from Cyllene, where they had been stationed following their return from Ionia. The fleet numbered fifty-three ships and remained under Alcidas's command, though Brasidas now served aboard as his advisor. After anchoring at Sybota, a mainland harbor, they set sail for Corcyra at dawn.
The Corcyraeans, thrown into extreme confusion and panic by both the civil strife within their city and the approaching enemy fleet, hastily equipped sixty vessels. Against the Athenians' advice to let them sail out first and then follow with a united fleet, the Corcyraeans sent their ships out piecemeal as soon as each was manned. When these vessels engaged the enemy in their disorganized fashion, two immediately defected to the Peloponnesians. On other ships, crews fought among themselves, and complete disorder prevailed. Observing this chaos, the Peloponnesians deployed twenty ships against the Corcyraeans while positioning the remainder against the twelve Athenian vessels, including the state ships Salaminia and Paralus.
The Corcyraeans attacked without strategy in small groups, handicapping themselves through their own incompetence. Meanwhile, the Athenians, wary of the enemy's numerical superiority and the danger of encirclement, avoided attacking either the main force or the center of the opposing division. Instead, they struck at its wing and sank one ship. The Peloponnesians then formed a defensive circle while the Athenians rowed around them, attempting to create disorder. The Peloponnesian division facing the Corcyraeans, fearing a repeat of their defeat at Naupactus, moved to support their comrades. The entire Peloponnesian fleet then advanced together against the Athenians, who retreated by backing water, withdrawing as slowly as possible to buy time for the Corcyraean escape while keeping the enemy engaged. This naval engagement continued until sunset.
The Corcyraeans, fearing the enemy might exploit their victory by attacking the city and rescuing the oligarchs on the island or dealing some other decisive blow, transported the prisoners back to Hera's temple and maintained a city watch. Despite their naval victory, the Peloponnesians declined to attack the city. Instead, they captured thirteen Corcyraean vessels and sailed back to their continental base. The following day, they again refrained from attacking the city, despite the height of disorder and panic within. Brasidas reportedly urged his superior Alcidas to attack, but instead they landed at Leukimme promontory and ravaged the countryside.
Historical Context
This passage describes a crucial naval engagement during the Corcyraean civil war (427 BCE), part of the larger Peloponnesian War. The democratic faction in Corcyra had recently gained the upper hand against oligarchs, who had been isolated on an island. The arrival of a Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas, with the brilliant commander Brasidas as advisor, threatened to reverse the democrats' gains. The battle reveals the Corcyraeans' political disunity manifesting as military incompetence, while the outnumbered Athenians demonstrate tactical discipline. The Peloponnesians' failure to exploit their victory by attacking the city represents a missed strategic opportunity that would preserve Corcyra's alliance with Athens. This episode illustrates how internal political strife (stasis) could fatally compromise a city's military effectiveness.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Naval Warfare Tactics
The Athenians employ sophisticated naval tactics, including the periplous (sailing around) maneuver and strategic withdrawal. Their discipline contrasts sharply with Corcyraean disorder, demonstrating why Athens maintained naval supremacy. The defensive circle formation shows Peloponnesian adaptation to Athenian tactics.
Learn more →Brasidas
Brasidas emerges as Sparta's most innovative commander, serving here as advisor to the cautious Alcidas. His aggressive recommendation to attack the city foreshadows his later bold campaigns in Thrace. His presence signals Sparta's recognition that traditional commanders like Alcidas needed more dynamic leadership.
Learn more →Sacred Ships of Athens
The Salaminia and Paralus were Athens' two sacred state triremes, used for religious missions and official business. Their presence in this battle underscores the engagement's importance and Athens' commitment to protecting Corcyra despite limited resources.
Learn more →Battle of Naupactus
The reference to Naupactus recalls Phormio's brilliant Athenian naval victory (429 BCE) where inferior numbers defeated a Peloponnesian fleet through superior tactics. This memory influences Peloponnesian caution and demonstrates how past defeats shaped strategic decisions.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.57)
Diodorus provides a condensed account of the Corcyraean civil war, emphasizing the brutality of the stasis and confirming the general sequence of events, though with less tactical detail than Thucydides.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.1.18-23)
While describing a later naval battle at Cyzicus, Xenophon shows similar Athenian tactical superiority and discipline contrasting with Peloponnesian hesitation, suggesting persistent patterns in naval warfare.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 6)
Plutarch describes Athenian naval operations during this period, noting how political divisions in allied cities often compromised military effectiveness, paralleling the Corcyraean situation.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the Corcyraean civil discord translate into military ineffectiveness? What does this suggest about the relationship between political unity and military success?
- Why might Alcidas have ignored Brasidas's advice to attack the city? Consider both tactical and strategic factors in your response.
- How do the different responses of the Athenians and Corcyraeans to the Peloponnesian threat reflect their different political systems and naval traditions?
- What role does psychological warfare play in this engagement? Consider the effects of fear, confusion, and past experiences on all three forces.