Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 203 of 506 Book 3, Chapter 11 June 15, 2026
40% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage describes two separate but contemporary military situations during the Peloponnesian War (around 426-425 BCE).

Crawley Translation (1910)

After this the Acarnanians allotted a third of the spoils to the Athenians, and divided the rest among their own different towns. The share of the Athenians was captured on the voyage home; the arms now deposited in the Attic temples are three hundred panoplies, which the Acarnanians set apart for Demosthenes, and which he brought to Athens in person, his return to his country after the Aetolian disaster being rendered less hazardous by this exploit. The Athenians in the twenty ships also went off to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, after the departure of Demosthenes and the Athenians, granted the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius and the Agraeans a free retreat from Oeniadae, to which place they had removed from the country of Salynthius, and for the future concluded with the Ambraciots a treaty and alliance for one hundred years, upon the terms following. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance; the Ambraciots could not be required to march with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the Athenians; for the rest the Ambraciots were to give up the places and hostages that they held of the Amphilochians, and not to give help to Anactorium, which was at enmity with the Acarnanians. With this arrangement they put an end to the war. After this the Corinthians sent a garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia, composed of three hundred heavy infantry, under the command of Xenocleides, son of Euthycles, who reached their destination after a difficult journey across the continent. Such was the history of the affair of Ambracia.

The same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their ships upon the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who had invaded its borders from the interior, and also sailed to the islands of Aeolus. Upon their return to Rhegium they found the Athenian general, Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, come to supersede Laches in the command of the fleet. The allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and induced the Athenians to send out more vessels to their assistance, pointing out that the Syracusans who already commanded their land were making efforts to get together a navy, to avoid being any longer excluded from the sea by a few vessels. The Athenians proceeded to man forty ships to send to them, thinking that the war in Sicily would thus be the sooner ended, and also wishing to exercise their navy. One of the generals, Pythodorus, was accordingly sent out with a few ships; Sophocles, son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles, being destined to follow with the main body. Meanwhile Pythodorus had taken the command of Laches’ ships, and towards the end of winter sailed against the Locrian fort, which Laches had formerly taken, and returned after being defeated in battle by the Locrians.

Modern Translation

Following these events, the Acarnanians allocated one-third of the captured spoils to the Athenians, distributing the remainder among their various cities. However, the Athenian portion was seized during the return voyage. The weapons now displayed in Athenian temples consist of three hundred complete suits of armor, which the Acarnanians specifically reserved for Demosthenes. He personally transported these to Athens, and this achievement made his homecoming considerably safer after his earlier defeat in Aetolia. The Athenian fleet of twenty ships subsequently departed for Naupactus. After Demosthenes and the Athenians had withdrawn, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians permitted the Ambraciot and Peloponnesian forces who had sought protection with Salynthius and the Agraeans to leave Oeniadae freely—they had relocated there from Salynthius's territory. Furthermore, they negotiated a century-long treaty and alliance with the Ambraciots on these conditions: the alliance would be purely defensive, not offensive; the Ambraciots would not be obligated to campaign alongside the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor would the Acarnanians be required to fight with the Ambraciots against Athens. Additionally, the Ambraciots agreed to surrender the Amphilochian territories and hostages they controlled and to withhold support from Anactorium, which remained hostile to the Acarnanians. This agreement concluded their conflict. Subsequently, the Corinthians dispatched a garrison of three hundred heavy infantry from their own citizens to Ambracia, commanded by Xenocleides, son of Euthycles, who completed an arduous overland journey to reach their post. Thus concluded the Ambracian affair.

That same winter, Athenian forces in Sicily launched an assault from their vessels against Himera's territory, coordinating with the Sicels who were attacking from the interior. They also sailed to the Aeolian islands. Returning to Rhegium, they encountered the Athenian general Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, who had arrived to replace Laches as fleet commander. Sicilian allies had sailed to Athens requesting additional naval support, arguing that while the Syracusans already controlled the land, they were now attempting to assemble a fleet to prevent being confined to shore by Athens's limited naval presence. The Athenians prepared forty ships for deployment, believing this would expedite the war's conclusion in Sicily while providing naval training opportunities. They immediately dispatched General Pythodorus with a small squadron, while Sophocles, son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles, would follow with the main force. Having assumed command of Laches's ships, Pythodorus sailed against the Locrian fortress that Laches had previously captured near winter's end, but suffered defeat in battle against the Locrians and withdrew.

Historical Context

This passage describes two separate but contemporary military situations during the Peloponnesian War (around 426-425 BCE). In northwestern Greece, the aftermath of the Battle of Olpae sees the victorious Acarnanians distributing spoils and negotiating a pragmatic peace treaty with Ambracia. Demosthenes, seeking to rehabilitate his reputation after his disastrous Aetolian campaign, returns to Athens with captured armor as proof of success. Meanwhile, in Sicily, Athens is escalating its involvement by sending reinforcements under new commanders, demonstrating the empire's capacity to wage war on multiple fronts. The Sicilian expedition, initially a limited intervention, is gradually expanding as local allies draw Athens deeper into western Greek affairs. This dual narrative illustrates both the complexity of alliance systems in the Greek world and Athens's imperial overextension.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Demosthenes's Aetolian Disaster

Earlier in Book 3, Demosthenes had led an overconfident invasion of Aetolia that ended in catastrophic defeat, with heavy Athenian losses. This military failure threatened his political career and personal safety, as failed generals often faced prosecution in Athens. His success at Olpae and the trophy armor he brings home serve as redemption.

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Greek Trophy Dedication

The dedication of captured armor (panoplies) in temples was a standard Greek practice following military victories. These dedications served both religious and propaganda purposes, displaying a city's military prowess to citizens and visitors. The three hundred suits represent a substantial victory and would have made an impressive display.

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Sicilian Expedition Escalation

This passage marks an early stage in Athens's increasing involvement in Sicily, which would culminate in the disastrous expedition of 415-413 BCE. The gradual escalation from supporting allies with a few ships to sending forty vessels demonstrates how limited interventions can expand beyond original intentions.

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Defensive vs. Offensive Alliances

The distinction between defensive (epimacheia) and offensive (symmacheia) alliances was crucial in Greek diplomacy. This treaty cleverly allows both parties to maintain their primary loyalties—Acarnanians to Athens, Ambraciots to the Peloponnesian League—while securing local peace and avoiding conflicts of interest.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.60)

Diodorus provides a parallel account of Athenian operations in Sicily during this period, though with less detail than Thucydides. He emphasizes the growing Syracusan threat and Athenian concerns about losing naval supremacy in western waters.

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Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 12)

While focusing on a later period, Plutarch discusses how early Athenian involvement in Sicily set precedents for future intervention. He notes how initial small commitments gradually escalated into major military undertakings.

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Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.1.35)

Though describing later events, Xenophon's account of shifting alliances in western Greece shows the long-term consequences of treaties like the Acarnanian-Ambraciot agreement, demonstrating how local arrangements affected larger conflicts.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does the Acarnanian-Ambraciot treaty demonstrate the complexity of alliance systems during the Peloponnesian War? What modern parallels might we draw?
  2. What does Demosthenes's need to bring physical trophies back to Athens reveal about accountability and public perception in Athenian democracy?
  3. How does the gradual escalation of Athenian involvement in Sicily illustrate the dangers of 'mission creep' in military interventions?
  4. Why might Thucydides have juxtaposed these two separate theaters of war (northwestern Greece and Sicily) in his narrative?