Today's Passage
This passage describes the fortification of Pylos in 425 BCE, a pivotal moment in the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the island, but Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While they were making objections, a squall chanced to come on and carried the fleet into Pylos. Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, it being for this that he had come on the voyage, and made them observe there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the place was strong by nature, and together with much of the country round unoccupied; Pylos, or Coryphasium, as the Lacedaemonians call it, being about forty-five miles distant from Sparta, and situated in the old country of the Messenians. The commanders told him that there was no lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to put the city to expense by occupying them. He, however, thought that this place was distinguished from others of the kind by having a harbour close by; while the Messenians, the old natives of the country, speaking the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do them the greatest mischief by their incursions from it, and would at the same time be a trusty garrison.
After speaking to the captains of companies on the subject, and failing to persuade either the generals or the soldiers, he remained inactive with the rest from stress of weather; until the soldiers themselves wanting occupation were seized with a sudden impulse to go round and fortify the place. Accordingly they set to work in earnest, and having no iron tools, picked up stones, and put them together as they happened to fit, and where mortar was needed, carried it on their backs for want of hods, stooping down to make it stay on, and clasping their hands together behind to prevent it falling off; sparing no effort to be able to complete the most vulnerable points before the arrival of the Lacedaemonians, most of the place being sufficiently strong by nature without further fortifications.
Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians were celebrating a festival, and also at first made light of the news, in the idea that whenever they chose to take the field the place would be immediately evacuated by the enemy or easily taken by force; the absence of their army before Athens having also something to do with their delay. The Athenians fortified the place on the land side, and where it most required it, in six days, and leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison it, with the main body of the fleet hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.
Modern Translation
When they reached the waters off Laconia, they received word that the Peloponnesian fleet had already arrived at Corcyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles were eager to sail immediately to the island, but Demosthenes insisted they first stop at Pylos to carry out necessary operations before continuing their journey. As they were debating this proposal, a sudden storm arose and drove the fleet into Pylos harbor. Demosthenes immediately pressed them to fortify the position—this had been his intention all along in joining the expedition. He pointed out the abundant supplies of stone and timber available, the site's natural defensive strength, and the fact that both the place itself and much of the surrounding territory remained uninhabited. Pylos (which the Lacedaemonians call Coryphasium) lies about forty-five miles from Sparta in what was formerly Messenian territory. The other commanders responded that there was no shortage of desolate promontories throughout the Peloponnese if he wanted to waste the city's resources occupying them. Demosthenes, however, argued that this location was uniquely valuable because of its nearby harbor. Moreover, the Messenians—the region's original inhabitants who spoke the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians—could inflict serious damage through raids from this base while serving as reliable defenders of the position.
After presenting his case to the company commanders and failing to convince either the generals or the common soldiers, Demosthenes resigned himself to waiting with the others while the bad weather persisted. Then, unexpectedly, the soldiers themselves—restless from inactivity—spontaneously decided to fortify the place. They threw themselves into the work with enthusiasm, though lacking proper tools. They gathered stones by hand, fitting them together as best they could. When mortar was needed, they carried it on their backs since they had no containers, bending forward to keep it in place and clasping their hands behind their backs to prevent it from sliding off. They worked tirelessly to complete the most exposed sections before the Lacedaemonians could arrive, though much of the site needed little additional fortification due to its natural defenses.
The Lacedaemonians, meanwhile, were occupied with a religious festival and initially dismissed the reports, confident that they could easily force the Athenians to abandon the position or capture it by assault whenever they chose to march. The absence of their main army, which was campaigning near Athens, also contributed to their delayed response. The Athenians completed the landward fortifications and the most critical defensive works in six days. They then left Demosthenes with five ships to hold the position while the main fleet hurried on toward Corcyra and Sicily.
Historical Context
This passage describes the fortification of Pylos in 425 BCE, a pivotal moment in the Peloponnesian War. An Athenian fleet bound for Sicily, commanded by Eurymedon and Sophocles, is forced by weather into Pylos harbor. Demosthenes, who had joined the expedition with this specific plan in mind, convinces the idle soldiers to fortify the naturally strong position. This seemingly minor incident would lead to one of Athens' greatest victories when the Spartans, attempting to retake Pylos, would trap their elite hoplites on the nearby island of Sphacteria. The eventual Athenian capture of these troops would shock the Greek world and give Athens significant leverage in peace negotiations. The passage illustrates Thucydides' themes of chance (the storm), individual initiative (Demosthenes), and the interplay between planning and opportunity in warfare.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Messenian Helots
The Messenians were the original inhabitants of the region conquered by Sparta centuries earlier and reduced to helot status. Their shared dialect with Spartans and knowledge of local terrain made them valuable allies for Athens. The establishment of a base at Pylos would encourage helot revolts, Sparta's greatest fear.
Learn more →Greek Military Engineering
The improvised fortification work described here was typical of Greek warfare. Soldiers often constructed field fortifications using local materials without specialized tools. The vivid description of carrying mortar on their backs illustrates the practical challenges of ancient siege craft.
Learn more →Spartan Religious Festivals
Sparta's strict observance of religious festivals often impeded military operations. The Carneia and Hyacinthia were particularly important festivals that required military inactivity. This religious conservatism repeatedly disadvantaged Sparta strategically, as at Marathon and Thermopylae.
Learn more →Athenian Naval Strategy
Athens' ability to project power through naval mobility was crucial to their imperial strategy. The fleet's ability to establish bases on enemy coastlines demonstrated the flexibility of sea power versus Sparta's land-based military system.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 7)
Plutarch describes the aftermath of Pylos, including how Cleon's unexpected success at Sphacteria increased political pressure on moderate leaders like Nicias, showing the political ramifications of this military success.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.61)
Diodorus provides a condensed account of the Pylos campaign, emphasizing the role of fortune in Demosthenes' success and the Spartan miscalculation.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.2.18)
Xenophon later describes how the Athenians used Pylos as a base for raiding Laconia, demonstrating the long-term strategic value of Demosthenes' initiative.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the role of chance (the storm) versus human planning (Demosthenes' intention) in this passage reflect broader themes about causation in Thucydides?
- What does the soldiers' spontaneous decision to fortify Pylos reveal about morale, leadership, and decision-making in democratic military forces?
- How does Thucydides use the contrast between Athenian opportunism and Spartan religious conservatism to comment on the nature of power?
- Why might Thucydides include such specific details about the fortification process (carrying mortar on backs, clasping hands)? What effect does this achieve?