Today's Passage
This passage describes the Spartan response to the Athenian occupation of Pylos in 425 BCE, a pivotal moment in the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci at once set out for Pylos, the other Lacedaemonians following more slowly, as they had just come in from another campaign. Word was also sent round Peloponnese to come up as quickly as possible to Pylos; while the sixty Peloponnesian ships were sent for from Corcyra, and being dragged by their crews across the isthmus of Leucas, passed unperceived by the Athenian squadron at Zacynthus, and reached Pylos, where the land forces had arrived before them. Before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time to send out unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon them to his assistance. While the ships hastened on their voyage in obedience to the orders of Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison. Meanwhile, as they expected the Athenian ships to arrive from Zacynthus, they intended, if they failed to take the place before, to block up the entrances of the harbour to prevent their being able to anchor inside it. For the island of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line close in front of the harbour, at once makes it safe and narrows its entrances, leaving a passage for two ships on the side nearest Pylos and the Athenian fortifications, and for eight or nine on that next the rest of the mainland: for the rest, the island was entirely covered with wood, and without paths through not being inhabited, and about one mile and five furlongs in length. The inlets the Lacedaemonians meant to close with a line of ships placed close together, with their prows turned towards the sea, and, meanwhile, fearing that the enemy might make use of the island to operate against them, carried over some heavy infantry thither, stationing others along the coast. By this means the island and the continent would be alike hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to land on either; and the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet towards the open sea having no harbour, and, therefore, presenting no point which they could use as a base to relieve their countrymen, they, the Lacedaemonians, without sea-fight or risk would in all probability become masters of the place, occupied as it had been on the spur of the moment, and unfurnished with provisions. This being determined, they carried over to the island the heavy infantry, drafted by lot from all the companies. Some others had crossed over before in relief parties, but these last who were left there were four hundred and twenty in number, with their Helot attendants, commanded by Epitadas, son of Molobrus.
Modern Translation
When the Peloponnesians returned from their invasion of Attica, the Spartans themselves, along with the nearest of the perioeci, immediately marched toward Pylos. The rest of the Lacedaemonians followed more slowly, having just returned from another military expedition. Messages were dispatched throughout the Peloponnese, urging all forces to advance on Pylos with utmost speed. The sixty Peloponnesian warships were recalled from Corcyra, and their crews hauled them across the Leucas isthmus. They slipped past the Athenian fleet stationed at Zacynthus undetected and reached Pylos, where the land forces had already assembled. Before the Peloponnesian fleet arrived, Demosthenes managed to dispatch two ships secretly to alert Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus about Pylos's precarious situation and to request immediate reinforcement. As these ships raced to deliver Demosthenes' urgent message, the Lacedaemonians prepared to attack the fortification by both land and sea, confident they could easily capture this hastily constructed position defended by a small garrison. Anticipating the arrival of Athenian ships from Zacynthus, they planned—should they fail to take the fort immediately—to blockade the harbor entrances and prevent the Athenians from anchoring within. The island of Sphacteria extends along the harbor's mouth, creating a protected anchorage while narrowing the entrances: the channel nearest Pylos and the Athenian fortifications allows passage for only two ships, while the channel on the mainland side accommodates eight or nine. The island itself, approximately one mile and five furlongs long, was completely forested and trackless, having never been inhabited. The Lacedaemonians intended to seal these channels by positioning ships closely together with their prows facing seaward. Concerned that the enemy might use the island as a base of operations, they transported heavy infantry there and stationed additional troops along the mainland coast. This strategy would render both the island and the continent hostile territory for the Athenians, who would find no landing place on either. Since the Pylos shoreline outside the inlet facing the open sea lacked any harbor, the Athenians would have no base from which to support their besieged comrades. Thus the Lacedaemonians calculated that without risking a naval battle, they would likely capture this position that had been occupied spontaneously and lacked adequate provisions. Having settled on this plan, they ferried heavy infantry to the island, selecting men by lot from all companies. While others had previously crossed in rotating relief parties, this final contingent numbered four hundred and twenty hoplites with their helot attendants, under the command of Epitadas, son of Molobrus.
Historical Context
This passage describes the Spartan response to the Athenian occupation of Pylos in 425 BCE, a pivotal moment in the Peloponnesian War. After Demosthenes fortified Pylos on the southwestern coast of the Peloponnese, the Spartans immediately recognized the threat this posed to their territory and mobilized their forces. The strategic importance of Pylos lay in its potential as an Athenian base for raiding Laconia and encouraging helot revolts. The Spartans' plan involved blockading the harbor using the island of Sphacteria and stationing troops there—a decision that would prove catastrophic when these forces became trapped, leading to one of Sparta's most humiliating defeats and fundamentally altering the war's dynamics.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Perioeci
The perioeci were free inhabitants of Laconia who lived in autonomous communities but lacked full Spartan citizenship. They served in the Spartan military and were crucial to the Lacedaemonian war effort, providing both soldiers and economic support while maintaining their own local governance under Spartan hegemony.
Learn more →Helots
Helots were the enslaved population of Laconia and Messenia who worked Spartan lands. Each Spartan hoplite typically brought helot attendants on campaign. The Spartan fear of helot revolt profoundly shaped their society and foreign policy, making the Athenian presence at Pylos particularly threatening.
Learn more →Ancient Naval Warfare
The portage of ships across the Leucas isthmus demonstrates common ancient naval practices. Greek warships were light enough to be dragged overland on rollers, allowing fleets to avoid dangerous sea routes or enemy patrols. This tactical flexibility was crucial in ancient Mediterranean warfare.
Learn more →Sphacteria
This small island off Pylos became the site of one of the war's most significant battles. The Spartan decision to garrison it proved disastrous when Athenian forces later trapped these elite troops, leading to an unprecedented Spartan surrender that shocked the Greek world and challenged assumptions about Spartan invincibility.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (7.1-4)
Plutarch provides additional details about the Pylos campaign and its aftermath, including the political ramifications in Athens and the role of Cleon in refusing Spartan peace offers.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.61-63)
Diodorus offers a condensed account of the Pylos affair, providing some different details about troop numbers and the strategic thinking behind both Athenian and Spartan moves.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.2.18)
Though writing about later events, Xenophon references the significance of Pylos and how its capture continued to influence Spartan-Athenian relations throughout the war.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the Spartan response to Pylos reveal both their strategic thinking and their critical vulnerabilities? What assumptions did they make that proved faulty?
- Analyze the role of geography in this passage. How do physical features like islands, harbors, and isthmuses shape military strategy?
- What does this passage suggest about the importance of naval power versus land forces in the Peloponnesian War?
- How might the presence of helot attendants with the Spartan forces on Sphacteria have influenced subsequent events?