Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 221 of 506 Book 4, Chapter 12 July 3, 2026
44% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage occurs during the Pylos affair of 425 BCE, when Athenian forces had trapped a contingent of Spartan hoplites on the island of Sphacteria.

Crawley Translation (1910)

At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in great distress, and that corn found its way in to the men in the island, caused no small perplexity; and the Athenians began to fear that winter might come on and find them still engaged in the blockade. They saw that the convoying of provisions round Peloponnese would be then impossible. The country offered no resources in itself, and even in summer they could not send round enough. The blockade of a place without harbours could no longer be kept up; and the men would either escape by the siege being abandoned, or would watch for bad weather and sail out in the boats that brought in their corn. What caused still more alarm was the attitude of the Lacedaemonians, who must, it was thought by the Athenians, feel themselves on strong ground not to send them any more envoys; and they began to repent having rejected the treaty. Cleon, perceiving the disfavour with which he was regarded for having stood in the way of the convention, now said that their informants did not speak the truth; and upon the messengers recommending them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, Cleon himself and Theagenes were chosen by the Athenians as commissioners. Aware that he would now be obliged either to say what had been already said by the men whom he was slandering, or be proved a liar if he said the contrary, he told the Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether disinclined for a fresh expedition, that instead of sending and wasting their time and opportunities, if they believed what was told them, they ought to sail against the men. And pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus, then general, whom he hated, he tauntingly said that it would be easy, if they had men for generals, to sail with a force and take those in the island, and that if he had himself been in command, he would have done it.

Modern Translation

Back in Athens, reports of the army's desperate situation and the successful smuggling of supplies to the men trapped on the island created considerable anxiety. The Athenians feared that winter would arrive while they were still maintaining the blockade. They recognized that transporting provisions around the Peloponnese would become impossible in winter. The region itself provided no resources, and even during summer they struggled to send adequate supplies. Without proper harbors, maintaining the blockade would become unfeasible; the enemy would either escape when the siege was lifted or wait for storms to sail away in their supply boats. Even more troubling was the Spartans' behavior—their refusal to send further peace envoys suggested to the Athenians that they felt confident in their position. The Athenians now regretted rejecting the peace treaty. Cleon, sensing the growing resentment against him for blocking the agreement, claimed the messengers were lying. When these informants suggested sending commissioners to verify their reports if Athens doubted them, the Athenians selected Cleon himself along with Theagenes as commissioners. Realizing he would either have to confirm what the men he had accused of lying had reported, or be exposed as a liar himself if he contradicted them, Cleon addressed the Athenians, who seemed inclined toward another military expedition. He argued that rather than sending commissioners and wasting precious time and opportunities, they should attack the men on the island if they believed the reports. Pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus, who was then serving as general and whom Cleon despised, he mockingly declared that with proper generals, it would be simple to sail with a force and capture the men on the island—something he claimed he would have already accomplished if he had been in command.

Historical Context

This passage occurs during the Pylos affair of 425 BCE, when Athenian forces had trapped a contingent of Spartan hoplites on the island of Sphacteria. The blockade had dragged on longer than expected, creating logistical challenges for Athens. Cleon, a prominent demagogue who had opposed peace negotiations with Sparta, now faced criticism for his stance. To deflect blame, he challenged the military leadership, particularly targeting Nicias, a cautious aristocratic general. This moment marks a crucial turning point where Cleon's political maneuvering would lead to his taking command of the operation himself. The passage illustrates the intersection of domestic politics and military strategy in Athenian democracy, showing how personal rivalries and public pressure influenced strategic decisions during the war.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Athenian Democracy

This passage showcases how military decisions were debated in the Athenian assembly, where politicians like Cleon could challenge generals and influence strategy through rhetoric. The democratic process allowed for rapid shifts in policy based on public sentiment and political maneuvering.

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Naval Blockades

The logistical challenges of maintaining a naval blockade in ancient warfare are evident here. Without modern supply chains, blockading forces faced severe difficulties, especially during winter when Mediterranean sailing was dangerous and provisioning from distant Athens became nearly impossible.

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Cleon the Demagogue

Cleon represents a new type of Athenian politician—not from the traditional aristocracy but from the merchant class. His aggressive rhetoric and populist appeals contrasted sharply with the cautious approach of aristocratic generals like Nicias, reflecting social tensions within Athenian democracy.

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The Pylos Campaign

The blockade of Sphacteria was a critical moment in the Peloponnesian War. The potential capture of Spartan hoplites offered Athens unprecedented leverage, as Sparta highly valued these elite warriors. This explains both the Athenian determination to maintain the blockade and Spartan confidence mentioned in the passage.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Nicias (7.1-4)

Plutarch describes the rivalry between Cleon and Nicias, portraying Cleon's challenge as reckless boasting that accidentally committed him to military command, providing personal details absent from Thucydides' account.

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Aristophanes: The Knights (Lines 54-57, 702-704)

This comedy, produced shortly after these events, satirizes Cleon's boastfulness and his promise to capture the Spartans, providing contemporary Athenian perspective on these political dynamics through theatrical ridicule.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.61)

Diodorus provides a condensed account of the Pylos affair, including Cleon's assumption of command, though with less detail about the political maneuvering described by Thucydides.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does this passage illustrate the tension between political rhetoric and military reality in democratic decision-making?
  2. What does Cleon's maneuvering reveal about the relationship between personal ambition and public policy in Athens?
  3. How might the outcome have differed if Athens had accepted the Spartan peace offer mentioned in the passage?
  4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of allowing political leaders to directly challenge military commanders in public forums?