Today's Passage
This passage comes from the debate at Athens in 433 BCE, where Corinthian ambassadors are arguing against Athens forming an alliance with Corcyra (modern Corfu).
Crawley Translation (1910)
“As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from the party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the credit due only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case, it was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at length understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they thought of the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their own misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with them not in alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite of their being at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest that they should have made overtures to you, and not at a time when we have been wronged and they are in peril; nor yet at a time when you will be admitting to a share in your protection those who never admitted you to a share in their power, and will be incurring an equal amount of blame from us with those in whose offences you had no hand. No, they should have shared their power with you before they asked you to share your fortunes with them.
“So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and the violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But that you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to learn. It may be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that it shall be competent for any state, whose name was not down on the list, to join whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not meant for those whose object in joining is the injury of other powers, but for those whose need of support does not arise from the fact of defection, and whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is mad enough to receive them war instead of peace; which will be the case with you, if you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary and remain our friend; if you join in their attack, you must share the punishment which the defenders inflict on them. And yet you have the best possible right to be neutral, or, failing this, you should on the contrary join us against them. Corinth is at least in treaty with you; with Corcyra you were never even in truce. But do not lay down the principle that defection is to be patronized. Did we on the defection of the Samians record our vote against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesian powers were equally divided on the question whether they should assist them? No, we told them to their face that every power has a right to punish its own allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive and assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies will come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press less heavily on us than on yourselves.
Modern Translation
Regarding their claim that they wanted the dispute submitted to arbitration first, it's clear that such an offer from those who hold all the advantages cannot be credited with the same sincerity as one coming from someone who, before resorting to force, actually puts himself on equal footing with his opponent in both actions and words. In their case, they didn't propose this seemingly fair solution of arbitration until after they had already besieged the city—only when they finally realized we wouldn't passively accept their aggression. And not content with their own wrongdoing there, they now appear before you demanding that you join them not as allies but as accomplices in their crimes, asking you to accept them despite their hostility toward us. Yet they should have approached you when they were at their strongest, not now when we've been wronged and they face danger. This is not the time when you'd be granting protection to those who never shared their power with you when they had it, while simultaneously earning equal blame from us for offenses you had no part in committing. No—they should have shared their strength with you before asking you to share their misfortunes.
We've now demonstrated both the legitimacy of our grievances and the violent, grasping nature of our opponents. But you still need to understand why you cannot justly receive them as allies. True, the treaty does contain a provision allowing any state not originally listed to join whichever side it chooses. However, this clause wasn't intended for those whose purpose in joining is to harm other powers, but rather for those seeking support for reasons other than rebellion, and whose alliance won't transform peace into war for whoever is reckless enough to accept them—which is exactly what will happen to you if you ignore our warning. You cannot aid them and remain our friends; if you assist their attack, you must accept the consequences that we, as defenders, will impose on them. You have every right to remain neutral, or better yet, you should join us against them. After all, you at least have a treaty with Corinth; with Corcyra, you've never even had a truce. But don't establish the precedent that rebellion should be rewarded. When the Samians revolted, did we vote against you when the other Peloponnesian powers were split on whether to help them? No—we declared openly that every power has the right to discipline its own allies. If you adopt a policy of harboring and helping all rebels, you'll discover that just as many of your own dependencies will defect to us, and the principle you establish will harm you more than it harms us.
Historical Context
This passage comes from the debate at Athens in 433 BCE, where Corinthian ambassadors are arguing against Athens forming an alliance with Corcyra (modern Corfu). Corcyra, a colony of Corinth, had revolted and was now seeking Athenian protection as conflict loomed. The Corinthians are making a sophisticated legal and moral argument about why Athens should not accept Corcyra as an ally, invoking treaty law, precedent, and the dangerous principle of supporting rebellious colonies. This debate was crucial because Athens' decision to form a defensive alliance with Corcyra became one of the immediate causes of the Peloponnesian War, as it brought Athens into direct conflict with Corinth, a key Spartan ally.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Greek Arbitration
Arbitration (dike) was a common method of resolving disputes between Greek city-states. The Corinthians argue that Corcyra's offer of arbitration is insincere because it came only after they had already resorted to force, suggesting bad faith in their diplomatic overtures.
Learn more →The Samian Revolt
The reference to Samos (440-439 BCE) is crucial. When this important Athenian ally revolted, Corinth supported Athens' right to discipline its own allies, establishing a precedent the Corinthians now invoke to argue that Corcyra, as their colony, falls under their jurisdiction.
Learn more →Greek Colonial Relations
The relationship between mother cities (metropoleis) and their colonies (apoikiai) was complex in ancient Greece. While colonies were independent, they maintained religious and cultural ties to their founders. Disputes over these relationships, as seen here between Corinth and Corcyra, could escalate into wider conflicts.
Learn more →Treaty Law in Classical Greece
The Corinthians reference specific treaty provisions about neutral states joining alliances. This reflects the sophisticated development of international law in 5th century Greece, where treaties often included detailed clauses about neutrality, arbitration, and alliance rights.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.30-31)
Diodorus provides a condensed account of the Corcyra-Corinth dispute and the debates at Athens, offering a different perspective on the same events with less rhetorical detail.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29)
Plutarch discusses Pericles' role in the decision to ally with Corcyra, providing insight into the Athenian leader's strategic thinking that Thucydides only implies.
Read passage →Aristotle: Politics (1303b)
Aristotle briefly mentions the Corcyra-Corinth conflict as an example of how disputes between colonies and mother cities can lead to larger wars, providing philosophical context to Thucydides' narrative.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the Corinthian argument about the timing of Corcyra's arbitration offer reflect broader themes of justice versus expediency in international relations?
- What are the implications of the Corinthian principle that 'every power has a right to punish its own allies'? How might this apply to modern international relations?
- How does Thucydides use this speech to illustrate the gap between legal arguments and power politics?
- Why do the Corinthians emphasize the danger of setting precedents in international relations? What does this reveal about Greek diplomatic thinking?