Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 253 of 506 Book 4, Chapter 14 August 4, 2026
50% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage describes two significant military operations in 424 BCE during the Peloponnesian War.

Crawley Translation (1910)

Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and the majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by fear for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens; not however admitting the army until they had taken his personal security for the oaths sworn by his government before they sent him out, assuring the independence of the allies whom he might bring over. Not long after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, followed their example and revolted.

Such were the events of this summer. It was in the first days of the winter following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the hands of the Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the latter of whom was to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to Delium. A mistake, however, was made in the days on which they were each to start; and Demosthenes, sailing first to Siphae, with the Acarnanians and many of the allies from those parts on board, failed to effect anything, through the plot having been betrayed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. Succours accordingly flocked in from all parts of Boeotia, Hippocrates not being yet there to make his diversion, and Siphae and Chaeronea were promptly secured, and the conspirators, informed of the mistake, did not venture on any movement in the towns.

Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens, resident aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his destination after the Boeotians had already come back from Siphae, and encamping his army began to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following manner. A trench was dug all round the temple and the consecrated ground, and the earth thrown up from the excavation was made to do duty as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, the vines round the sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together with stones and bricks pulled down from the houses near; every means, in short, being used to run up the rampart. Wooden towers were also erected where they were wanted, and where there was no part of the temple buildings left standing, as on the side where the gallery once existing had fallen in. The work was begun on the third day after leaving home, and continued during the fourth, and till dinnertime on the fifth, when most of it being now finished the army removed from Delium about a mile and a quarter on its way home. From this point most of the light troops went straight on, while the heavy infantry halted and remained where they were; Hippocrates having stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts, and to give directions for the completion of such part of the outworks as had been left unfinished.

Modern Translation

These were the arguments Brasidas presented. After extensive debate from both sides, the Acanthians cast their votes secretly. The majority, swayed by Brasidas's persuasive rhetoric and concerned about their grape harvest, chose to break away from Athens. However, they refused to admit his forces until he provided personal guarantees for the oaths his government had sworn before dispatching him—oaths that promised autonomy to any allies he might win over. Shortly afterward, Stagirus, an Andrian colony, followed Acanthus's lead and also revolted.

These events concluded the summer campaign. As winter began, the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes were preparing to execute a coordinated plan to seize strategic positions in Boeotia. Demosthenes was to sail to Siphae while Hippocrates marched to Delium. Unfortunately, they miscalculated their timing. Demosthenes arrived first at Siphae with Acarnanian troops and numerous regional allies, but the operation failed completely—the conspiracy had been exposed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who alerted the Spartans, who in turn warned the Boeotians. Reinforcements poured in from across Boeotia before Hippocrates could create his planned diversion. Siphae and Chaeronea were quickly secured by Boeotian forces, and the conspirators, learning of the operation's failure, abandoned any attempt at uprising within their cities.

Meanwhile, Hippocrates mobilized a comprehensive force of Athenian citizens, resident foreigners, and allies, reaching Delium after the Boeotians had already returned from Siphae. He established camp and began fortifying Apollo's sanctuary using these methods: They excavated a circular trench around both temple and sacred grounds, piling the earth to form a defensive wall reinforced with stakes. They harvested nearby vines and incorporated them into the fortification along with stones and bricks salvaged from neighboring buildings—employing every available resource to strengthen the rampart. They constructed wooden towers at strategic points where no temple structures remained, particularly where an old gallery had collapsed. Work commenced on the third day after departure from Athens and continued through the fourth day and past noon on the fifth. With most fortifications complete, the army withdrew approximately two kilometers toward home. The light infantry proceeded directly while the heavy troops halted and maintained position. Hippocrates remained at Delium to organize the garrison and oversee completion of the unfinished defensive works.

Historical Context

This passage describes two significant military operations in 424 BCE during the Peloponnesian War. First, the Spartan general Brasidas successfully persuades Acanthus to revolt from Athens through a combination of rhetoric and implicit threats to their harvest. Second, Athens attempts a complex synchronized attack on Boeotia that fails due to poor coordination and betrayal. The Athenians planned to exploit internal dissent in Boeotian cities while simultaneously establishing a fortified position at Delium. The operation's failure represents a major strategic setback for Athens and demonstrates the challenges of coordinating complex military operations in ancient warfare. The fortification of Delium, a sacred site, also raises questions about religious propriety in wartime.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Brasidas's Northern Campaign

Brasidas's expedition to northern Greece (424-422 BCE) was a brilliant strategic move that threatened Athens's vital grain supply routes and tribute-paying allies. His combination of military prowess and diplomatic skill made him one of Sparta's most effective commanders.

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Sacred Space in Warfare

The fortification of Delium, a sanctuary of Apollo, violated Greek religious norms about sacred spaces. Such actions could provoke divine anger and provided moral justification for enemy retaliation, as the subsequent Battle of Delium would demonstrate.

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Athenian Imperial System

The revolt of Acanthus illustrates the fragility of Athens's empire, which relied on naval power to maintain control over reluctant allies. Local economic interests, like the grape harvest mentioned here, often outweighed loyalty to Athens when imperial control weakened.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.67-69)

Diodorus provides an account of Brasidas's campaign and the Battle of Delium, offering additional details about casualties and the religious controversy surrounding the fortification of the sanctuary.

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Plutarch: Life of Nicias (6.1-2)

Plutarch mentions the Delium campaign as part of the aggressive Athenian strategy before Nicias's rise to prominence, contextualizing it within broader Athenian imperial ambitions.

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Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.1)

Though Xenophon begins where Thucydides breaks off, he references earlier Boeotian campaigns to explain the long-standing hostility between Athens and Thebes.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does Brasidas's successful persuasion of Acanthus illustrate the relationship between rhetoric, fear, and political decision-making in Greek city-states?
  2. What does the failure of the Athenian operation in Boeotia reveal about the challenges of intelligence, coordination, and operational security in ancient warfare?
  3. How should we interpret the Athenian decision to fortify a religious sanctuary? What does this suggest about the relationship between military necessity and religious observance?
  4. What role did economic considerations (like the grape harvest) play in determining political loyalty during the Peloponnesian War?