Today's Passage
This passage describes Brasidas's tactical retreat from Illyria in 423 BCE after his alliance with the Macedonian king Perdiccas collapsed.
Crawley Translation (1910)
With this brief address Brasidas began to lead off his army. Seeing this, the barbarians came on with much shouting and hubbub, thinking that he was flying and that they would overtake him and cut him off. But wherever they charged they found the young men ready to dash out against them, while Brasidas with his picked company sustained their onset. Thus the Peloponnesians withstood the first attack, to the surprise of the enemy, and afterwards received and repulsed them as fast as they came on, retiring as soon as their opponents became quiet. The main body of the barbarians ceased therefore to molest the Hellenes with Brasidas in the open country, and leaving behind a certain number to harass their march, the rest went on after the flying Macedonians, slaying those with whom they came up, and so arrived in time to occupy the narrow pass between two hills that leads into the country of Arrhabaeus. They knew that this was the only way by which Brasidas could retreat, and now proceeded to surround him just as he entered the most impracticable part of the road, in order to cut him off.
Brasidas, perceiving their intention, told his three hundred to run on without order, each as quickly as he could, to the hill which seemed easiest to take, and to try to dislodge the barbarians already there, before they should be joined by the main body closing round him. These attacked and overpowered the party upon the hill, and the main army of the Hellenes now advanced with less difficulty towards it—the barbarians being terrified at seeing their men on that side driven from the height and no longer following the main body, who, they considered, had gained the frontier and made good their escape. The heights once gained, Brasidas now proceeded more securely, and the same day arrived at Arnisa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas. The soldiers, enraged at the desertion of the Macedonians, vented their rage on all their yokes of oxen which they found on the road, and on any baggage which had tumbled off (as might easily happen in the panic of a night retreat), by unyoking and cutting down the cattle and taking the baggage for themselves. From this moment Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as an enemy and to feel against the Peloponnesians a hatred which could not be congenial to the adversary of the Athenians. However, he departed from his natural interests and made it his endeavour to come to terms with the latter and to get rid of the former.
Modern Translation
With these few words, Brasidas began to lead his army forward. When the barbarians saw this movement, they rushed forward with tremendous noise and confusion, believing he was retreating and that they could catch and destroy him. However, wherever they attacked, they encountered the young soldiers ready to charge out against them, while Brasidas himself with his elite troops bore the brunt of their assault. In this way, the Peloponnesians successfully resisted the initial attack—much to the enemy's astonishment—and continued to receive and drive back each successive wave of attackers, withdrawing only when the barbarians paused. Eventually, the main barbarian force stopped harassing Brasidas's Greeks in the open terrain. Leaving behind a detachment to harass their march, the majority pursued the fleeing Macedonians, killing those they caught, and managed to reach and occupy the narrow pass between two hills that led into Arrhabaeus's territory. They understood this was Brasidas's only escape route and now moved to encircle him just as he entered the most difficult section of the path, intending to trap him completely.
Brasidas, recognizing their strategy, ordered his three hundred elite soldiers to break ranks and run as fast as possible toward whichever hill seemed most accessible, with instructions to drive off the barbarians already positioned there before the main enemy force could complete their encirclement. His men attacked and overwhelmed the defenders on the hill, allowing the main Greek army to advance more easily toward that position. The barbarians, seeing their comrades driven from the heights and believing the main Greek force had already crossed the border and escaped, were struck with fear and abandoned their pursuit. Having secured the high ground, Brasidas continued his march with greater safety and reached Arnisa, the first town in Perdiccas's territory, that same day. The soldiers, furious at the Macedonian betrayal, took revenge on any ox-teams they found abandoned on the road and on scattered baggage (inevitably lost during a panicked night retreat), slaughtering the oxen and seizing the supplies for themselves. From this moment forward, Perdiccas viewed Brasidas as an enemy and developed a hatred for the Peloponnesians that conflicted with his position as Athens's opponent. Nevertheless, he set aside his natural allegiances and began working to reach an agreement with the Athenians while seeking to rid himself of the Peloponnesians.
Historical Context
This passage describes Brasidas's tactical retreat from Illyria in 423 BCE after his alliance with the Macedonian king Perdiccas collapsed. Brasidas, the brilliant Spartan commander, had joined Perdiccas in a campaign against Arrhabaeus, but when Illyrian reinforcements arrived, Perdiccas's forces fled in panic during the night, abandoning their Greek allies. Now Brasidas must execute a fighting withdrawal through hostile territory with barbarian forces attempting to cut off his escape route. The passage showcases Brasidas's military genius in turning a potential disaster into a successful retreat, but also marks a crucial diplomatic shift as Perdiccas switches sides from Sparta to Athens, significantly affecting the balance of power in northern Greece during the Peloponnesian War.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Brasidas's Northern Campaign
Brasidas's expedition to Thrace and Macedonia (424-422 BCE) represented Sparta's most successful offensive operation of the Archidamian War. His diplomatic and military skills won over numerous Athenian allies, threatening Athens's vital grain supply routes and northern tribute-paying cities.
Learn more →Ancient Greek Tactical Withdrawal
The fighting retreat described here exemplifies sophisticated Greek military tactics. Using picked troops as rearguard, securing high ground, and maintaining unit cohesion while withdrawing were essential skills that separated professional armies from barbarian forces.
Learn more →Macedon in the Peloponnesian War
Macedonia under Perdiccas II constantly shifted allegiances between Athens and Sparta, playing both sides to maintain independence. This opportunistic diplomacy was typical of smaller powers caught between the great warring states of classical Greece.
Learn more →Greek-Barbarian Relations
Thucydides's description of 'barbarians' (non-Greeks) emphasizes their disorder and emotional volatility versus Greek discipline. This cultural stereotype reinforced Greek identity while acknowledging that barbarian forces could pose serious military threats.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.68)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of Brasidas's northern campaigns, though with less tactical detail than Thucydides. He emphasizes Brasidas's charisma in winning over cities.
Read passage →Xenophon: Anabasis (7.3-4)
Xenophon's account of the Ten Thousand's fighting retreat through hostile territory offers interesting parallels to Brasidas's tactical withdrawal, showing similar Greek military discipline against barbarian opponents.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (28-29)
Plutarch's description of the Athenian retreat from Syracuse shows a contrasting failed withdrawal, where panic and disorder led to catastrophe, highlighting Brasidas's superior leadership.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Brasidas's handling of this crisis demonstrate the qualities that made him Sparta's most successful commander? What specific decisions proved most crucial?
- What does this passage reveal about the reliability of alliances in the ancient Greek world? How did smaller powers like Macedon navigate between larger states?
- How does Thucydides's portrayal of 'barbarians' versus Greeks reflect cultural biases? What military realities might underlie these stereotypes?
- Why might the soldiers' plundering of Macedonian property have been politically significant beyond mere revenge? How did this affect future relations?