Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 279 of 506 Book 4, Chapter 14 August 30, 2026
55% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage describes Brasidas's failed night attack on Potidaea in 423 BCE, near the end of the ninth year of the Peloponnesian War.

Crawley Translation (1910)

At the close of the same winter, in fact almost in spring, Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidæa. He arrived by night, and succeeded in planting a ladder against the wall without being discovered, the ladder being planted just in the interval between the passing round of the bell and the return of the man who brought it back. Upon the garrison, however, taking the alarm immediately afterwards, before his men came up, he quickly led off his troops, without waiting until it was day. So ended the winter and the ninth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.

Modern Translation

As that same winter drew to its close—indeed, with spring almost upon them—Brasidas launched an assault on Potidaea. Arriving under cover of darkness, he managed to place a ladder against the wall undetected, timing it perfectly between the sentry's rounds with the warning bell. But the moment the garrison realized what was happening, before his troops could scale the walls, he swiftly withdrew his forces rather than risk discovery in daylight. Thus concluded both the winter season and the ninth year of this war that Thucydides records.

Historical Context

This passage describes Brasidas's failed night attack on Potidaea in 423 BCE, near the end of the ninth year of the Peloponnesian War. Brasidas, the brilliant Spartan general who had been campaigning successfully in Thrace, attempted to capture this strategically important city on the Chalcidice peninsula. Potidaea had revolted from Athens in 432 BCE, triggering events that led to the war, and was now allied with Sparta. The city's location made it valuable for controlling the region. Brasidas's tactical innovation—exploiting the gap in sentry rounds—shows his reputation for unconventional warfare, though his caution in withdrawing when discovered reflects the calculated risk-taking that characterized his northern campaigns. This minor episode exemplifies the continuous low-level warfare that characterized much of the conflict.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Brasidas's Thracian Campaign

Brasidas's expedition to Thrace (424-422 BCE) was one of Sparta's most successful offensive operations. His charismatic leadership and promises of liberation from Athenian rule won over many cities, seriously threatening Athens's vital grain supply routes and tribute-paying allies in the region.

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Ancient Siege Warfare

Night attacks using scaling ladders were high-risk operations in ancient warfare. Success depended on surprise, as defenders with adequate warning could easily repel climbers. The mention of the warning bell shows the sophisticated watch systems cities employed against such threats.

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Potidaea's Strategic Importance

Potidaea controlled the narrow isthmus connecting Pallene to the mainland of Chalcidice. Its revolt from Athens in 432 BCE was a crucial catalyst for the Peloponnesian War. The city's location made it vital for controlling trade and military movements in the northern Aegean.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.67-68)

Diodorus provides additional details about Brasidas's campaigns in Thrace during this period, including his capture of Amphipolis and negotiations with various cities.

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Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 6)

Plutarch discusses the broader context of Spartan operations in the north and their impact on Athenian strategy, particularly highlighting how these threatened Athens's imperial revenues.

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Discussion Questions

  1. What does Brasidas's immediate withdrawal reveal about the balance between boldness and prudence in military leadership?
  2. How does this minor incident illustrate the nature of warfare during the 'quiet' periods of the Peloponnesian War?
  3. What can we infer about ancient Greek defensive systems from the mention of the sentry's bell routine?
  4. Why might Thucydides include this failed attack in his narrative when he often omits minor military actions?