Today's Passage
This passage describes the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Sybota (433 BCE) and the escalating tensions that would lead to the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by treachery, being common ground to the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After establishing Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight hundred of the Corcyraeans were slaves; these they sold; two hundred and fifty they retained in captivity, and treated with great attention, in the hope that they might bring over their country to Corinth on their return; most of them being, as it happened, men of very high position in Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her political existence in the war with Corinth, and the Athenian vessels left the island. This was the first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians, viz., that they had fought against them with the Corcyraeans in time of treaty.
Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war. Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her hostility. The Potidæans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were ordered to raze the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the persons sent from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that they might be persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to revolt with them. These precautions against the Potidæans were taken by the Athenians immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length openly hostile, but Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally been made an enemy. He had been made an enemy by the Athenians entering into alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were in league against him. In his alarm he had sent to Lacedaemon to try and involve the Athenians in a war with the Peloponnesians, and was endeavouring to win over Corinth in order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He also made overtures to the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to persuade them to join in the revolt; for he thought that if these places on the border could be made his allies, it would be easier to carry on the war with their co-operation. Alive to all this, and wishing to anticipate the revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as follows. They were just then sending off thirty ships and a thousand heavy infantry for his country under the command of Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, with four colleagues. They instructed the captains to take hostages of the Potidæans, to raze the wall, and to be on their guard against the revolt of the neighbouring cities.
Modern Translation
On their return voyage, the Corinthians captured Anactorium, located at the entrance to the Ambracian Gulf. They seized this territory through deception, as it was jointly held by both Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After installing Corinthian colonists there, they sailed home. Of the Corcyraean prisoners, eight hundred who were enslaved were sold off, while two hundred and fifty were kept captive and treated exceptionally well, hoping these men might convince their homeland to side with Corinth upon their release—many of them being, as it turned out, among Corcyra's most influential citizens. Thus Corcyra survived politically through its conflict with Corinth, and the Athenian fleet departed from the island. This incident became the primary grievance Corinth held against Athens: that the Athenians had fought alongside the Corcyraeans while a treaty was still in effect.
Almost immediately afterward, new tensions emerged between Athens and the Peloponnesians, adding fuel to the coming war. As Corinth plotted revenge, Athens grew increasingly suspicious of her intentions. The Potidaeans, who occupied the Pallene peninsula as a Corinthian colony yet paid tribute to Athens, received orders to demolish their wall facing Pallene, surrender hostages, expel their Corinthian magistrates, and refuse the annual officials Corinth traditionally sent. Athens feared that Perdiccas and the Corinthians might convince them to rebel, potentially triggering revolts among other Thracian allies. These measures against Potidaea were implemented immediately following the Corcyraean battle. Corinth had now become openly antagonistic, while Perdiccas, son of Alexander and king of Macedon, had transformed from longtime friend and ally into an adversary. His hostility stemmed from Athens allying with his brother Philip and Derdas, who had united against him. Alarmed, he dispatched envoys to Sparta hoping to entangle Athens in war with the Peloponnesians, while courting Corinth to orchestrate Potidaea's revolt. He also approached the Thracian Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans, urging them to join the rebellion, calculating that securing these border territories as allies would facilitate his military operations. Recognizing these machinations and determined to prevent the cities' defection, Athens took action. They happened to be dispatching thirty ships and a thousand hoplites to Macedonia under Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, and four fellow commanders. The generals received orders to secure hostages from Potidaea, destroy the wall, and remain vigilant against rebellion in neighboring cities.
Historical Context
This passage describes the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Sybota (433 BCE) and the escalating tensions that would lead to the Peloponnesian War. Following their naval engagement with Corcyra, where Athens intervened, Corinth seized Anactorium and began plotting retaliation. Meanwhile, Athens moved preemptively against Potidaea, a strategically vital city that was both a Corinthian colony and Athenian tributary. The situation was complicated by Perdiccas of Macedon, who switched from Athenian ally to enemy after Athens supported his rivals. This created a dangerous convergence of interests between Corinth, Macedon, and potentially rebellious Athenian subjects in the northern Aegean. The passage illustrates how local conflicts could rapidly escalate into wider confrontations, as various powers pursued their interests through alliance networks and proxy conflicts.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Potidaea and Strategic Geography
Potidaea controlled the narrow isthmus of Pallene, making it crucial for controlling access to the Chalcidice peninsula. Its dual loyalty as a Corinthian colony paying tribute to Athens exemplified the complex relationships that made the Greek world prone to conflict. The city's strategic location made it a flashpoint in Athenian-Corinthian tensions.
Learn more →Greek Colonization and Metropolis Relations
The relationship between colonies (apoikiai) and mother cities (metropoleis) was complex. Corinth's practice of sending annual magistrates to Potidaea shows how some cities maintained direct political control over colonies. This created divided loyalties when colonies became subject to other powers, as seen in Potidaea's tribute obligations to Athens.
Learn more →Hostage-Taking in Greek Diplomacy
Taking hostages was a standard Greek practice to ensure compliance with treaties or prevent rebellion. High-status hostages served as human guarantees of their city's behavior. Athens' demand for Potidaean hostages reflects this diplomatic tool, while Corinth's careful treatment of elite Corcyraean prisoners shows how hostages could be used to influence politics.
Learn more →Perdiccas II of Macedon
Perdiccas II ruled Macedon from 448-413 BCE, skillfully navigating between Athens, Sparta, and local powers. His shifting alliances exemplified the realpolitik of peripheral kingdoms dealing with major Greek powers. His conflict with Athens over his brothers' rebellion demonstrates how internal Macedonian politics could affect broader Greek affairs.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.34)
Diodorus provides a condensed account of the Potidaean affair, emphasizing the economic motivations behind Athens' actions and providing additional details about the siege that followed.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29-31)
Plutarch discusses Pericles' role in these events, particularly the Megarian Decree and escalating tensions with Corinth, providing insight into Athenian decision-making during this crisis period.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (2.2.3)
Though covering a later period, Xenophon describes similar patterns of Athens managing tributary allies through hostages and garrison installations, showing the continuity of Athenian imperial practices.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the treatment of prisoners of war differ between the enslaved and the elite captives? What does this reveal about Greek social hierarchies and political strategies?
- Was Athens justified in its preemptive actions against Potidaea? How do preventive measures compare to actual aggression in terms of responsibility for war?
- How does Perdiccas' position illustrate the challenges faced by smaller powers caught between major Greek states? What options did such rulers have?
- What role did colonial relationships play in creating the conditions for wider conflict? How did divided loyalties contribute to instability in the Greek world?