Today's Passage
This passage occurs during the unstable Peace of Nicias (421-413 BCE), a temporary halt in the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
In the assembly held the next day, Nicias, in spite of the Lacedaemonians having been deceived themselves, and having allowed him to be deceived also in not admitting that they had come with full powers, still maintained that it was best to be friends with the Lacedaemonians, and, letting the Argive proposals stand over, to send once more to Lacedaemon and learn her intentions. The adjournment of the war could only increase their own prestige and injure that of their rivals; the excellent state of their affairs making it their interest to preserve this prosperity as long as possible, while those of Lacedaemon were so desperate that the sooner she could try her fortune again the better. He succeeded accordingly in persuading them to send ambassadors, himself being among the number, to invite the Lacedaemonians, if they were really sincere, to restore Panactum intact with Amphipolis, and to abandon their alliance with the Boeotians (unless they consented to accede to the treaty), agreeably to the stipulation which forbade either to treat without the other. The ambassadors were also directed to say that the Athenians, had they wished to play false, might already have made alliance with the Argives, who were indeed come to Athens for that very purpose, and went off furnished with instructions as to any other complaints that the Athenians had to make. Having reached Lacedaemon, they communicated their instructions, and concluded by telling the Lacedaemonians that unless they gave up their alliance with the Boeotians, in the event of their not acceding to the treaty, the Athenians for their part would ally themselves with the Argives and their friends. The Lacedaemonians, however, refused to give up the Boeotian alliance—the party of Xenares the ephor, and such as shared their view, carrying the day upon this point—but renewed the oaths at the request of Nicias, who feared to return without having accomplished anything and to be disgraced; as was indeed his fate, he being held the author of the treaty with Lacedaemon. When he returned, and the Athenians heard that nothing had been done at Lacedaemon, they flew into a passion, and deciding that faith had not been kept with them, took advantage of the presence of the Argives and their allies, who had been introduced by Alcibiades, and made a treaty and alliance with them upon the terms following:
The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, acting for themselves and the allies in their respective empires, made a treaty for a hundred years, to be without fraud or hurt by land and by sea.
Modern Translation
When the assembly convened the following day, Nicias persisted in his position. Despite the fact that the Spartans had both deceived themselves and allowed him to be deceived by denying they possessed full negotiating authority, he still argued that maintaining friendship with Sparta was the wisest course. He proposed postponing consideration of the Argive proposals and sending another embassy to Sparta to clarify their true intentions. He reasoned that prolonging the current cessation of hostilities could only enhance Athens' reputation while diminishing that of their enemies. Given Athens' flourishing circumstances, it was in their interest to preserve their current prosperity for as long as possible, whereas Sparta's situation was so dire that they would benefit from any opportunity to test their fortunes sooner rather than later. Nicias successfully convinced the assembly to dispatch ambassadors—with himself among them—to demand that the Spartans, if they were genuinely committed to peace, should return Panactum intact along with Amphipolis and terminate their alliance with the Boeotians (unless the Boeotians agreed to join the peace treaty), in accordance with the provision that neither party could negotiate separately. The ambassadors were further instructed to articulate that Athens, had they intended treachery, could have already concluded an alliance with the Argives, who had come to Athens precisely for that purpose. They departed with comprehensive instructions regarding all other grievances Athens wished to address. Upon arriving in Sparta, they presented their demands and concluded by warning that unless Sparta abandoned its Boeotian alliance—assuming the Boeotians continued to reject the treaty—Athens would form an alliance with Argos and its allies. The Spartans, however, refused to abandon their Boeotian allies—the faction led by the ephor Xenares and his supporters prevailed on this issue—though they did renew their oaths at Nicias' request. Nicias feared returning empty-handed and facing disgrace, which indeed came to pass, as he was widely considered the architect of the Spartan treaty. When he returned and the Athenians learned that nothing had been achieved in Sparta, they erupted in fury. Convinced that they had been betrayed, they seized upon the presence of the Argive delegation and their allies, who had been brought forward by Alcibiades, and promptly concluded a treaty and alliance with them on the following terms: The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, representing themselves and their respective allied territories, established a hundred-year treaty, pledging to refrain from all treachery or harm by land and sea.
Historical Context
This passage occurs during the unstable Peace of Nicias (421-413 BCE), a temporary halt in the Peloponnesian War. The peace treaty between Athens and Sparta was already showing signs of strain due to unfulfilled obligations on both sides. Sparta had failed to return key territories to Athens as promised, while maintaining alliances that violated the treaty's terms. The previous chapter revealed Alcibiades' manipulation of Spartan ambassadors, undermining their credibility before the Athenian assembly. Now Nicias, the treaty's chief architect and advocate for peace with Sparta, attempts damage control by sending another embassy. His failure leads directly to Athens forming an alliance with Argos, Sparta's regional rival, effectively creating a new anti-Spartan coalition that would reignite broader conflicts in the Peloponnese.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Peace of Nicias
The Peace of Nicias (421 BCE) was a treaty intended to end the first phase of the Peloponnesian War. Named after its chief Athenian negotiator, it quickly unraveled due to non-compliance by both sides and the conflicting interests of their respective allies. The peace formally lasted six years but was effectively dead within two.
Learn more →Alcibiades' Political Maneuvering
Alcibiades emerges here as Nicias' chief rival in Athenian politics. His manipulation of the Spartan ambassadors in the previous chapter and his introduction of the Argive delegation demonstrate his preference for aggressive policies and his skill at political intrigue, foreshadowing his later controversial career.
Learn more →The Quadruple Alliance
The alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis represented a significant realignment of Greek powers. This coalition aimed to challenge Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnese and would lead to the Battle of Mantinea (418 BCE), though it ultimately failed to break Spartan power.
Learn more →Ephor Xenares
The ephors were Sparta's five annually elected magistrates who wielded considerable power. Xenares' opposition to abandoning the Boeotian alliance shows how internal Spartan politics could override diplomatic agreements, contributing to the breakdown of the Peace of Nicias.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapters 9-10)
Plutarch provides character analysis of Nicias during this period, emphasizing his cautious nature and fear of public criticism, which helps explain his persistent advocacy for peace despite Spartan deceptions.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Alcibiades (Chapters 14-15)
Offers Alcibiades' perspective on these events, detailing his rivalry with Nicias and his orchestration of the Argive alliance as a means to gain political prominence and pursue anti-Spartan policies.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.75-77)
Provides an alternative account of the breakdown of the Peace of Nicias and formation of the Argive alliance, though with less detail than Thucydides regarding the specific negotiations.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Nicias' argument about preserving prosperity versus Sparta's desperation reveal assumptions about the relationship between power and risk-taking in international relations?
- What does this passage suggest about the role of personal reputation and face-saving in diplomatic negotiations? Consider Nicias' fear of returning empty-handed.
- How does the rapid shift from attempted reconciliation to new alliance formation illustrate the fragility of peace agreements in the ancient Greek world?
- To what extent were the structural problems of the Peace of Nicias (unfulfilled obligations, conflicting alliances) inevitable given the multipolar nature of Greek politics?