Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 313 of 506 Book 5, Chapter 16 October 3, 2026
62% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage describes the complex diplomatic and military maneuvering during the Peace of Nicias period (421-413 BCE), when the formal peace between Athens and Sparta was repeatedly violated through proxy conflicts.

Crawley Translation (1910)

While the Argives were in Epidaurus embassies from the cities assembled at Mantinea, upon the invitation of the Athenians. The conference having begun, the Corinthian Euphamidas said that their actions did not agree with their words; while they were sitting deliberating about peace, the Epidaurians and their allies and the Argives were arrayed against each other in arms; deputies from each party should first go and separate the armies, and then the talk about peace might be resumed. In compliance with this suggestion, they went and brought back the Argives from Epidaurus, and afterwards reassembled, but without succeeding any better in coming to a conclusion; and the Argives a second time invaded Epidaurus and plundered the country. The Lacedaemonians also marched out to Caryae; but the frontier sacrifices again proving unfavourable, they went back again, and the Argives, after ravaging about a third of the Epidaurian territory, returned home. Meanwhile a thousand Athenian heavy infantry had come to their aid under the command of Alcibiades, but finding that the Lacedaemonian expedition was at an end, and that they were no longer wanted, went back again.

So passed the summer. The next winter the Lacedaemonians managed to elude the vigilance of the Athenians, and sent in a garrison of three hundred men to Epidaurus, under the command of Agesippidas. Upon this the Argives went to the Athenians and complained of their having allowed an enemy to pass by sea, in spite of the clause in the treaty by which the allies were not to allow an enemy to pass through their country. Unless, therefore, they now put the Messenians and Helots in Pylos to annoy the Lacedaemonians, they, the Argives, should consider that faith had not been kept with them. The Athenians were persuaded by Alcibiades to inscribe at the bottom of the Laconian pillar that the Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths, and to convey the Helots at Cranii to Pylos to plunder the country; but for the rest they remained quiet as before. During this winter hostilities went on between the Argives and Epidaurians, without any pitched battle taking place, but only forays and ambuscades, in which the losses were small and fell now on one side and now on the other. At the close of the winter, towards the beginning of spring, the Argives went with scaling ladders to Epidaurus, expecting to find it left unguarded on account of the war and to be able to take it by assault, but returned unsuccessful. And the winter ended, and with it the thirteenth year of the war ended also.

Modern Translation

While the Argives were campaigning in Epidaurus, representatives from various cities gathered at Mantinea at the invitation of the Athenians. Once the conference began, Euphamidas of Corinth pointed out the contradiction between their words and actions: while they sat discussing peace, the Epidaurians with their allies and the Argives stood armed against each other. He suggested that delegates from each side should first go and separate the armies, after which peace talks could resume. Following his advice, they went and brought the Argives back from Epidaurus, then reconvened. However, they made no more progress toward agreement than before. The Argives promptly invaded Epidaurus again and ravaged the countryside. The Spartans also marched out to Caryae, but when the border sacrifices proved unfavorable, they turned back. The Argives, having devastated about a third of Epidaurian territory, returned home. Meanwhile, a thousand Athenian heavy infantry arrived to support them under Alcibiades' command, but discovering that the Spartan expedition had ended and their assistance was unnecessary, they too went home.

Thus the summer passed. The following winter, the Spartans successfully evaded Athenian surveillance and installed a garrison of three hundred men in Epidaurus under Agesippidas' command. The Argives then approached the Athenians with a complaint: they had permitted an enemy force to pass by sea, violating the treaty provision that allies must not allow enemies passage through their territory. Unless the Athenians now stationed Messenians and Helots at Pylos to harass the Spartans, the Argives would consider the alliance betrayed. Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to inscribe on the Spartan treaty pillar that they had broken their oaths, and to transfer the Helots from Cranii to Pylos for raiding operations; otherwise, they maintained their previous stance. Throughout this winter, the Argives and Epidaurians continued fighting, though without any major battle—only raids and ambushes that produced minor casualties on both sides. As winter ended and spring approached, the Argives attempted to take Epidaurus by assault with scaling ladders, expecting the war to have left it poorly defended, but they failed and withdrew. With winter's end came the conclusion of the war's thirteenth year.

Historical Context

This passage describes the complex diplomatic and military maneuvering during the Peace of Nicias period (421-413 BCE), when the formal peace between Athens and Sparta was repeatedly violated through proxy conflicts. The focus is on Argos, attempting to establish itself as a major power, attacking Epidaurus (a Spartan ally). The peace conference at Mantinea reveals the futility of diplomatic efforts when military actions continue. Alcibiades appears as a key figure manipulating Athenian policy, while the Spartans cleverly circumvent Athenian naval dominance. The passage illustrates how the nominal peace was actually a period of continued warfare through allies, setting the stage for the resumption of full-scale conflict.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Border Sacrifices

Before crossing frontiers for military campaigns, Greek armies performed sacrifices to determine divine favor. Unfavorable omens could halt entire expeditions, as seen here with the Spartans at Caryae. This religious practice significantly influenced military strategy and timing.

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Alcibiades' Influence

Alcibiades emerges as a dominant force in Athenian politics, advocating aggressive policies against Sparta. His persuasion of Athens to publicly record Spartan oath-breaking shows his skill at propaganda and his role in undermining the Peace of Nicias.

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Proxy Warfare

The conflict between Argos and Epidaurus exemplifies how Athens and Sparta continued fighting through allied states during the nominal peace. This indirect warfare allowed both powers to maintain the fiction of peace while pursuing strategic objectives.

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Helots at Pylos

The Athenian fort at Pylos, established in 425 BCE, served as a base for helot desertion and raids into Spartan territory. The threat to relocate helots there was a powerful diplomatic tool, exploiting Sparta's greatest internal vulnerability.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Alcibiades (15.1-3)

Plutarch describes Alcibiades' manipulation of the Argive alliance and his role in undermining the Peace of Nicias, providing personal details about his motivations and character during this period.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.81)

Diodorus provides an alternative account of the Argive-Epidaurian conflict, though with less detail than Thucydides, offering a different perspective on the breakdown of the Peace of Nicias.

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Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.1-5)

Though covering a later period, Xenophon's opening demonstrates similar patterns of proxy warfare and alliance manipulation that characterized Greek interstate relations throughout the classical period.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does Euphamidas' observation about the contradiction between peace negotiations and military preparations reflect broader themes in Thucydides about the relationship between words and deeds?
  2. What does the Spartan response to unfavorable border sacrifices reveal about the intersection of religion and strategy in Greek warfare?
  3. How does this passage illustrate the fragility of peace treaties in the ancient Greek world, and what parallels might we draw to modern international relations?
  4. What role does Alcibiades play in escalating tensions, and how does this foreshadow his later impact on the war?