Today's Passage
This passage marks the crucial transition to the Sicilian Expedition (415-413 BCE), Athens' most ambitious and ultimately disastrous military venture.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched to Sicily. The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians excepted, marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part of the land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried off some corn. They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left them a few soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after making a truce for a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives were to injure each other’s territory, returned home with the army. Not long afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred heavy infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their forces, marched out and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but the garrison escaped by night, the besiegers having bivouacked some way off. The next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground, and went back again; after which the Athenians went home in their ships. Meanwhile the Athenians took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian border some cavalry of their own and the Macedonian exiles that were at Athens, and plundered the country of Perdiccas. Upon this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had a truce with Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to join Perdiccas in the war, which they refused to do. And the winter ended, and with it ended the sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.
Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a month’s pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask to have sent them. The Athenians held an assembly and, after hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally, and in particular as to the money, of which, it was said, there was abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, who were appointed with full powers; they were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens. Five days after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest means of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by the generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who had been chosen to the command against his will, and who thought that the state was not well advised, but upon a slight aid specious pretext was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise, and gave them the following counsel:
Modern Translation
The Athenian ambassadors were duly sent to Sicily. That same winter, the Spartans and their allies—except for the Corinthians—invaded Argive territory. They devastated a small portion of the land, seized several teams of oxen, and carried off grain supplies. They also established Argive exiles at Orneae, leaving them with a small garrison drawn from their main force. After arranging a temporary truce stipulating that neither the people of Orneae nor the Argives would attack each other's territory, they returned home with their army. Shortly afterward, the Athenians arrived with thirty warships and six hundred heavy infantry. The Argives, mobilizing their entire force to join them, marched out and laid siege to the garrison at Orneae for a day. However, the defenders escaped under cover of night while the besiegers were encamped at some distance. When the Argives discovered this the following day, they completely demolished Orneae before withdrawing. The Athenians then sailed home. During this period, the Athenians transported some of their own cavalry and Macedonian exiles residing in Athens by sea to Methone on the Macedonian frontier, where they raided the territory of Perdiccas. In response, the Spartans sent word to the Thracian Chalcidians—who maintained a renewable ten-day truce with Athens—encouraging them to support Perdiccas in the conflict. The Chalcidians declined to participate. Thus ended the winter, and with it the sixteenth year of this war chronicled by Thucydides.
In early spring of the following summer, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, accompanied by representatives from Egesta carrying sixty talents of uncoined silver—intended as one month's wages for sixty ships they hoped to request. The Athenians convened an assembly where they heard from both the Egestaeans and their own envoys a report that was as appealing as it was false, particularly regarding the supposedly abundant funds in the temples and treasury. The assembly voted to dispatch sixty ships to Sicily under the supreme command of Alcibiades son of Clinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes, granting them full authority. Their mission was to support the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, restore Leontini if the war progressed favorably, and manage all other Sicilian affairs as they deemed most advantageous to Athens. Five days later, a second assembly convened to determine the most efficient methods for outfitting the fleet and to approve any additional resources the generals might require for the expedition. Nicias, who had been appointed to command despite his reluctance and who believed the state was making an unwise decision—pursuing the conquest of all Sicily based on flimsy and attractive pretexts when such an undertaking was enormously ambitious—stepped forward hoping to dissuade the Athenians from this venture and offered the following advice:
Historical Context
This passage marks the crucial transition to the Sicilian Expedition (415-413 BCE), Athens' most ambitious and ultimately disastrous military venture. After years of uneasy peace following the Peace of Nicias (421 BCE), Athens is drawn into Sicilian affairs through an appeal from Egesta. The winter campaigns show continued low-level conflict in Greece, with Sparta supporting Argive exiles and Athens conducting operations in Macedonia. The arrival of Egestan envoys with payment for ships and false reports of wealth sets in motion the fateful decision to intervene in Sicily. The appointment of three generals with different perspectives—the ambitious Alcibiades, the reluctant Nicias, and the professional soldier Lamachus—creates a divided command that will prove problematic. Nicias' opposition to the expedition, despite being chosen to lead it, exemplifies the internal tensions within Athenian democracy.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Sicilian Expedition
The Sicilian Expedition (415-413 BCE) was Athens' attempt to conquer Sicily, particularly Syracuse. Motivated by imperial ambition and false reports of wealth, it ended in complete disaster with the loss of over 40,000 men and 200 ships, marking the beginning of Athens' decline.
Learn more →Athenian Democracy and Decision-Making
The passage illustrates how the Athenian assembly could be swayed by attractive but false reports. The democratic process, while allowing debate, could lead to rash decisions when influenced by emotion and misinformation rather than careful deliberation.
Learn more →Nicias
Nicias (c. 470-413 BCE) was a wealthy, conservative Athenian general who opposed aggressive expansion. His reluctance to lead the Sicilian expedition and attempts to dissuade the assembly demonstrate the tensions between personal conviction and public duty in democratic Athens.
Learn more →Greek Mercenary Payments
The sixty talents of uncoined silver represents substantial wealth—one talent could pay a trireme crew for a month. This prepayment system was common in Greek warfare, where cities hired naval forces from more powerful states.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (12-14)
Plutarch provides biographical context for Nicias' opposition to the expedition, emphasizing his piety and caution. He describes Nicias as trying to discourage the expedition by exaggerating its difficulties.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Alcibiades (17-18)
Offers Alcibiades' perspective on the expedition, portraying him as the chief advocate who inflamed Athenian ambitions with promises of conquering not just Sicily but Carthage and Africa.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.83-84)
Provides additional details about the Egestan deception, describing how they tricked Athenian envoys by moving the same treasure between temples and hosting lavish banquets with borrowed gold and silver.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the Athenian assembly's decision-making process, as shown here, reveal both the strengths and weaknesses of democratic governance?
- What role does accurate intelligence play in strategic decision-making, and how did the false Egestan reports influence Athens' fate?
- Why might Nicias have been appointed to lead an expedition he opposed, and what does this suggest about political dynamics in Athens?
- How do the minor conflicts described in the first paragraph (Argos, Macedonia) relate to Athens' decision to undertake a major expedition to Sicily?