Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 347 of 506 Book 6, Chapter 18 November 6, 2026
69% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage occurs during the Athenian assembly's debate about the Sicilian Expedition in 415 BCE.

Crawley Translation (1910)

Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them of their oaths and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became more eager for the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that it would be now useless to try to deter them by the old line of argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance of his estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows:

“I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition, and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to give you my opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear we are going against cities that are great and not subject to one another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept our rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they are very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect to join us from their connection with Leontini, there are seven others armed at all points just like our own power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition. These are full of heavy infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in abundance and crowds to man them; they have also money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some of the barbarians as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in the number of their horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead of importing it.

“Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry; especially if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to defend ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have to retire under compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements, owing to want of reflection at first: we must therefore start from home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far from our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may undertaken undertaken the quality of allies, among your subject states here in Hellas, where any additional supplies needed were easily drawn from the friendly territory; but we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land entirely strange, from which during four months in winter it is not even easy for a messenger get to Athens.

Modern Translation

These were the words of Alcibiades. After listening to him, along with the Egestaeans and certain Leontine exiles who stepped forward to remind the assembly of their sworn obligations and plead for military support, the Athenians grew even more enthusiastic about the expedition than they had been before. Nicias, recognizing that his previous arguments would no longer dissuade them, but hoping he might still change their minds by presenting an overwhelming estimate of what would be required, rose to speak a second time:

"I can see, fellow Athenians, that you are absolutely determined to proceed with this expedition. I therefore hope that everything will turn out as we desire, and I'll share my assessment of our current situation. Based on all the intelligence I've gathered, we're preparing to attack cities that are powerful and independent of one another—cities that don't suffer under oppression and therefore have no desire for regime change, nor would they eagerly trade harsh subjugation for easier terms. They're certainly not going to exchange their freedom for our rule. Looking just at the Greek settlements, there are many of them for a single island. Apart from Naxos and Catana, which I expect will side with us due to their ties with Leontini, there are seven other cities equipped with military capabilities matching our own—especially Selinus and Syracuse, our primary targets. These cities possess substantial forces of heavy infantry, archers, and javelin-throwers. They have numerous warships with plenty of crews to man them. They have wealth too—some held privately, some in the temples at Selinus, and Syracuse also receives tribute offerings from certain barbarian peoples. But their greatest advantage over us is their cavalry forces and their self-sufficiency in grain production, which means they don't rely on imports.

"Facing such formidable opposition, a modest naval force won't suffice. We'll need a substantial land army to accompany our fleet if we hope to achieve anything worthy of our aspirations and avoid being confined to the coast by their superior cavalry—particularly if these cities become alarmed and form an alliance, leaving us isolated without allies (except the Egestaeans) who can provide cavalry for our defense. It would be humiliating to be forced into retreat or to have to request reinforcements because we failed to plan properly from the start. We must therefore depart from Athens with an adequate force, understanding that we're sailing far from home on an expedition unlike any you might undertake as hegemon among your subject allies here in Greece, where additional supplies can be easily obtained from friendly territory. Instead, we're severing ourselves from our base and venturing into completely foreign lands, where even sending a messenger back to Athens becomes impossible for four months during winter."

Historical Context

This passage occurs during the Athenian assembly's debate about the Sicilian Expedition in 415 BCE. Alcibiades has just delivered a persuasive speech advocating for the invasion, appealing to Athenian ambition and imperial glory. Nicias, the senior general who opposes the expedition, realizes his initial arguments against it have failed. He now attempts a different strategy: accepting the expedition as inevitable but dramatically inflating the resources required, hoping to discourage the Athenians through the sheer scale of the undertaking. This represents a pivotal moment in Athenian history, as the decision to invade Sicily would ultimately lead to catastrophic defeat and mark the beginning of Athens' decline. The debate showcases the dynamics of Athenian democracy and the power of rhetoric in shaping foreign policy decisions.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Sicilian Cities

The Greek cities in Sicily were wealthy and powerful, having developed independently from mainland Greece. Syracuse, founded by Corinth, was particularly formidable with its own naval power and democratic government. These cities maintained complex relationships with each other and the indigenous Sicilian peoples.

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Athenian Assembly

The ekklesia was Athens' primary democratic institution where citizens debated and voted on major decisions including war and peace. The assembly's susceptibility to persuasive rhetoric, as shown here, was both a strength and weakness of the democratic system.

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Ancient Naval Warfare

Naval power was crucial to Athens' empire, but Nicias emphasizes that Sicily would require significant land forces. This highlights the limitations of naval supremacy when facing enemies with strong cavalry and self-sufficient territories.

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Grain Supply in Antiquity

Nicias's mention of Syracuse's grain self-sufficiency was strategically significant. Athens relied heavily on imported grain, making it vulnerable to siege. Syracuse's agricultural independence would make it much harder to defeat through blockade.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Nicias (12-14)

Plutarch provides biographical context for Nicias's opposition to the expedition, describing his cautious nature and religious concerns. He portrays Nicias as attempting to dissuade the Athenians through exaggeration of difficulties.

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Plutarch: Life of Alcibiades (17-18)

Offers Alcibiades' perspective on the debate, emphasizing his personal ambitions and persuasive abilities. Shows how individual personalities shaped this crucial decision in Athenian history.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.83-84)

Provides an alternative account of the Sicilian debate with different emphasis on the arguments presented. Offers additional details about the Egestaean appeal for help.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does Nicias's rhetorical strategy of 'malicious compliance' reflect the dynamics of democratic decision-making? What are the risks of this approach?
  2. What role does geographic distance play in Nicias's argument? How does this relate to modern concerns about military overextension?
  3. How do the different motivations of Alcibiades (personal ambition) and the Egestaeans (seeking protection) complicate the Athenian decision-making process?
  4. What does this passage reveal about the relationship between rhetoric and policy in democratic Athens? Are modern democracies susceptible to similar dynamics?