Today's Passage
This passage describes the naval prelude to the Battle of Naupactus (429 BCE), a crucial engagement early in the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in the Crissaean Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and prevented the coast Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the interior, was disabled from doing so by being compelled about the same time as the battle at Stratus to fight with Phormio and the twenty Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. For they were watched, as they coasted along out of the gulf, by Phormio, who wished to attack in the open sea. But the Corinthians and allies had started for Acarnania without any idea of fighting at sea, and with vessels more like transports for carrying soldiers; besides which, they never dreamed of the twenty Athenian ships venturing to engage their forty-seven. However, while they were coasting along their own shore, there were the Athenians sailing along in line with them; and when they tried to cross over from Patrae in Achaea to the mainland on the other side, on their way to Acarnania, they saw them again coming out from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. They slipped from their moorings in the night, but were observed, and were at length compelled to fight in mid passage. Each state that contributed to the armament had its own general; the Corinthian commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ranged their vessels in as large a circle as possible without leaving an opening, with the prows outside and the sterns in; and placed within all the small craft in company, and their five best sailers to issue out at a moment’s notice and strengthen any point threatened by the enemy.
Modern Translation
During this time, the fleet from Corinth and its allies in the Crisaean Gulf, which was supposed to coordinate with Cnemus and prevent the coastal Acarnanians from joining their inland compatriots, found itself unable to fulfill this mission. Around the same time as the battle at Stratus, they were forced into a naval engagement with Phormio and his twenty Athenian ships based at Naupactus. Phormio had been tracking their movements as they sailed along the coast from the gulf, waiting for an opportunity to attack them in open water. The Corinthians and their allies had set out for Acarnania with no intention of naval combat, their vessels being configured more as troop transports than warships. Moreover, they never imagined that twenty Athenian ships would dare challenge their fleet of forty-seven vessels. Yet as they sailed along their own coastline, the Athenians shadowed them, maintaining formation alongside. When the Peloponnesians attempted to cross from Patrae in Achaea to the opposite mainland en route to Acarnania, they spotted the Athenians emerging from Chalcis and the Evenus river to intercept them. Though they tried to escape under cover of darkness by slipping their moorings, they were detected and ultimately forced to engage in battle while crossing the strait. Each allied state provided its own commander for the expedition; the Corinthian leadership consisted of Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians arranged their ships in the widest possible circle without creating gaps, positioning their prows outward and sterns inward. Inside this formation they placed all their smaller vessels and their five fastest ships, ready to rush out immediately to reinforce any position the enemy might threaten.
Historical Context
This passage describes the naval prelude to the Battle of Naupactus (429 BCE), a crucial engagement early in the Peloponnesian War. The Corinthian-led fleet, originally intended to support land operations in Acarnania, encounters Phormio's smaller but more experienced Athenian squadron. Despite their numerical superiority (47 ships to 20), the Peloponnesians adopt a defensive circular formation, revealing their lack of confidence in open naval combat. This encounter demonstrates Athens' naval dominance and the psychological advantage it conferred, as even a smaller Athenian force could intimidate a larger enemy fleet into defensive postures. The passage highlights the strategic importance of controlling sea routes and how Athens used its naval superiority to disrupt enemy operations far from home.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Ancient Naval Tactics
The circular formation (kyklos) described here was a defensive naval tactic used when outnumbered or facing superior seamanship. Ships would form a circle with rams facing outward, protecting their vulnerable sterns and creating a floating fortress that was difficult to penetrate.
Learn more →Phormio
Phormio was one of Athens' most successful naval commanders, known for his innovative tactics and ability to defeat larger enemy fleets. His victories at Naupactus demonstrated the superiority of Athenian naval training and the effectiveness of aggressive tactics against defensive formations.
Learn more →Naupactus
Naupactus (modern Nafpaktos) was a strategically vital port controlling the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf. Its possession by Athens allowed them to monitor and intercept Peloponnesian naval movements, making it a crucial base for projecting Athenian power in western Greece.
Learn more →Acarnania
Acarnania was a region in western Greece whose control was contested between Athens and the Peloponnesian League. Its strategic importance lay in its position along the western trade routes and its potential as a base for operations against either Athenian or Peloponnesian interests.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.48)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of Phormio's naval victories, emphasizing the Athenian commander's tactical brilliance and the psychological impact of Athens' naval reputation on their enemies.
Read passage →Plutarch: Moralia (803B-804B)
In his essay on the glory of Athens, Plutarch discusses Phormio's naval innovations and how Athenian naval supremacy was built on superior training and tactics rather than mere numbers.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.1.1-15)
Though describing later events, Xenophon's account of naval tactics and the importance of seamanship versus numbers provides context for understanding the dynamics of this earlier engagement.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does this passage illustrate the psychological dimension of military power? Consider why 47 ships would adopt a defensive formation against 20.
- What does the Peloponnesian choice of 'vessels more like transports' reveal about their strategic assumptions and the nature of surprise in warfare?
- How does Thucydides' description of the circular formation reflect broader themes about innovation versus tradition in military affairs?
- What role does geographic knowledge play in this encounter? Consider Phormio's use of local waters and the Peloponnesians' attempted night escape.