Today's Passage
This passage describes the Battle of Rhium (429 BCE), a crucial naval engagement early in the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and forced them to contract their circle, by continually brushing past and making as though they would attack at once, having been previously cautioned by Phormio not to do so till he gave the signal. His hope was that the Peloponnesians would not retain their order like a force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of one another and the small craft cause confusion; and if the wind should blow from the gulf (in expectation of which he kept sailing round them, and which usually rose towards morning), they would not, he felt sure, remain steady an instant. He also thought that it rested with him to attack when he pleased, as his ships were better sailers, and that an attack timed by the coming of the wind would tell best. When the wind came down, the enemy’s ships were now in a narrow space, and what with the wind and the small craft dashing against them, at once fell into confusion: ship fell foul of ship, while the crews were pushing them off with poles, and by their shouting, swearing, and struggling with one another, made captains’ orders and boatswains’ cries alike inaudible, and through being unable for want of practice to clear their oars in the rough water, prevented the vessels from obeying their helmsmen properly. At this moment Phormio gave the signal, and the Athenians attacked. Sinking first one of the admirals, they then disabled all they came across, so that no one thought of resistance for the confusion, but fled for Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. The Athenians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and taking most of the men out of them sailed to Molycrium, and after setting up a trophy on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to Poseidon, returned to Naupactus. As for the Peloponnesians, they at once sailed with their remaining ships along the coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the Eleian arsenal; where Cnemus, and the ships from Leucas that were to have joined them, also arrived after the battle at Stratus.
Modern Translation
The Athenians, arranged in battle formation, sailed in circles around their enemies, forcing them to draw their formation ever tighter. They repeatedly swept past, feigning immediate attack, but had been strictly ordered by Phormio to hold back until he gave the command. His strategy relied on the expectation that the Peloponnesians could not maintain their formation as effectively at sea as they might on land—their ships would inevitably collide with one another, while the smaller vessels would create chaos. Moreover, if the wind rose from the gulf (as it typically did toward dawn, and for which he had positioned them), he was certain they could not hold steady for even a moment. He was also confident that the timing of attack remained entirely in his control, given his ships' superior maneuverability, and that an assault coordinated with the wind's arrival would prove most effective. When the wind finally came, the enemy fleet found itself compressed into a confined space. Between the wind's force and the smaller boats crashing into them, chaos erupted immediately: ships collided with one another while crews frantically tried to push them apart with poles. The shouting, cursing, and general pandemonium drowned out both the captains' commands and the boatswains' calls. Their inexperience showed as they struggled to manage their oars in the choppy waters, leaving the vessels unable to respond properly to their helmsmen. At this crucial moment, Phormio signaled the attack. The Athenians struck, first sinking one of the enemy flagships, then systematically disabling every vessel they encountered. The Peloponnesians, overwhelmed by confusion, abandoned any thought of resistance and fled toward Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. The Athenians pursued, capturing twelve ships and taking most of their crews prisoner before sailing to Molycrium. After erecting a trophy on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a captured ship to Poseidon, they returned to Naupactus. The surviving Peloponnesian ships immediately sailed along the coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the Eleian naval base, where Cnemus and the fleet from Leucas—which should have reinforced them—arrived only after the defeat at Stratus.
Historical Context
This passage describes the Battle of Rhium (429 BCE), a crucial naval engagement early in the Peloponnesian War. The Athenian admiral Phormio, commanding a smaller but more experienced fleet, faces a larger Peloponnesian force in the Gulf of Corinth. Using superior seamanship and tactical innovation, Phormio exploits his enemies' inexperience at sea and their inability to maintain formation in rough conditions. The victory demonstrated Athens' naval supremacy and secured their control of the vital sea route to the west. This battle exemplifies the asymmetric nature of the conflict: Athens' maritime expertise against Sparta's land-based power. The defeat forced the Peloponnesians to reconsider their naval strategy and highlighted the importance of experience and training in ancient naval warfare.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Ancient Naval Tactics
The periplous (sailing around) maneuver described here was a classic Athenian tactic that exploited their superior seamanship. By forcing enemies into a defensive circle (kyklos), skilled crews could create chaos and pick off individual ships. This required exceptional coordination and rowing skill that the Peloponnesians lacked.
Learn more →Phormio
One of Athens' most brilliant naval commanders, Phormio specialized in exploiting Athenian naval superiority through innovative tactics. His victories at Rhium and Naupactus with inferior numbers became legendary examples of skill triumphing over strength in ancient warfare.
Learn more →Trireme Warfare
Ancient Greek warships required enormous coordination among 170 rowers. Inexperienced crews, like the Peloponnesians here, struggled with basic maneuvers in rough conditions. The inability to 'clear their oars' meant rowers couldn't achieve the synchronized strokes necessary for effective movement.
Learn more →Religious Dedication
The dedication of a captured ship to Poseidon and erection of a trophy (tropaion) were standard Greek victory rituals. These acts acknowledged divine favor and marked the spot where the enemy 'turned' (tropē) in flight, serving both religious and propagandistic purposes.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.48)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of Phormio's naval victories, emphasizing the Athenian commander's tactical brilliance and the Peloponnesian inexperience at sea, though with less tactical detail than Thucydides.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (36)
While not describing this specific battle, Plutarch discusses Athenian naval supremacy under Pericles and the strategic importance of controlling the Gulf of Corinth, providing context for Phormio's operations.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.1-2)
Xenophon's later naval battles show how both sides learned from early engagements like Rhium, with Spartans eventually developing competent naval forces through Persian funding and practice.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Phormio's use of environmental factors (wind, confined space) reflect broader themes about the relationship between human planning and natural forces in Thucydides?
- What does this passage reveal about the importance of experience and training versus numerical superiority in ancient warfare?
- How does Thucydides' detailed tactical description serve his larger historiographical purposes? What might this tell us about his intended audience?
- Compare the role of psychological factors (confusion, panic) in this naval battle with land battles described by Thucydides. What patterns emerge?