Today's Passage
This passage describes two simultaneous military operations during the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War (428 BCE).
Crawley Translation (1910)
While these envoys, reaching Lacedaemon after a difficult journey across the open sea, were negotiating for succours being sent them, the ambassadors from Athens returned without having effected anything; and hostilities were at once begun by the Mitylenians and the rest of Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnians, who came to the aid of the Athenians with the Imbrians and Lemnians and some few of the other allies. The Mitylenians made a sortie with all their forces against the Athenian camp; and a battle ensued, in which they gained some slight advantage, but retired notwithstanding, not feeling sufficient confidence in themselves to spend the night upon the field. After this they kept quiet, wishing to wait for the chance of reinforcements arriving from Peloponnese before making a second venture, being encouraged by the arrival of Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermaeondas, a Theban, who had been sent off before the insurrection but had been unable to reach Lesbos before the Athenian expedition, and who now stole in in a galley after the battle, and advised them to send another galley and envoys back with them, which the Mitylenians accordingly did.
Meanwhile the Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inaction of the Mitylenians, summoned allies to their aid, who came in all the quicker from seeing so little vigour displayed by the Lesbians, and bringing round their ships to a new station to the south of the town, fortified two camps, one on each side of the city, and instituted a blockade of both the harbours. The sea was thus closed against the Mitylenians, who, however, commanded the whole country, with the rest of the Lesbians who had now joined them; the Athenians only holding a limited area round their camps, and using Malea more as the station for their ships and their market.
While the war went on in this way at Mitylene, the Athenians, about the same time in this summer, also sent thirty ships to Peloponnese under Asopius, son of Phormio; the Acarnanians insisting that the commander sent should be some son or relative of Phormio. As the ships coasted along shore they ravaged the seaboard of Laconia; after which Asopius sent most of the fleet home, and himself went on with twelve vessels to Naupactus, and afterwards raising the whole Acarnanian population made an expedition against Oeniadae, the fleet sailing along the Achelous, while the army laid waste the country. The inhabitants, however, showing no signs of submitting, he dismissed the land forces and himself sailed to Leucas, and making a descent upon Nericus was cut off during his retreat, and most of his troops with him, by the people in those parts aided by some coastguards; after which the Athenians sailed away, recovering their dead from the Leucadians under truce.
Modern Translation
After a perilous voyage across the open sea, the envoys finally reached Sparta to negotiate for military assistance. Meanwhile, the Athenian ambassadors returned home empty-handed, and hostilities immediately commenced between the Mitylenians and the rest of Lesbos—except for the Methymnians, who sided with Athens alongside the Imbrians, Lemnians, and a handful of other allies. The Mitylenians launched an all-out assault on the Athenian camp. In the ensuing battle, they secured a minor tactical advantage but withdrew nonetheless, lacking the confidence to maintain their position overnight. Subsequently, they adopted a defensive stance, preferring to await potential reinforcements from the Peloponnese before attempting another offensive. Their hopes were bolstered by the arrival of Meleas, a Spartan, and Hermaeondas, a Theban, who had been dispatched before the revolt began but failed to reach Lesbos before the Athenian expedition arrived. These men now slipped through in a trireme following the battle and counseled the Mitylenians to send another ship and envoys back with them—advice the Mitylenians promptly followed.
Meanwhile, the Athenians, emboldened by Mitylenian passivity, called upon their allies for support. These reinforcements arrived swiftly, encouraged by the Lesbians' apparent lack of resolve. The Athenians repositioned their fleet to the south of the city, established two fortified camps on opposite sides, and implemented a naval blockade of both harbors. While they controlled the sea approaches to Mitylene, the Mitylenians—now joined by the other Lesbians—commanded the countryside. The Athenians controlled only a small perimeter around their camps, using Malea primarily as a naval base and supply depot.
While the siege of Mitylene continued, the Athenians simultaneously dispatched thirty ships to the Peloponnese under Asopius, son of Phormio—the Acarnanians had specifically requested a commander from Phormio's family. As the fleet sailed along the coast, they plundered the Laconian shoreline. Asopius then sent most ships home while he proceeded with twelve vessels to Naupactus. After mobilizing the entire Acarnanian army, he launched a campaign against Oeniadae, with the fleet navigating the Achelous while ground forces devastated the countryside. When the inhabitants refused to surrender, he dismissed the army and sailed to Leucas. During an attack on Nericus, however, Asopius was killed while retreating, along with most of his men, by local forces supported by coastal guards. The surviving Athenians departed after recovering their dead under a truce with the Leucadians.
Historical Context
This passage describes two simultaneous military operations during the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War (428 BCE). The primary focus is the Mytilenean revolt on Lesbos, where Athens faces its first major allied defection. Mitylene, seeking Spartan support, attempts to break free from Athenian control but lacks the military strength for decisive action. The Athenians establish a blockade, controlling the sea while the rebels hold the countryside. Concurrently, Athens conducts raids in the Peloponnese under Asopius, son of the famous admiral Phormio. This expedition ends disastrously with Asopius's death at Leucas. These events illustrate Athens's imperial challenges: maintaining control over rebellious allies while simultaneously projecting power against Spartan territory. The Mytilenean revolt represents a critical test of Athenian imperial stability during wartime.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Mytilenean Revolt
The revolt of Mitylene (428-427 BCE) was the first major defection of an Athenian ally during the Peloponnesian War. As a ship-contributing ally rather than a tribute-paying subject, Mitylene's rebellion threatened the foundations of Athenian naval supremacy and imperial control.
Learn more →Ancient Greek Naval Warfare
The blockade of Mitylene demonstrates typical Greek naval tactics: controlling harbors to isolate cities from maritime supply lines. The Athenians' establishment of two camps and control of both harbors shows their systematic approach to siege warfare combining land and naval forces.
Learn more →Phormio and His Legacy
Phormio was Athens's most successful naval commander in the early war years. The Acarnanians' insistence on having his son command their joint expedition reflects both Phormio's reputation and the importance of personal relationships in Greek interstate politics.
Learn more →Spartan Foreign Policy
The presence of Spartan and Theban advisors in Mitylene illustrates Sparta's strategy of encouraging revolts within the Athenian empire. This indirect approach aimed to weaken Athens without committing major Spartan forces to overseas operations.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.55)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the Mytilenean revolt, offering additional details about the negotiations between Mitylene and Sparta, though his chronology sometimes differs from Thucydides.
Read passage →Aristotle: Politics (Book 5.1304a)
Aristotle briefly mentions the Mytilenean revolt as an example of how inequality among oligarchs can lead to revolution, providing insight into the internal politics behind the rebellion.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.1.14)
While describing later events, Xenophon references the strategic importance of Lesbos and Mitylene to Athenian naval power, helping explain why Athens reacted so strongly to this revolt.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- What does the Mytilenians' hesitation after their tactical victory reveal about the psychology of rebellion against a dominant power?
- How does Thucydides contrast Athenian energy with Mytilenean indecision, and what might this suggest about his views on imperial power?
- Why might the Acarnanians have insisted on having a relative of Phormio command their joint expedition? What does this tell us about leadership in the ancient world?
- Compare the two Athenian operations described here: what do they reveal about Athens's strategic priorities and capabilities in 428 BCE?