Today's Passage
This passage comes from the Mytilenean debate at Sparta in 428 BCE.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith in their not attempting any change; but the greater number being their subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would naturally chafe under this solitary instance of independence as contrasted with the submission of the majority; particularly as they daily grew more powerful, and we more destitute. Now the only sure basis of an alliance is for each party to be equally afraid of the other; he who would like to encroach is then deterred by the reflection that he will not have odds in his favour. Again, if we were left independent, it was only because they thought they saw their way to empire more clearly by specious language and by the paths of policy than by those of force. Not only were we useful as evidence that powers who had votes, like themselves, would not, surely, join them in their expeditions, against their will, without the party attacked being in the wrong; but the same system also enabled them to lead the stronger states against the weaker first, and so to leave the former to the last, stripped of their natural allies, and less capable of resistance. But if they had begun with us, while all the states still had their resources under their own control, and there was a centre to rally round, the work of subjugation would have been found less easy. Besides this, our navy gave them some apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or with some other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The court which we paid to their commons and its leaders for the time being also helped us to maintain our independence. However, we did not expect to be able to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out, from the examples that we had had of their conduct to the rest.
“How then could we put our trust in such friendship or freedom as we had here? We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made them court us in war, and us them in peace; sympathy, the ordinary basis of confidence, had its place supplied by terror, fear having more share than friendship in detaining us in the alliance; and the first party that should be encouraged by the hope of impunity was certain to break faith with the other. So that to condemn us for being the first to break off, because they delay the blow that we dread, instead of ourselves delaying to know for certain whether it will be dealt or not, is to take a false view of the case. For if we were equally able with them to meet their plots and imitate their delay, we should be their equals and should be under no necessity of being their subjects; but the liberty of offence being always theirs, that of defence ought clearly to be ours.
Modern Translation
If we had all remained independent states, we could have placed greater trust in Athens not attempting to alter the existing order. But with most states now subject to Athens while they continued to treat us as equals, they naturally resented this lone example of independence standing in contrast to the submission of the majority—especially as their power grew daily while ours diminished. The only reliable foundation for an alliance is mutual fear between partners; when one side wishes to encroach, they are deterred by knowing they lack the advantage. We were left independent only because Athens believed they could achieve empire more effectively through persuasive rhetoric and political maneuvering than through naked force. We served as useful evidence that states with voting rights, like Athens itself, would not willingly join their expeditions unless the attacked party was genuinely at fault. This system also allowed them to lead stronger states against weaker ones first, leaving the powerful states isolated until last, stripped of their natural allies and less able to resist. Had they begun with us while all states still controlled their own resources and could rally together, subjugation would have proven far more difficult. Additionally, our navy caused them concern—there was always the possibility it might ally with you Spartans or another power and threaten Athens. Our careful cultivation of their democratic assembly and current leaders also helped preserve our independence. Yet we knew this could not last much longer without this war, given their treatment of other states.
How could we trust such friendship or freedom? We accepted each other reluctantly; fear drove them to court us during war, as it drove us to court them in peace. Where sympathy normally builds confidence, terror took its place—fear more than friendship kept us allied, and whichever side first saw an opportunity for safe betrayal would surely take it. To condemn us for breaking away first—because Athens delays the blow we fear while we refuse to wait passively for its certain arrival—misunderstands the situation entirely. If we possessed equal power to counter their schemes and match their delays, we would be their equals, not their subjects. But since they always hold the initiative for offense, we must clearly retain the right of defense.
Historical Context
This passage comes from the Mytilenean debate at Sparta in 428 BCE. Mytilene, a powerful city on the island of Lesbos and one of Athens' last autonomous allies, has revolted from the Athenian Empire and sent envoys to Sparta seeking military support. The speaker argues that Mytilene's revolt was justified, explaining how Athens had systematically subjugated its allies while maintaining a facade of alliance. The envoy reveals the calculated nature of Athenian imperialism and the precarious position of the few remaining independent states. This speech is crucial for understanding how Athens' allies perceived their relationship with the imperial power and illustrates the transformation of the Delian League from voluntary alliance to coercive empire.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Imperialism
Athens transformed the Delian League from a defensive alliance against Persia into an empire. By 428 BCE, most members had become tribute-paying subjects rather than autonomous allies. This systematic subjugation followed a pattern of isolating and conquering states individually.
Learn more →Balance of Power Theory
The speaker articulates an early version of balance of power theory, arguing that alliances work only when partners fear each other equally. This mutual deterrence prevents aggression, while power imbalances invite exploitation.
Learn more →Naval Power in Ancient Greece
Mytilene's navy was significant enough to concern Athens. Naval power was crucial in the Greek world, especially for island states. Control of the sea meant control of trade routes and the ability to project power across the Aegean.
Learn more →Democratic Decision-Making
The reference to courting 'their commons and its leaders' reveals how foreign states tried to influence Athenian policy through the democratic assembly. This shows the intersection of domestic politics and foreign relations in democratic Athens.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Aristotle: Constitution of Athens (Chapter 24)
Aristotle describes how Athens used its naval supremacy to control allies and extract tribute, corroborating the Mytilenean account of Athenian imperial methods.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (Chapter 12)
Plutarch discusses how Pericles justified using allied tribute for Athenian building projects, showing the economic exploitation that the Mytileneans feared.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 2.2.3)
Xenophon describes the harsh terms Athens imposed on rebellious allies, illustrating why states like Mytilene feared losing their independence.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the Mytilenean speaker's analysis of power dynamics in alliances relate to modern international relations theory?
- Is preemptive action justified when a state fears future aggression, or should one wait for concrete evidence of hostile intent?
- What role does rhetoric play in maintaining imperial control, according to this passage? How does this compare to modern examples?
- The speaker argues that fear, not friendship, maintained their alliance with Athens. Can sustainable alliances be built on fear alone?