Today's Passage
This passage describes two separate military campaigns during the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
His preparations completed, Eurylochus lodged the hostages in Kytinium, in Doris, and advanced upon Naupactus through the country of the Locrians, taking upon his way Oeneon and Eupalium, two of their towns that refused to join him. Arrived in the Naupactian territory, and having been now joined by the Aetolians, the army laid waste the land and took the suburb of the town, which was unfortified; and after this Molycrium also, a Corinthian colony subject to Athens. Meanwhile the Athenian Demosthenes, who since the affair in Aetolia had remained near Naupactus, having had notice of the army and fearing for the town, went and persuaded the Acarnanians, although not without difficulty because of his departure from Leucas, to go to the relief of Naupactus. They accordingly sent with him on board his ships a thousand heavy infantry, who threw themselves into the place and saved it; the extent of its wall and the small number of its defenders otherwise placing it in the greatest danger. Meanwhile Eurylochus and his companions, finding that this force had entered and that it was impossible to storm the town, withdrew, not to Peloponnese, but to the country once called Aeolis, and now Calydon and Pleuron, and to the places in that neighbourhood, and Proschium in Aetolia; the Ambraciots having come and urged them to combine with them in attacking Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia and Acarnania; affirming that the conquest of these countries would bring all the continent into alliance with Lacedaemon. To this Eurylochus consented, and dismissing the Aetolians, now remained quiet with his army in those parts, until the time should come for the Ambraciots to take the field, and for him to join them before Argos.
Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the Athenians in Sicily with their Hellenic allies, and such of the Sicel subjects or allies of Syracuse as had revolted from her and joined their army, marched against the Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held by the Syracusans, and after attacking it without being able to take it, retired. In the retreat, the allies retreating after the Athenians were attacked by the Syracusans from the fort, and a large part of their army routed with great slaughter. After this, Laches and the Athenians from the ships made some descents in Locris, and defeating the Locrians, who came against them with Proxenus, son of Capaton, upon the river Caicinus, took some arms and departed.
Modern Translation
Having completed his preparations, Eurylochus deposited the hostages at Cytinium in Doris and advanced toward Naupactus, marching through Locrian territory. On his route, he captured Oeneon and Eupalium, two Locrian cities that had refused to ally with him. Upon reaching Naupactian territory, now reinforced by the Aetolians, his forces ravaged the countryside and seized the unfortified suburbs of the city. They also captured Molycrium, a Corinthian colony under Athenian control. Meanwhile, the Athenian general Demosthenes, who had remained near Naupactus since the Aetolian disaster, received intelligence about the approaching army. Fearing for the city's safety, he persuaded the Acarnanians—though with considerable difficulty due to his earlier abandonment of Leucas—to send reinforcements to Naupactus. They dispatched a thousand heavy infantry aboard his ships, who successfully entered the city and secured its defense; otherwise, given its extensive walls and insufficient garrison, the city would have faced certain capture. When Eurylochus and his forces realized that these reinforcements had arrived and that storming the city was now impossible, they withdrew—not toward the Peloponnese, but to the region formerly known as Aeolis, now called Calydon and Pleuron, along with neighboring areas and Proschium in Aetolia. The Ambraciots had approached them, proposing a joint assault on Amphilochian Argos and the remainder of Amphilochia and Acarnania, claiming that conquering these territories would bring the entire mainland under Spartan influence. Eurylochus agreed to this plan and, after dismissing the Aetolians, kept his army inactive in the region, waiting for the moment when the Ambraciots would mobilize and he could join them before Argos.
With summer's end came winter. In Sicily, the Athenians and their Greek allies, together with those Sicel subjects and former allies of Syracuse who had defected to join them, launched an attack on the Sicel town of Inessa, whose citadel was occupied by Syracusan forces. Unable to capture it, they retreated. During the withdrawal, as the allied forces followed behind the Athenians, the Syracusans sallied forth from their stronghold and struck the allies, routing a substantial portion of their army and inflicting heavy casualties. Subsequently, Laches and the Athenian naval forces conducted several raids on Locrian territory. When the Locrians, led by Proxenus son of Capaton, engaged them near the river Caecinus, the Athenians defeated them, captured some weapons, and withdrew.
Historical Context
This passage describes two separate military campaigns during the Peloponnesian War. The first involves Eurylochus, a Spartan commander, leading a coalition force against Naupactus, an important Athenian naval base on the northern shore of the Corinthian Gulf. His campaign represents Sparta's attempt to expand influence in northwestern Greece and threaten Athens' western allies. Demosthenes, recently defeated in Aetolia, manages to save Naupactus by securing Acarnanian reinforcements despite their anger over his earlier actions. The second campaign occurs in Sicily, where Athens is attempting to expand its influence. The failed assault on Inessa and subsequent Syracusan counterattack demonstrate the difficulties Athens faced in its Sicilian ventures, foreshadowing the later catastrophic Sicilian Expedition. Both campaigns illustrate the war's geographic scope and the importance of local alliances in determining success or failure.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Naupactus Strategic Importance
Naupactus controlled the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf and served as Athens' crucial western naval base. Its position allowed Athens to monitor Corinthian naval movements and support operations in northwestern Greece. The city also provided refuge for Messenian exiles who served as valuable allies.
Learn more →Demosthenes' Aetolian Campaign
Demosthenes had recently suffered a devastating defeat in Aetolia (426 BCE) when his hoplites were overwhelmed by light-armed Aetolian troops in mountainous terrain. This disaster forced him to remain near Naupactus rather than return to Athens, where he faced potential prosecution for the failed campaign.
Learn more →Sicilian Theater of War
The Sicilian campaigns represented Athens' attempt to expand westward and cut off Peloponnesian grain supplies. These early operations under Laches (427-425 BCE) achieved limited success but established Athenian presence in Sicily, setting the stage for the later, disastrous Sicilian Expedition of 415-413 BCE.
Learn more →Greek Coalition Warfare
This passage illustrates the complex alliance systems of the Peloponnesian War. Success depended on securing local allies who provided troops, supplies, and regional knowledge. Both Athens and Sparta competed for the allegiance of smaller states, making diplomacy as important as military might.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.60)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the campaigns in northwestern Greece during this period, offering additional details about the Aetolian involvement and the strategic importance of controlling the region around the Corinthian Gulf.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 3)
While focusing on a later period, Plutarch discusses Athenian strategic thinking regarding Sicily and the western expansion that began with these early campaigns under Laches, providing context for understanding Athens' long-term ambitions.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.1.1-10)
Though describing later events, Xenophon's account demonstrates the continuing strategic importance of Naupactus and the northwestern Greek regions in conflicts between Athens and Sparta, showing the lasting impact of these campaigns.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Demosthenes' ability to secure Acarnanian support despite his previous failure demonstrate the pragmatic nature of Greek interstate relations?
- What does Eurylochus' campaign route and strategic decisions reveal about the limitations of Spartan power projection outside the Peloponnese?
- How do the simultaneous campaigns in northwestern Greece and Sicily illustrate the expanding geographic scope of the Peloponnesian War?
- What role did local knowledge and allied support play in determining the success or failure of military operations, as seen in both campaigns described?