Today's Passage
This passage describes the Battle of Olpae (426 BCE), a significant engagement during the Peloponnesian War's northwestern campaigns.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Uniting here at daybreak, they sat down at the place called Metropolis, and encamped. Not long afterwards the Athenians in the twenty ships came into the Ambracian Gulf to support the Argives, with Demosthenes and two hundred Messenian heavy infantry, and sixty Athenian archers. While the fleet off Olpae blockaded the hill from the sea, the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians, most of whom were kept back by force by the Ambraciots, had already arrived at Argos, and were preparing to give battle to the enemy, having chosen Demosthenes to command the whole of the allied army in concert with their own generals. Demosthenes led them near to Olpae and encamped, a great ravine separating the two armies. During five days they remained inactive; on the sixth both sides formed in order of battle. The army of the Peloponnesians was the largest and outflanked their opponents; and Demosthenes fearing that his right might be surrounded, placed in ambush in a hollow way overgrown with bushes some four hundred heavy infantry and light troops, who were to rise up at the moment of the onset behind the projecting left wing of the enemy, and to take them in the rear. When both sides were ready they joined battle; Demosthenes being on the right wing with the Messenians and a few Athenians, while the rest of the line was made up of the different divisions of the Acarnanians, and of the Amphilochian carters. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up pell-mell together, with the exception of the Mantineans, who were massed on the left, without however reaching to the extremity of the wing, where Eurylochus and his men confronted the Messenians and Demosthenes.
The Peloponnesians were now well engaged and with their outflanking wing were upon the point of turning their enemy’s right; when the Acarnanians from the ambuscade set upon them from behind, and broke them at the first attack, without their staying to resist; while the panic into which they fell caused the flight of most of their army, terrified beyond measure at seeing the division of Eurylochus and their best troops cut to pieces. Most of the work was done by Demosthenes and his Messenians, who were posted in this part of the field. Meanwhile the Ambraciots (who are the best soldiers in those countries) and the troops upon the right wing, defeated the division opposed to them and pursued it to Argos. Returning from the pursuit, they found their main body defeated; and hard pressed by the Acarnanians, with difficulty made good their passage to Olpae, suffering heavy loss on the way, as they dashed on without discipline or order, the Mantineans excepted, who kept their ranks best of any in the army during the retreat.
Modern Translation
Meeting at dawn, they established their position at a place called Metropolis and set up camp. Shortly afterward, the Athenian fleet of twenty ships arrived in the Ambracian Gulf to reinforce the Argives, bringing with them Demosthenes, two hundred Messenian heavy infantry, and sixty Athenian archers. While the naval forces maintained a blockade of the hill at Olpae from the sea, the Acarnanians and some Amphilochians had already reached Argos—though most of the latter were forcibly prevented from joining by the Ambraciots. They were now preparing for battle against the enemy, having selected Demosthenes to serve as supreme commander of the allied forces alongside their own generals. Demosthenes led the army close to Olpae and established camp, with a deep ravine dividing the opposing forces. For five days, neither side made a move; on the sixth day, both armies deployed for battle. The Peloponnesian force was larger and extended beyond their opponents' flanks. Concerned that his right wing might be encircled, Demosthenes concealed approximately four hundred heavy infantry and light troops in a sunken path thick with vegetation, positioning them to emerge behind the enemy's projecting left wing at the moment of engagement and attack from the rear. When both armies were prepared, they engaged. Demosthenes commanded the right wing with the Messenians and a small contingent of Athenians, while various Acarnanian divisions and Amphilochian javelin-throwers formed the remainder of the line. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were arranged without clear organization, except for the Mantineans, who were concentrated on the left, though not at the wing's extreme end, where Eurylochus and his forces faced the Messenians and Demosthenes. The Peloponnesians had advanced deeply into combat and were about to turn the enemy's right flank when the concealed Acarnanians attacked from behind, routing them immediately without resistance. The resulting panic spread throughout most of their army, who were utterly terrified to witness the destruction of Eurylochus's division—their finest troops. Demosthenes and his Messenians, positioned in this sector, accomplished most of the decisive action. Meanwhile, the Ambraciots (renowned as the region's finest soldiers) and the forces on the right wing defeated their opposing division and pursued them to Argos. Upon returning from their pursuit, they discovered their main force had been defeated. Under severe pressure from the Acarnanians, they struggled to reach Olpae, sustaining heavy casualties during their retreat as they fled in complete disorder—all except the Mantineans, who maintained the best formation of any unit throughout the withdrawal.
Historical Context
This passage describes the Battle of Olpae (426 BCE), a significant engagement during the Peloponnesian War's northwestern campaigns. The Athenian general Demosthenes, fresh from his innovative victories using light troops in Aetolia, commands a coalition of Acarnanians and Amphilochians against Peloponnesian forces led by Eurylochus. The battle showcases Demosthenes' tactical brilliance through his use of ambush tactics—a departure from traditional hoplite warfare. His concealment of troops in rough terrain to attack the enemy's flank represents the evolving nature of Greek warfare. The defeat severely weakened Spartan influence in northwestern Greece and demonstrated Athens' ability to project power effectively through allies and innovative tactics, even in peripheral theaters of the war.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Demosthenes' Military Innovations
Demosthenes pioneered the use of light-armed troops and ambush tactics in Greek warfare, moving beyond traditional hoplite phalanx battles. His experiences in rough terrain taught him to exploit topography and use peltasts (light infantry) effectively against heavy infantry, revolutionizing Greek military tactics.
Learn more →Acarnania in the Peloponnesian War
Acarnania was a crucial Athenian ally in northwestern Greece, providing strategic depth against Corinthian and Peloponnesian expansion. The region's loyalty to Athens and its skilled light troops made it valuable for controlling the Ionian Sea routes and threatening Peloponnesian allies.
Learn more →Messenian Exiles
The Messenians mentioned were likely exiles from Messenia, enslaved by Sparta as helots. Many escaped Messenians served Athens enthusiastically, motivated by hatred of Sparta. Their presence at Naupactus made them valuable allies in western operations.
Learn more →Greek Ambush Warfare
While ambushes were considered somewhat dishonorable in Greek warfare, which traditionally favored open hoplite battles, practical commanders increasingly used them. Demosthenes' success legitimized these tactics, especially when fighting in difficult terrain unsuited to phalanx warfare.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.60)
Diodorus provides a condensed account of Demosthenes' northwestern campaigns, including the battle at Olpae, though with less tactical detail than Thucydides.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.2.18)
Xenophon describes similar ambush tactics used later in the war, showing how Demosthenes' innovations influenced subsequent Greek warfare, particularly in rough terrain.
Read passage →Polyaenus: Stratagems (3.1.3)
Polyaenus catalogs Demosthenes' tactical innovations, including his use of ambushes and light troops, presenting him as a master of unconventional warfare.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Demosthenes' use of ambush tactics challenge traditional Greek notions of honorable warfare? What does this suggest about the evolution of military ethics during prolonged conflict?
- Why might Thucydides emphasize that the Mantineans alone maintained discipline during the retreat? What does this tell us about the importance of training and morale in ancient warfare?
- How does the geographic setting (ravines, hollows, bushes) function as a 'character' in this battle narrative? What does this suggest about the relationship between landscape and strategy?
- What role does panic play in the battle's outcome? How does Thucydides' description of psychological factors complement his tactical analysis?