Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 200 of 506 Book 3, Chapter 11 June 12, 2026
40% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage describes the aftermath of the Battle of Olpae (426 BCE) during the Peloponnesian War.

Crawley Translation (1910)

The battle did not end until the evening. The next day Menedaius, who on the death of Eurylochus and Macarius had succeeded to the sole command, being at a loss after so signal a defeat how to stay and sustain a siege, cut off as he was by land and by the Athenian fleet by sea, and equally so how to retreat in safety, opened a parley with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals for a truce and permission to retreat, and at the same time for the recovery of the dead. The dead they gave back to him, and setting up a trophy took up their own also to the number of about three hundred. The retreat demanded they refused publicly to the army; but permission to depart without delay was secretly granted to the Mantineans and to Menedaius and the other commanders and principal men of the Peloponnesians by Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues; who desired to strip the Ambraciots and the mercenary host of foreigners of their supporters; and, above all, to discredit the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians with the Hellenes in those parts, as traitors and self-seekers.

While the enemy was taking up his dead and hastily burying them as he could, and those who obtained permission were secretly planning their retreat, word was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the Ambraciots from the city, in compliance with the first message from Olpae, were on the march with their whole levy through Amphilochia to join their countrymen at Olpae, knowing nothing of what had occurred. Demosthenes prepared to march with his army against them, and meanwhile sent on at once a strong division to beset the roads and occupy the strong positions. In the meantime the Mantineans and others included in the agreement went out under the pretence of gathering herbs and firewood, and stole off by twos and threes, picking on the way the things which they professed to have come out for, until they had gone some distance from Olpae, when they quickened their pace. The Ambraciots and such of the rest as had accompanied them in larger parties, seeing them going on, pushed on in their turn, and began running in order to catch them up. The Acarnanians at first thought that all alike were departing without permission, and began to pursue the Peloponnesians; and believing that they were being betrayed, even threw a dart or two at some of their generals who tried to stop them and told them that leave had been given. Eventually, however, they let pass the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew only the Ambraciots, there being much dispute and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. The number thus slain was about two hundred; the rest escaped into the bordering territory of Agraea, and found refuge with Salynthius, the friendly king of the Agraeans.

Modern Translation

The battle continued until nightfall. The following day, Menedaius—who had assumed sole command after the deaths of Eurylochus and Macarius—found himself in an impossible position. After such a devastating defeat, he could neither withstand a siege (being cut off by land and blockaded by the Athenian fleet at sea) nor retreat safely. He therefore opened negotiations with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals, requesting a truce, permission to withdraw, and the recovery of their dead. The allies returned the enemy dead and erected a trophy, while collecting their own fallen, numbering about three hundred. They publicly refused the request for a general retreat. However, Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues secretly granted permission for the Mantineans, Menedaius, and other prominent Peloponnesian commanders to withdraw. Their aim was to isolate the Ambraciots and foreign mercenaries from their allies and, more importantly, to damage the reputation of the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians throughout Greece by exposing them as traitors who abandoned their allies for personal safety.

While the enemy collected and hastily buried their dead, and those with permission secretly planned their escape, messengers brought news to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians: the entire Ambraciot army from the city was marching through Amphilochia to reinforce their countrymen at Olpae, unaware of the recent defeat. Demosthenes immediately prepared to march against them, first dispatching a strong detachment to secure the roads and occupy strategic positions. Meanwhile, the Mantineans and others covered by the secret agreement began leaving camp, ostensibly to gather herbs and firewood. They departed in small groups, actually collecting plants to maintain their cover, until they had moved some distance from Olpae, then quickened their pace. The Ambraciots and others who had accompanied them in larger groups, seeing them leaving, rushed after them, running to catch up. The Acarnanians initially believed everyone was fleeing without authorization and began pursuing the Peloponnesians. Thinking they were being betrayed, some even threw spears at their own generals who tried to stop them, explaining that permission had been granted. Eventually they allowed the Mantineans and Peloponnesians to pass but killed any Ambraciots they caught, though distinguishing between Ambraciots and Peloponnesians proved extremely difficult and contentious. About two hundred Ambraciots were killed; the survivors escaped into neighboring Agraea, where they found sanctuary with Salynthius, the friendly Agraean king.

Historical Context

This passage describes the aftermath of the Battle of Olpae (426 BCE) during the Peloponnesian War. The Spartan-led force under Eurylochus had been defeated by the Athenians under Demosthenes and their Acarnanian allies. The new Peloponnesian commander Menedaius faces a desperate situation and negotiates for withdrawal. Demosthenes cleverly grants secret permission only to the Peloponnesian leaders, deliberately excluding the Ambraciots to weaken future opposition and damage Spartan credibility. The passage reveals both the brutal pragmatism of ancient warfare and the importance of reputation in Greek interstate relations. The subsequent confusion and slaughter of the Ambraciots demonstrates how quickly alliances could dissolve into chaos when self-preservation was at stake.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Greek Military Customs

The recovery of the dead was a sacred duty in Greek warfare. Requesting permission to retrieve bodies was tantamount to admitting defeat, while granting such permission confirmed victory. The erection of a trophy (tropaion) at the turning point of battle was a religious act marking divine favor.

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Acarnania

Acarnania was a region in western Greece that remained loyal to Athens throughout most of the Peloponnesian War. Its strategic location made it crucial for controlling northwestern Greece and maintaining communications with Athenian allies in the region.

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Demosthenes (General)

Not to be confused with the later orator, this Demosthenes was an innovative Athenian general who specialized in light-armed warfare and ambush tactics. His campaigns in western Greece demonstrated tactical brilliance and psychological warfare, as shown in this manipulation of enemy alliances.

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Xenia and Betrayal

The secret deal violated Greek concepts of loyalty to allies. By abandoning the Ambraciots, the Peloponnesians prioritized self-preservation over honor, demonstrating how the war's pressures eroded traditional values. This would damage Spartan credibility as leaders of their alliance.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.60)

Diodorus provides a briefer account of the Acarnanian campaign, focusing on Demosthenes' tactical innovations and the psychological impact of the Spartan withdrawal on their alliance system.

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Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.2.18)

Xenophon describes a similar situation where Spartan commanders abandoned allies to save themselves during the later stages of the Peloponnesian War, showing this became a pattern that undermined Spartan hegemony.

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Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 12)

Plutarch discusses how battlefield truces and the treatment of the dead could be manipulated for strategic advantage, similar to Demosthenes' exploitation of burial customs to divide his enemies.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does Demosthenes' strategy of dividing the enemy alliance reflect the 'realist' approach to international relations that Thucydides often highlights?
  2. What does the confusion and killing of Ambraciots reveal about the breakdown of order and identity in warfare? How might this scene have resonated with Thucydides' contemporary readers?
  3. Is Demosthenes' deception justifiable by the standards of ancient warfare? How does this compare to modern concepts of military ethics?
  4. What does this passage suggest about the tension between collective alliance obligations and individual state survival in the Greek world?