Today's Passage
This passage occurs during the debate at Athens in 433 BCE, where Corcyraean envoys are making their final appeal for an alliance with Athens against Corinth.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support. The advantages of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact that the power which is at enmity with you is also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able to punish defection? And there is a wide difference between declining the alliance of an inland and of a maritime power. For your first endeavour should be to prevent, if possible, the existence of any naval power except your own; failing this, to secure the friendship of the strongest that does exist. And if any of you believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must remember that on the one hand, whatever your fears, your strength will be formidable to your antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence you derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must also remember that your decision is for Athens no less than Corcyra, and that you are not making the best provision for her interests, if at a time when you are anxiously scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the breaking out of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your side a place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for the coast-navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to bar the passage of naval reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese, and from Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most desirable station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both general and particular considerations, let this show you the folly of sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable naval powers in Hellas—Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth—and that if you allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to reinforce you in the struggle.”
Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the Corinthians spoke as follows:
Modern Translation
However, your true policy should be to give us open support and assistance. The benefits of this approach, as we stated at the outset of our address, are numerous. We'll highlight what is perhaps the most important: Could there be any stronger proof of our reliability than the fact that the very power hostile to you is equally hostile to us, and that this power has the full capacity to punish any betrayal? There's a crucial distinction between refusing an alliance with a landlocked state versus a naval power. Your primary objective should be to prevent, if at all possible, the emergence of any naval force besides your own; if that proves impossible, then to secure the allegiance of the most powerful navy that exists. If some among you think our proposal makes strategic sense but hesitate to act, fearing it might violate the treaty, you must consider this: however great your apprehensions, your strength will intimidate your adversaries; conversely, whatever comfort you take from rejecting us, your vulnerability will not frighten a powerful enemy. You must also recognize that your decision affects Athens as much as Corcyra, and you're hardly serving Athens' best interests if, at a moment when you're nervously watching for signs of the war that's virtually upon you, you waver about securing an ally whose friendship or hostility carries the most serious implications. Our island occupies a strategic position for coastal routes toward Italy and Sicily, capable of blocking naval reinforcements traveling from there to the Peloponnese or vice versa; in every other respect too, it's an invaluable base. To summarize as concisely as possible, considering both broad principles and specific circumstances, let this demonstrate the foolishness of abandoning us. Remember that only three major naval powers exist in Greece—Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth—and if you permit two of these to merge, allowing Corinth to absorb us, you'll face the combined navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnese at sea. But if you accept our alliance, our fleet will strengthen yours in the coming conflict."
These were the Corcyraeans' words. When they concluded, the Corinthians presented their response:
Historical Context
This passage occurs during the debate at Athens in 433 BCE, where Corcyraean envoys are making their final appeal for an alliance with Athens against Corinth. The dispute originated over Epidamnus, a colony that both Corcyra and Corinth claimed influence over. The Corcyraeans, possessing the second-largest navy in Greece, are arguing that Athens should ally with them despite existing treaties. They emphasize the strategic value of their naval power and geographic position, while warning that war with Sparta is imminent. This debate is crucial because Athens' decision to form a defensive alliance with Corcyra becomes one of the immediate causes of the Peloponnesian War, as it brings Athens into direct conflict with Corinth, a key Spartan ally. The passage showcases the cold realpolitik that characterized interstate relations in classical Greece.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Naval Power in Classical Greece
Naval supremacy was crucial for controlling trade routes and projecting power across the Mediterranean. Athens' empire depended on its fleet, while Sparta relied on land forces. The emergence of other naval powers like Corcyra threatened this balance.
Learn more →The Thirty Years' Peace
The treaty signed in 446/5 BCE between Athens and Sparta that the Athenians feared breaking. It stipulated that each side would retain its existing allies and that neutral states could join either alliance. The Corcyra question tested these provisions.
Learn more →Corcyra (Corfu)
Modern Corfu, strategically located in the Ionian Sea. Its position controlled access to the Adriatic and western trade routes, making it vital for any power seeking to project influence westward toward Sicily and Italy.
Learn more →Realpolitik in Thucydides
Thucydides presents international relations as governed by power and self-interest rather than justice or morality. The Corcyraeans' argument exemplifies this, appealing purely to Athenian strategic interests rather than moral obligations.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.30-33)
Provides an alternative account of the Corcyra-Corinth dispute and the Athenian debate, though with less detail than Thucydides. Emphasizes the role of Pericles in the decision.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29)
Discusses Pericles' support for the Corcyraean alliance and how this decision contributed to the outbreak of war. Provides insight into Athenian decision-making.
Read passage →Herodotus: Histories (3.48-53)
Describes earlier conflicts between Corinth and Corcyra, providing historical background for their enmity that helps explain the intensity of their dispute over Epidamnus.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the Corcyraean argument reflect the tension between moral obligations and strategic interests in international relations?
- What role does fear play in the Corcyraean appeal, and how does this connect to Thucydides' analysis of the war's causes?
- How might Athens have avoided war while still protecting its interests? Was the alliance with Corcyra inevitable?
- Compare the Corcyraean emphasis on naval power with modern debates about military technology and strategic advantage.