Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 216 of 506 Book 4, Chapter 12 June 28, 2026
43% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage occurs in 425 BCE during the Pylos affair, when 420 Spartan hoplites were trapped on the island of Sphacteria by Athenian forces.

Crawley Translation (1910)

Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians, their idea being that the Athenians, already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their opposition, would joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give back the men. The Athenians, however, having the men on the island, thought that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they chose to make it, and grasped at something further. Foremost to encourage them in this policy was Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the time and very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them to answer as follows: First, the men in the island must surrender themselves and their arms and be brought to Athens. Next, the Lacedaemonians must restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, all places acquired not by arms, but by the previous convention, under which they had been ceded by Athens herself at a moment of disaster, when a truce was more necessary to her than at present. This done they might take back their men, and make a truce for as long as both parties might agree.

To this answer the envoys made no reply, but asked that commissioners might be chosen with whom they might confer on each point, and quietly talk the matter over and try to come to some agreement. Hereupon Cleon violently assailed them, saying that he knew from the first that they had no right intentions, and that it was clear enough now by their refusing to speak before the people, and wanting to confer in secret with a committee of two or three. No, if they meant anything honest let them say it out before all. The Lacedaemonians, however, seeing that whatever concessions they might be prepared to make in their misfortune, it was impossible for them to speak before the multitude and lose credit with their allies for a negotiation which might after all miscarry, and on the other hand, that the Athenians would never grant what they asked upon moderate terms, returned from Athens without having effected anything.

Modern Translation

These were the Spartan proposals, based on their assumption that the Athenians, who were already eager for a truce and had been prevented from obtaining one only by Spartan resistance, would now gladly embrace peace when it was freely offered and return their prisoners. The Athenians, however, with the Spartan soldiers trapped on the island in their power, believed they could secure a treaty whenever they wished, and therefore aimed for greater concessions. The chief advocate of this aggressive stance was Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, the most influential popular leader of the day who wielded enormous sway over the masses. He convinced them to respond as follows: First, the men on the island must surrender unconditionally with their weapons and be transported to Athens. Second, the Spartans must return Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia—territories they had gained not through military conquest but through an earlier agreement, when Athens had ceded them during a period of crisis when she desperately needed peace more than she did now. Only after meeting these conditions could they recover their men and negotiate a truce of mutually agreeable duration.

The Spartan envoys offered no immediate response to these terms but instead requested that special commissioners be appointed with whom they could discuss each point privately, examining the issues calmly to reach some understanding. At this, Cleon launched a fierce attack, declaring that he had suspected their dishonest intentions from the beginning, and now their true nature was exposed by their refusal to negotiate publicly before the assembly, preferring instead secret discussions with a small committee. If they had any honorable proposals, he demanded, let them declare them openly before everyone. The Spartans, however, recognized that any concessions they might consider making in their current predicament could not be voiced before the public assembly without damaging their credibility with their allies, especially if negotiations ultimately failed. Moreover, they realized the Athenians would never accept reasonable terms. Therefore, they departed Athens having accomplished nothing.

Historical Context

This passage occurs in 425 BCE during the Pylos affair, when 420 Spartan hoplites were trapped on the island of Sphacteria by Athenian forces. The potential capture of these elite soldiers, including 120 Spartiates (full Spartan citizens), represented an unprecedented crisis for Sparta, whose entire social system depended on its limited warrior class. The Spartans desperately sought their return through diplomacy, offering peace and alliance. Cleon, Athens' hawkish demagogue, seized this opportunity to demand excessive concessions, effectively sabotaging negotiations. This episode demonstrates both Athenian imperial confidence at its height and the democratic assembly's susceptibility to aggressive populist rhetoric. The failure of these negotiations would lead to the eventual Athenian victory at Sphacteria, fundamentally altering the war's dynamics.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Cleon's Political Strategy

Cleon exemplified the new breed of Athenian politician—a wealthy tanner rather than aristocrat, who gained power through oratory and popular appeal. His demand for public negotiations exploited democratic ideology while ensuring diplomatic failure, as he knew Sparta couldn't openly discuss concessions that might seem weak.

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The Sphacteria Crisis

The blockade of Spartan hoplites on Sphacteria represented Sparta's greatest crisis. These weren't just soldiers but included Spartiates, whose capture would be catastrophic for Sparta's already declining citizen population. This explains Sparta's unprecedented willingness to seek peace.

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Athenian Imperialism

The territories Athens demanded—Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia—reveal imperial ambitions beyond the war's original causes. These strategic locations would enhance Athenian control over crucial ports and passages, demonstrating how initial defensive wars can transform into expansionist ventures.

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Democratic Decision-Making

This episode illustrates both strengths and weaknesses of Athenian democracy. While transparency was a democratic principle, Cleon's insistence on public negotiations made genuine diplomacy impossible, showing how demagogues could manipulate democratic procedures for political gain.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Nicias (7.1-4)

Plutarch describes the same negotiations, emphasizing the contrast between Cleon's belligerence and Nicias's more moderate approach, providing insight into Athenian political divisions during this crisis.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.61)

Diodorus offers a condensed account of the Sphacteria affair and negotiations, providing an alternative perspective on Cleon's motivations and the Spartan peace offers.

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Aristophanes: Knights (Lines 794-796)

This comedy, produced shortly after these events, satirizes Cleon's role in rejecting peace, offering contemporary Athenian perspective on his demagoguery and war-mongering.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does Cleon's demand for public negotiations reflect both democratic principles and political manipulation? Can transparency in diplomacy sometimes hinder rather than help?
  2. What does this passage reveal about the transformation of Athenian war aims from defensive to imperial? How do military advantages affect diplomatic objectives?
  3. Why might the Spartans have been unable to negotiate publicly? What does this suggest about the different political systems of Athens and Sparta?
  4. How does Thucydides portray the role of individual leaders like Cleon in shaping collective decisions? What are the dangers of charismatic leadership in democratic systems?