Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 229 of 506 Book 4, Chapter 13 July 11, 2026
45% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage describes an Athenian raid on Corinthian territory in 425 BCE, during the Archidamian War phase of the Peloponnesian War.

Crawley Translation (1910)

The same summer, directly after these events, the Athenians made an expedition against the territory of Corinth with eighty ships and two thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and two hundred cavalry on board horse transports, accompanied by the Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians from the allies, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, with two colleagues. Putting out to sea they made land at daybreak between Chersonese and Rheitus, at the beach of the country underneath the Solygian hill, upon which the Dorians in old times established themselves and carried on war against the Aeolian inhabitants of Corinth, and where a village now stands called Solygia. The beach where the fleet came to is about a mile and a half from the village, seven miles from Corinth, and two and a quarter from the Isthmus. The Corinthians had heard from Argos of the coming of the Athenian armament, and had all come up to the Isthmus long before, with the exception of those who lived beyond it, and also of five hundred who were away in garrison in Ambracia and Leucadia; and they were there in full force watching for the Athenians to land. These last, however, gave them the slip by coming in the dark; and being informed by signals of the fact the Corinthians left half their number at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and marched in all haste to the rescue.

Battus, one of the two generals present at the action, went with a company to defend the village of Solygia, which was unfortified; Lycophron remaining to give battle with the rest. The Corinthians first attacked the right wing of the Athenians, which had just landed in front of Chersonese, and afterwards the rest of the army. The battle was an obstinate one, and fought throughout hand to hand. The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians, who had been placed at the end of the line, received and with some difficulty repulsed the Corinthians, who thereupon retreated to a wall upon the rising ground behind, and throwing down the stones upon them, came on again singing the paean, and being received by the Athenians, were again engaged at close quarters. At this moment a Corinthian company having come to the relief of the left wing, routed and pursued the Athenian right to the sea, whence they were in their turn driven back by the Athenians and Carystians from the ships. Meanwhile the rest of the army on either side fought on tenaciously, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron sustained the attack of the Athenian left, which it was feared might attempt the village of Solygia.

Modern Translation

That same summer, immediately following these events, the Athenians launched a campaign against Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and two hundred cavalry transported on specially designed vessels. Allied forces from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus accompanied them. The expedition was commanded by Nicias, son of Niceratus, along with two fellow generals. Setting sail, they reached land at dawn between Chersonese and Rheitus, at a beach below the Solygian hill. In ancient times, the Dorians had established themselves on this hill and waged war against the Aeolian inhabitants of Corinth. A village called Solygia now stands there. The landing beach was approximately one and a half miles from the village, seven miles from Corinth, and just over two miles from the Isthmus. The Corinthians had received intelligence from Argos about the approaching Athenian force and had mobilized to the Isthmus well in advance—all except those living beyond it and five hundred troops stationed in Ambracia and Leucadia. They maintained a vigilant watch for the Athenian landing. However, the Athenians evaded detection by arriving under cover of darkness. When the Corinthians learned of the landing through signal fires, they divided their forces, leaving half at Cenchreae to guard against a possible attack on Crommyon, while the remainder rushed to engage the enemy.

Battus, one of the two Corinthian generals present, led a detachment to defend the unfortified village of Solygia, while Lycophron commanded the main force in battle. The Corinthians first struck the Athenian right wing, which had just disembarked near Chersonese, then engaged the rest of the army. The fighting was fierce and predominantly hand-to-hand combat. The Athenian right wing, where the Carystians were positioned at the line's extremity, received the Corinthian assault and managed to repel it, though with considerable effort. The Corinthians withdrew to a wall on the elevated ground behind them, hurled stones down at their enemies, then advanced again while chanting their battle hymn. The Athenians met them, and close combat resumed. At this critical moment, a Corinthian reserve unit arrived to reinforce their left wing, routing the Athenian right and driving them back to the shore. There, the Athenians and Carystians, supported by troops from the ships, counterattacked and forced the Corinthians back. Throughout this action, both armies' main forces continued fighting with determination, particularly the Corinthian right wing under Lycophron, who held firm against the Athenian left, fearing they might attempt to capture Solygia.

Historical Context

This passage describes an Athenian raid on Corinthian territory in 425 BCE, during the Archidamian War phase of the Peloponnesian War. The expedition, led by the prominent general Nicias, represents Athens' strategy of using naval superiority to strike at Peloponnesian coastal territories. The battle near Solygia demonstrates the challenges of amphibious operations, as the Athenians faced immediate resistance upon landing. The Corinthians' advance warning from Argos (nominally neutral but sympathetic to Athens) shows the complex diplomatic networks operating during the war. This raid was part of Athens' broader strategy to pressure Corinth, a key Spartan ally whose commercial rivalry with Athens had been a major cause of the war. The fierce hand-to-hand combat and tactical reversals illustrate the unpredictable nature of hoplite warfare.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Hoplite Warfare

The battle exemplifies classical Greek hoplite combat: heavy infantry fighting in close formation with spears and shields. The emphasis on 'hand to hand' fighting and the singing of the paean (battle hymn) before charging were typical elements of hoplite engagements.

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Athenian Naval Strategy

Athens' use of naval power to conduct amphibious raids was central to their war strategy. The fleet's ability to strike anywhere along the enemy coastline gave Athens a significant advantage, though landing operations remained risky as this battle demonstrates.

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Corinth in the Peloponnesian War

Corinth was Athens' major commercial rival and a driving force behind Spartan entry into the war. Their territory's proximity to Athens made them vulnerable to raids, but their prompt response here shows their military preparedness.

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Nicias

Nicias was a prominent Athenian politician and general, known for his caution and wealth. He would later lead the disastrous Sicilian Expedition (415-413 BCE). This earlier command shows him in a more successful light, conducting limited operations suited to Athenian strengths.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Nicias (6.1-4)

Plutarch describes Nicias' early military career and his cautious approach to warfare, mentioning several successful raids he conducted against Peloponnesian territories during this period.

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Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.1-2)

Though focusing on later events, Xenophon's account of Athenian naval operations provides context for understanding the tactical evolution from raids like Solygia to later fleet actions.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.43)

Diodorus provides a compressed account of Athenian operations during this period, including raids on the Peloponnesian coast, though with less tactical detail than Thucydides.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does this battle illustrate both the advantages and limitations of Athens' naval strategy during the Peloponnesian War?
  2. What role did intelligence and communication (signals from Argos, fire signals among Corinthians) play in ancient warfare, and how did it affect the outcome here?
  3. Compare the leadership styles of the commanders: what can we infer about Battus and Lycophron's division of responsibilities versus Nicias' role?
  4. How does Thucydides' detailed tactical narrative here serve his larger historical and philosophical purposes?