Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 238 of 506 Book 4, Chapter 13 July 20, 2026
47% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage presents a speech advocating for peace during the Peloponnesian War, likely delivered at a conference or assembly where various Greek states are considering their response to Athenian power.

Crawley Translation (1910)

“So far as regards the Athenians, such are the great advantages proved inherent in a wise policy. Independently of this, in the face of the universal consent, that peace is the first of blessings, how can we refuse to make it amongst ourselves; or do you not think that the good which you have, and the ills that you complain of, would be better preserved and cured by quiet than by war; that peace has its honours and splendours of a less perilous kind, not to mention the numerous other blessings that one might dilate on, with the not less numerous miseries of war? These considerations should teach you not to disregard my words, but rather to look in them every one for his own safety. If there be any here who feels certain either by right or might to effect his object, let not this surprise be to him too severe a disappointment. Let him remember that many before now have tried to chastise a wrongdoer, and failing to punish their enemy have not even saved themselves; while many who have trusted in force to gain an advantage, instead of gaining anything more, have been doomed to lose what they had. Vengeance is not necessarily successful because wrong has been done, or strength sure because it is confident; but the incalculable element in the future exercises the widest influence, and is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all things, as it frightens us all equally, and thus makes us consider before attacking each other.

“Let us therefore now allow the undefined fear of this unknown future, and the immediate terror of the Athenians’ presence, to produce their natural impression, and let us consider any failure to carry out the programmes that we may each have sketched out for ourselves as sufficiently accounted for by these obstacles, and send away the intruder from the country; and if everlasting peace be impossible between us, let us at all events make a treaty for as long a term as possible, and put off our private differences to another day. In fine, let us recognize that the adoption of my advice will leave us each citizens of a free state, and as such arbiters of our own destiny, able to return good or bad offices with equal effect; while its rejection will make us dependent on others, and thus not only impotent to repel an insult, but on the most favourable supposition, friends to our direst enemies, and at feud with our natural friends.

Modern Translation

As far as the Athenians are concerned, these are the significant advantages that have been demonstrated to flow from prudent policy. But setting this aside, given that everyone agrees peace is the greatest blessing, how can we refuse to establish it among ourselves? Do you not believe that whatever good fortune you possess and whatever misfortunes you suffer would be better safeguarded and remedied through peace rather than war? That peace brings its own honors and glories, but of a less dangerous kind, not to mention the countless other benefits one could elaborate upon, along with the equally countless miseries of warfare? These reflections should persuade you not to dismiss my words, but rather to seek in them your own security. If anyone here feels confident that through justice or force he can achieve his aims, let him not find this setback too crushing a disappointment. He should remember that many before him have attempted to punish those who wronged them, yet failed not only to exact revenge but even to preserve themselves; while many who relied on force to secure advantage have, instead of gaining more, lost what they already possessed. Revenge does not automatically succeed simply because an injustice has been committed, nor is strength guaranteed victory merely because it feels confident. The unpredictable element of the future exerts the broadest influence and proves most deceptive, yet paradoxically most beneficial, since it inspires equal fear in everyone and thus compels us to deliberate before attacking one another.

Therefore, let us now allow both this vague dread of an uncertain future and the immediate intimidation of the Athenian presence to have their natural effect. Let us accept that any inability to accomplish our individual objectives can be adequately explained by these impediments, and let us expel the invader from our territory. If eternal peace between us proves impossible, let us at minimum establish a treaty for the longest feasible period and defer our private disputes to a later time. In summary, let us acknowledge that accepting my proposal will leave each of us citizens of independent states, masters of our own fate, equally capable of returning favors or injuries as we see fit. Rejecting it, however, will render us subordinate to others, leaving us not merely powerless to avenge insults but, in the best-case scenario, allied with our worst enemies while hostile to our natural friends.

Historical Context

This passage presents a speech advocating for peace during the Peloponnesian War, likely delivered at a conference or assembly where various Greek states are considering their response to Athenian power. The speaker, probably a Spartan or allied representative, argues pragmatically for negotiation over continued conflict. The speech occurs during a period when Athens's imperial reach was causing widespread concern among other Greek poleis. The speaker employs sophisticated rhetoric, appealing to both self-interest and fear of uncertainty to persuade his audience to choose diplomacy over military confrontation. This reflects the complex diplomatic maneuvering that characterized much of the Peloponnesian War, where smaller states often had to navigate between the competing interests of Athens and Sparta.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Greek Interstate Relations

The passage illuminates the complex web of alliances and enmities that characterized the Greek world during the Peloponnesian War. The speaker's reference to becoming 'friends to our direst enemies' reflects how the bipolar conflict between Athens and Sparta forced smaller states into uncomfortable alliances.

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The Role of Fortune (Tyche)

The speaker's emphasis on the 'incalculable element in the future' reflects Greek thinking about tyche (fortune/chance). This concept was central to Greek historical thought, representing the unpredictable forces that could overturn human planning and expectations.

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Rhetoric and Persuasion

This speech exemplifies the sophisticated rhetorical techniques employed in Greek political discourse. The speaker uses various persuasive strategies including appeals to fear, self-interest, and historical precedent to argue for peace over war.

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Athenian Imperialism

The reference to Athenians as 'intruders' and the 'immediate terror of the Athenians' presence' reflects widespread Greek resentment of Athenian imperial expansion during the 5th century BCE, which was a primary cause of the Peloponnesian War.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 2, Chapter 2.19-23)

Xenophon describes negotiations for peace at the end of the Peloponnesian War, showing similar themes of pragmatism versus pride in diplomatic discussions.

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Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 9-10)

Plutarch describes Nicias's efforts to negotiate peace during the war, illustrating similar tensions between those favoring negotiation and those preferring military solutions.

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Aristotle: Politics (Book 5, 1304b)

Aristotle discusses how external threats and the fear of powerful neighbors affect internal politics and decision-making in Greek city-states.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does the speaker's argument about the 'incalculable element in the future' relate to modern theories of deterrence and risk assessment in international relations?
  2. What does this passage reveal about the tensions between independence and security that smaller states faced during the Peloponnesian War?
  3. How might different audiences (Spartans, Athenians, neutral states) have received this speech differently?
  4. To what extent does the speaker's pragmatic approach to peace negotiations remain relevant in contemporary diplomatic contexts?