Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 240 of 506 Book 4, Chapter 13 July 22, 2026
47% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage describes a critical moment in 424 BCE when internal strife in Megara created an opportunity for Athenian expansion.

Crawley Translation (1910)

The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed by the hostilities of the Athenians, who invaded their country twice every year with all their forces, and harassed by the incursions of their own exiles at Pegae, who had been expelled in a revolution by the popular party, began to ask each other whether it would not be better to receive back their exiles, and free the town from one of its two scourges. The friends of the emigrants, perceiving the agitation, now more openly than before demanded the adoption of this proposition; and the leaders of the commons, seeing that the sufferings of the times had tired out the constancy of their supporters, entered in their alarm into correspondence with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray the town, thinking this less dangerous to themselves than the return of the party which they had banished. It was accordingly arranged that the Athenians should first take the long walls extending for nearly a mile from the city to the port of Nisaea, to prevent the Peloponnesians coming to the rescue from that place, where they formed the sole garrison to secure the fidelity of Megara; and that after this the attempt should be made to put into their hands the upper town, which it was thought would then come over with less difficulty.

Modern Translation

That same summer, the Megarians in the city found themselves under severe pressure from Athenian hostilities—the Athenians invaded their territory twice yearly with their entire army—and suffered from raids by their own exiles based at Pegae, who had been driven out during a democratic revolution. They began debating among themselves whether it might be wiser to recall their exiles and thereby eliminate one of the two threats plaguing their city. The friends of the exiles, sensing this shift in sentiment, now advocated more openly than before for their return. The democratic leaders, recognizing that the hardships of war had exhausted their supporters' resolve, grew alarmed and secretly contacted the Athenian generals Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes. They decided to betray their city, calculating this to be less dangerous than allowing the return of the faction they had expelled. The plan called for the Athenians to first capture the Long Walls—stretching nearly a mile from the city to the port of Nisaea—thereby preventing any Peloponnesian relief force from the garrison there, which alone ensured Megara's loyalty to their cause. Once this was accomplished, they would attempt to deliver the upper city itself, which they believed would then surrender more readily.

Historical Context

This passage describes a critical moment in 424 BCE when internal strife in Megara created an opportunity for Athenian expansion. Megara, strategically located between Athens and Corinth, was suffering from a two-front crisis: regular Athenian invasions and raids by aristocratic exiles who had been expelled by the democratic faction. The democratic leaders, fearing the return of their oligarchic opponents more than Athenian domination, conspired with Athenian generals to betray their city. The plan involved first capturing the Long Walls connecting Megara to its port Nisaea, where a Peloponnesian garrison maintained the city's alliance with Sparta. This episode illustrates how civil discord (stasis) could override patriotic loyalty and how Athens exploited such divisions to expand its influence during the Archidamian War.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Megara's Strategic Importance

Megara controlled the land route between the Peloponnese and central Greece, making it crucial for both Athens and Sparta. Its ports on both the Saronic and Corinthian gulfs gave it significant commercial and military value. Control of Megara would effectively isolate the Peloponnese from Boeotia.

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Stasis in Greek Cities

Civil conflict (stasis) between democratic and oligarchic factions was endemic in Greek poleis during the Peloponnesian War. These internal divisions often proved more destructive than external warfare, as citizens prioritized factional interests over civic unity.

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Long Walls in Greek Warfare

Long walls connecting cities to their ports were crucial defensive structures, allowing cities to maintain sea access during sieges. Athens' own Long Walls were vital to its strategy. Megara's walls to Nisaea served a similar function under Peloponnesian control.

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Athenian Generals

Hippocrates and Demosthenes were prominent Athenian commanders in 424 BCE. Demosthenes had recently won victories in northwestern Greece, while Hippocrates would later die at the Battle of Delium. Their joint command here shows Athens' aggressive strategy in this period.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Aristophanes: Acharnians (Lines 524-539)

Aristophanes' comedy, produced in 425 BCE, mentions the Megarian Decree and depicts a starving Megarian trying to sell his daughters as pigs, illustrating the economic devastation that drove Megara to desperation.

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Plutarch: Life of Pericles (Chapter 30)

Plutarch discusses the Megarian Decree, which banned Megarians from Athenian markets and harbors, as a major cause of the Peloponnesian War, providing background for understanding Megara's suffering.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.66)

Diodorus provides a parallel account of these events, offering some additional details about the attempted betrayal of Megara and the subsequent Athenian operations.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does this passage illustrate the tension between patriotic duty and factional loyalty in Greek political life? What modern parallels might exist?
  2. Why might the democratic leaders have feared the return of oligarchic exiles more than Athenian domination? What does this reveal about Greek political psychology?
  3. How does Thucydides present the moral dimensions of betrayal here? Does he judge the Megarian democrats, or does he maintain his characteristic objectivity?
  4. What role did geography (the Long Walls, the port of Nisaea) play in ancient Greek strategic thinking, and how does this passage demonstrate its importance?