Today's Passage
This passage describes a covert operation in 424 BCE during the Peloponnesian War, where Athens attempted to capture Megara through treachery.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The Athenians, after plans had been arranged between themselves and their correspondents both as to words and actions, sailed by night to Minoa, the island off Megara, with six hundred heavy infantry under the command of Hippocrates, and took post in a quarry not far off, out of which bricks used to be taken for the walls; while Demosthenes, the other commander, with a detachment of Plataean light troops and another of Peripoli, placed himself in ambush in the precinct of Enyalius, which was still nearer. No one knew of it, except those whose business it was to know that night. A little before daybreak, the traitors in Megara began to act. Every night for a long time back, under pretence of marauding, in order to have a means of opening the gates, they had been used, with the consent of the officer in command, to carry by night a sculling boat upon a cart along the ditch to the sea, and so to sail out, bringing it back again before day upon the cart, and taking it within the wall through the gates, in order, as they pretended, to baffle the Athenian blockade at Minoa, there being no boat to be seen in the harbour. On the present occasion the cart was already at the gates, which had been opened in the usual way for the boat, when the Athenians, with whom this had been concerted, saw it, and ran at the top of their speed from the ambush in order to reach the gates before they were shut again, and while the cart was still there to prevent their being closed; their Megarian accomplices at the same moment killing the guard at the gates. The first to run in was Demosthenes with his Plataeans and Peripoli, just where the trophy now stands; and he was no sooner within the gates than the Plataeans engaged and defeated the nearest party of Peloponnesians who had taken the alarm and come to the rescue, and secured the gates for the approaching Athenian heavy infantry.
Modern Translation
After the Athenians and their collaborators inside Megara had coordinated both their signals and timing, they sailed under cover of darkness to Minoa, the island fortress off Megara. Hippocrates commanded six hundred hoplites who took up position in a nearby quarry that had once supplied bricks for the city walls. Meanwhile, Demosthenes, the other general, concealed himself with a unit of Plataean light infantry and another of Peripoli in the sanctuary of Enyalius, which lay even closer to the city. Only those who needed to know were aware of the operation that night. Just before dawn, the Megarian conspirators set their plan in motion. For many nights previously, they had established a routine—ostensibly to conduct raids but actually to create an opportunity to open the gates. With their commander's permission, they would transport a small rowing boat on a wagon through the ditch to the sea each night, sail out, then return before daylight, bringing the vessel back through the gates on the same wagon. They claimed this deception would confuse the Athenian naval blockade at Minoa, since no boat would be visible in the harbor. On this particular night, the wagon had reached the gates, which were opened according to the established pattern for the boat's return. This was the signal the Athenians had been waiting for. They sprinted from their hiding places, racing to reach the gates before they could be closed again, while the wagon still blocked them open. Their Megarian allies simultaneously killed the gate guards. Demosthenes led the charge with his Plataeans and Peripoli, rushing through at the spot where the victory monument now stands. Once inside, the Plataeans immediately engaged and routed the nearest Peloponnesian troops who had responded to the alarm, securing the gates for the main force of Athenian hoplites advancing behind them.
Historical Context
This passage describes a covert operation in 424 BCE during the Peloponnesian War, where Athens attempted to capture Megara through treachery. Megara, strategically located between Athens and Corinth, controlled vital land routes to the Peloponnese. The Athenians had already seized the port of Nisaea and the island of Minoa, establishing a partial blockade. This nighttime assault involved coordination between Athenian forces led by generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes and pro-Athenian conspirators within Megara. The elaborate deception using a boat-smuggling routine demonstrates the sophisticated intelligence operations of ancient warfare. Success would have given Athens control over a crucial strategic position, potentially altering the war's trajectory. The operation represents Athens' aggressive strategy during this period, attempting to exploit internal divisions in enemy cities.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Megara's Strategic Importance
Megara controlled the land route between Athens and the Peloponnese, making it crucial for both sides. Its two ports, Nisaea on the Saronic Gulf and Pegae on the Corinthian Gulf, provided access to both major sea routes. Control of Megara would effectively cut Peloponnesian land access to central Greece.
Learn more →Greek Hoplite Warfare
The 600 heavy infantry (hoplites) mentioned were citizen-soldiers armed with bronze armor, large shields, and spears. They fought in close formation (phalanx) and represented the military and political elite of Greek city-states. Their effectiveness depended on maintaining formation and discipline.
Learn more →Treachery in Greek Warfare
Internal betrayal (prodosia) was common in Greek warfare, often resulting from political factions within cities. Pro-Athenian or pro-Spartan groups would conspire with external forces to overthrow their opponents. Such treachery was both feared and frequently attempted throughout the Peloponnesian War.
Learn more →Demosthenes as General
Demosthenes (not the orator) was one of Athens' most innovative generals, known for unconventional tactics and use of light-armed troops. His earlier successes at Pylos had demonstrated his strategic creativity. He often employed surprise attacks and non-traditional forces effectively.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 6)
Plutarch mentions Athenian operations around Megara during this period, providing additional context about the strategic importance of controlling the Megarid and the ongoing rivalry between Athenian generals.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.66)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of Athenian operations against Megara, though with less detail than Thucydides. He emphasizes the role of internal strife in Megara that made the betrayal possible.
Read passage →Aristophanes: Acharnians (Lines 515-539)
Though a comedy, Aristophanes references the Megarian Decree and Athens' hostile relationship with Megara, providing contemporary Athenian perspectives on the conflict that led to operations like this one.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the elaborate deception involving the boat-smuggling routine reflect the sophistication of ancient Greek intelligence operations? What modern parallels might exist?
- What does this passage reveal about the role of internal political divisions in Greek warfare? How did external powers exploit these divisions?
- Consider the ethical implications of using treachery in warfare. How might ancient Greeks have viewed such tactics compared to open battle?
- Why was controlling Megara so strategically important for Athens? How might success here have changed the course of the Peloponnesian War?