Today's Passage
This passage describes a critical moment in 424 BCE during Athens' attempt to capture Megara and its port Nisaea.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had arisen, and that the capture of the town by force was no longer practicable, at once proceeded to invest Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it before relief arrived, the surrender of Megara would soon follow. Iron, stone-masons, and everything else required quickly coming up from Athens, the Athenians started from the wall which they occupied, and from this point built a cross wall looking towards Megara down to the sea on either side of Nisaea; the ditch and the walls being divided among the army, stones and bricks taken from the suburb, and the fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade wherever this seemed necessary; the houses also in the suburb with the addition of battlements sometimes entering into the fortification. The whole of this day the work continued, and by the afternoon of the next the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, alarmed by the absolute want of provisions, which they used to take in for the day from the upper town, not anticipating any speedy relief from the Peloponnesians, and supposing Megara to be hostile, capitulated to the Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms, and should each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; their Lacedaemonian commander, and any others of his countrymen in the place, being left to the discretion of the Athenians. On these conditions they surrendered and came out, and the Athenians broke down the long walls at their point of junction with Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and went on with their other preparations.
Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis, happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting ready an army for Thrace. As soon as he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the safety of Megara, he sent to the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, a village so called of the Megarid, under Mount Geraneia, and went himself, with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy infantry, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such troops of his own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea not yet taken. Hearing of its fall (he had marched out by night to Tripodiscus), he took three hundred picked men from the army, without waiting till his coming should be known, and came up to Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were down by the sea, ostensibly, and really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but above all to get into Megara and secure the town. He accordingly invited the townspeople to admit his party, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.
Modern Translation
When the Athenian generals realized that something had gone wrong and that taking the city by direct assault was no longer feasible, they immediately moved to blockade Nisaea. They calculated that if they could capture it before reinforcements arrived, Megara itself would quickly surrender. Iron tools, stonemasons, and all necessary equipment arrived promptly from Athens. Starting from the wall they already controlled, the Athenians constructed a cross-wall extending down to the sea on both sides of Nisaea, effectively cutting it off from Megara. The entire army divided up the work on the ditch and walls, using stones and bricks taken from the suburbs, cutting down fruit trees and timber to build palisades wherever needed. They even incorporated suburban houses into their fortifications by adding battlements. They worked throughout that entire day, and by the following afternoon the wall was nearly complete. At this point, the garrison in Nisaea panicked. They had run out of provisions, having depended on daily supplies from the upper town. With no expectation of quick relief from the Peloponnesians and believing Megara had turned hostile, they negotiated surrender terms with the Athenians. The agreement stipulated that they would surrender their weapons and pay a fixed ransom per man, while their Spartan commander and any other Spartans present would be handed over unconditionally to Athenian discretion. Under these terms they surrendered and marched out. The Athenians then demolished the long walls where they connected to Megara, occupied Nisaea, and continued their preparations.
At this very moment, the Spartan commander Brasidas, son of Tellis, happened to be near Sicyon and Corinth, assembling an army for a campaign in Thrace. When news reached him of the walls' capture, he grew alarmed for the Peloponnesians trapped in Nisaea and for Megara's security. He immediately sent word to the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, a village in Megarian territory below Mount Geraneia. He himself marched with 2,700 Corinthian heavy infantry, 400 Phliasians, 600 Sicyonians, and whatever troops he had already recruited, hoping to arrive before Nisaea fell. Learning of its capture (he had marched by night to Tripodiscus), he selected 300 elite soldiers from his force and, without waiting for news of his approach to spread, advanced undetected to Megara while the Athenians remained down by the sea. His stated intention—and genuine hope—was to attempt recapturing Nisaea, but his primary objective was to enter Megara and secure the city. He therefore requested that the citizens admit his force, claiming he had reasonable hopes of recovering Nisaea.
Historical Context
This passage describes a critical moment in 424 BCE during Athens' attempt to capture Megara and its port Nisaea. The Athenians, having failed in their initial assault on Megara itself, successfully besieged and captured Nisaea through a sophisticated circumvallation operation. The swift Athenian engineering effort, completing siege walls in just over a day, demonstrates their military efficiency. Meanwhile, the renowned Spartan general Brasidas, who was preparing for his famous Thracian campaign, rushed to intervene. His rapid response and attempt to secure Megara before Athens could consolidate its position illustrates the strategic importance of Megara, which controlled the land route between Athens and the Peloponnese. This episode showcases the war's characteristic pattern of rapid moves and countermoves, where timing and intelligence often determined success.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Ancient Siege Warfare
The Athenian circumvallation of Nisaea exemplifies classical Greek siege tactics. Rather than direct assault, they isolated the port through counter-walls, cutting supply lines and forcing surrender through starvation—a method later perfected in sieges like Syracuse.
Learn more →Brasidas
Brasidas was Sparta's most innovative and successful general during the Archidamian War. His rapid response here foreshadows his later brilliant campaigns in Thrace, where he would capture Amphipolis and fundamentally alter the war's strategic balance.
Learn more →Megara's Strategic Importance
Megara controlled the land route between Athens and the Peloponnese. Its two ports, Nisaea on the Saronic Gulf and Pegae on the Corinthian Gulf, made it crucial for naval operations. Control of Megara could effectively isolate the Peloponnese from central Greece.
Learn more →Peloponnesian League Military Organization
Brasidas's force composition reveals how Spartan commanders assembled coalition armies. The specific contingents from Corinth, Phlius, and Sicyon show the league's federal structure, with each city-state contributing predetermined troop numbers to joint operations.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (6.1-3)
Plutarch mentions Athenian operations around Megara during this period, noting how initial successes like Nisaea raised Athenian confidence but ultimately led to overextension.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.66)
Diodorus provides a condensed account of the Megara campaign, emphasizing the speed of Brasidas's response and the psychological impact on Megarian politics.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.35)
Though describing later events, Xenophon notes how control of Megara and its ports remained strategically vital throughout the war, validating both sides' efforts here.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the Athenian siege technique at Nisaea reflect their naval mindset applied to land warfare? Consider their emphasis on isolation and blockade rather than assault.
- What does Brasidas's immediate response reveal about Spartan strategic thinking and intelligence networks during the war?
- Why might the Nisaean garrison have surrendered so quickly? What does this suggest about the reliability of allied forces in ancient warfare?
- How does Thucydides' detailed description of the siege engineering serve his larger historical purposes? What might he want readers to understand about Athenian capabilities?