Today's Passage
This passage describes the complex political and military situation at Megara in 424 BCE.
Crawley Translation (1910)
However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel them and restore the exiles; the other that the commons, apprehensive of this very danger, might set upon them, and the city be thus destroyed by a battle within its gates under the eyes of the ambushed Athenians. He was accordingly refused admittance, both parties electing to remain quiet and await the event; each expecting a battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and thinking it safer to see their friends victorious before declaring in their favour.
Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the army. At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to relieve Megara, whose danger they considered their own, even before hearing from Brasidas, they were already in full force at Plataea, when his messenger arrived to add spurs to their resolution; and they at once sent on to him two thousand two hundred heavy infantry, and six hundred horse, returning home with the main body. The whole army thus assembled numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian heavy infantry were drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light troops being scattered over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian horse and driven to the sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on previous occasions no relief had ever come to the Megarians from any quarter. Here the Boeotians were in their turn charged and engaged by the Athenian horse, and a cavalry action ensued which lasted a long time, and in which both parties claimed the victory. The Athenians killed and stripped the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of his comrades who had charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters of the bodies gave them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but regarding the action as a whole the forces separated without either side having gained a decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to their army and the Athenians to Nisaea.
Modern Translation
One faction among the Megarians, however, feared that Brasidas might drive them out and bring back the exiled party; the other faction worried that the common people, terrified by precisely this possibility, would attack them. The result would be civil war within the city walls, fought in full view of the Athenians lying in ambush. Both factions therefore refused to admit Brasidas, choosing instead to keep quiet and wait to see how events unfolded. Each side calculated that there would be a battle between the Athenians and the relief force, and thought it wiser to wait until their allies had won before openly taking sides.
Finding himself unable to persuade them, Brasidas returned to his main force. At dawn, the Boeotians arrived to join him. They had already decided to relieve Megara—whose peril they regarded as their own—even before receiving word from Brasidas, and were assembled in full strength at Plataea when his messenger reached them, spurring them to immediate action. They dispatched two thousand two hundred heavy infantry and six hundred cavalry to him, while the bulk of their forces returned home. The combined army now totaled six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian heavy infantry had taken position near Nisaea and the coast, but their light-armed troops, scattered across the plain, were suddenly attacked by Boeotian cavalry and driven back to the sea—caught completely off guard since previously no relief forces had ever come to help the Megarians from any direction. The Athenian cavalry then countercharged the Boeotians, leading to a prolonged cavalry engagement in which both sides claimed victory. The Athenians killed and stripped the Boeotian cavalry commander and several of his men who had charged all the way to Nisaea. Retaining possession of the bodies, they returned them under truce and erected a trophy. Yet considering the battle as a whole, the two forces withdrew without either gaining a clear advantage—the Boeotians to their army, the Athenians to Nisaea.
Historical Context
This passage describes the complex political and military situation at Megara in 424 BCE. The Athenians had attempted to seize Megara through internal betrayal, capturing the port of Nisaea. Brasidas, the brilliant Spartan commander, arrived with a relief force but found himself unable to enter the city due to factional politics. The Megarians, divided between oligarchic factions, feared that admitting either side would trigger civil war. The arrival of Boeotian reinforcements led to an indecisive cavalry engagement. This episode illustrates the importance of internal politics in Greek warfare and shows how civil strife (stasis) could paralyze a city-state. The incident occurs during the Archidamian War phase of the Peloponnesian War, demonstrating the strategic importance of Megara as a buffer between Athens and the Peloponnese.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Megarian Politics
Megara's strategic location between Athens and Corinth made it a crucial prize. The city's internal divisions between oligarchic factions and fear of democratic revolution paralyzed its ability to act decisively, illustrating how stasis (civil conflict) weakened Greek city-states.
Learn more →Brasidas
Brasidas was Sparta's most innovative commander, known for his speed, diplomacy, and unconventional tactics. His campaigns in Thrace would later prove crucial to Spartan strategy, though here he faces the limitations of traditional Greek warfare when confronted with internal politics.
Learn more →Greek Cavalry Warfare
Cavalry played a secondary role in Greek warfare, primarily used for reconnaissance and pursuit. This engagement shows its limitations - neither side could achieve decisive results despite prolonged fighting, typical of ancient cavalry actions.
Learn more →Trophy (Tropaion)
The erection of a trophy marked battlefield victory in Greek warfare. Made from captured arms, it served religious and propaganda purposes. The fact that both sides claimed victory here shows the ambiguous nature of the engagement.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.66-67)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the Megarian affair, though with less detail about the internal politics and more focus on the military movements.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (6)
Plutarch mentions the Megarian expedition as one of Nicias's successes, providing additional context about Athenian leadership and strategic thinking during this period.
Read passage →Aristophanes: Acharnians (lines 515-539)
Though comedic, Aristophanes references the Megarian Decree and Athenian-Megarian tensions, providing contemporary Athenian perspectives on the conflict with Megara.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the fear of civil war (stasis) among the Megarian factions ultimately benefit neither Athens nor Sparta? What does this suggest about the self-destructive nature of internal conflict?
- Why might Thucydides emphasize that both sides claimed victory in the cavalry engagement? What does this ambiguity reveal about the nature of military success and propaganda?
- How does Brasidas's failure to enter Megara despite his military strength illustrate the limitations of external military force when confronted with internal political divisions?
- What role does timing play in this passage? Consider how the near-simultaneous arrival of Brasidas and the Boeotians affected the outcome.