Today's Passage
This passage describes the crucial Athenian decision to ally with Corcyra in 433 BCE, a pivotal moment leading to the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had changed and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens could not be required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth. But each of the contracting parties had a right to the other’s assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other by mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other naval powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. They were commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their instructions were to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under certain circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and threatened a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions, they were to do their utmost to prevent it. These instructions were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty.
Modern Translation
After hearing both delegations speak, the Athenians convened two assemblies. In the first meeting, there was a clear inclination to accept Corinth's arguments. By the second assembly, however, public sentiment had shifted, and they voted to form an alliance with Corcyra—though with specific limitations. This would be a defensive alliance only, not an offensive one. It would not violate their existing treaty with the Peloponnesian League: Athens could not be obligated to support Corcyra in attacking Corinth. However, both parties would have the right to call upon each other for help if invaded, whether the attack targeted their homeland or their allies' territory. By this time, people were beginning to sense that war with the Peloponnesian League was inevitable, and no one wanted to see Corcyra's formidable naval forces fall under Corinthian control. Still, if these two powers could exhaust each other through fighting, Athens would be better positioned for the eventual conflict with Corinth and other naval states. Additionally, Corcyra's location offered strategic advantages for the coastal route to Italy and Sicily. Based on these considerations, Athens accepted the alliance with Corcyra. Shortly after the Corinthian envoys left, Athens dispatched ten ships to assist Corcyra, commanded by Lacedaemonius (son of Cimon), Diotimus (son of Strombichus), and Proteas (son of Epicles). Their orders were to avoid engaging the Corinthian fleet unless absolutely necessary. Only if Corinth attempted to land on Corcyra or its territories were they authorized to intervene with full force. These careful instructions reflected Athens' desire to avoid breaking the existing treaty.
Historical Context
This passage describes the crucial Athenian decision to ally with Corcyra in 433 BCE, a pivotal moment leading to the Peloponnesian War. Corcyra, a powerful naval state, was engaged in a conflict with its mother-city Corinth over the colony of Epidamnus. Both sides sent delegations to Athens seeking support. The Athenians' decision reveals their strategic calculations: they recognized that war with Sparta was approaching and sought to prevent Corcyra's fleet from joining their enemies. The limited, defensive nature of the alliance and the restrictive orders given to the naval commanders show Athens attempting to gain strategic advantage while technically avoiding violation of the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta. This delicate balancing act ultimately failed, as the alliance became one of the immediate causes of the war.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Democracy
The two assemblies demonstrate Athenian democratic decision-making in action. Public opinion could shift between meetings as citizens deliberated on complex foreign policy issues. This shows both the strengths and potential volatility of direct democracy in classical Athens.
Learn more →Naval Power
Corcyra possessed the second-largest fleet in Greece after Athens, making it a crucial strategic asset. Control of naval power was essential for trade, communication, and military dominance in the Greek world, especially for island and coastal states.
Learn more →The Thirty Years' Peace
Signed in 446/5 BCE between Athens and Sparta, this treaty ended the First Peloponnesian War. Athens' careful structuring of the Corcyraean alliance as 'defensive only' was an attempt to avoid technically violating this treaty, though Corinth and Sparta would argue otherwise.
Learn more →Epidamnus Affair
The conflict began when Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra, experienced civil strife. When Corcyra refused to help, Epidamnus turned to Corinth, Corcyra's mother-city. This triggered a chain reaction that drew in the major Greek powers and precipitated the Peloponnesian War.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.33)
Diodorus provides a briefer account of the Corcyraean alliance, emphasizing how this decision angered Corinth and contributed to the outbreak of war. His version corroborates Thucydides' narrative while offering a more compressed timeline.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29)
Plutarch discusses Pericles' role in advocating for the Corcyraean alliance, presenting it as part of his broader strategy of inevitable conflict with Sparta. He emphasizes Pericles' influence on Athenian public opinion during these debates.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.1)
Though Xenophon begins his history where Thucydides breaks off, he references the Corcyraean alliance as one of the war's primary causes, showing how this event was remembered as crucial to understanding the conflict's origins.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the shift in Athenian public opinion between the two assemblies reflect the strengths and weaknesses of democratic decision-making in foreign policy?
- Was Athens' attempt to create a 'defensive only' alliance a genuine effort to preserve peace, or merely a legal fiction to justify expansion?
- How does Thucydides' presentation of Athenian motivations (preventing Corcyra's fleet from joining enemies, strategic location) reveal his views on the relationship between power and justice?
- What does this passage suggest about the inevitability of the Peloponnesian War? Could different decisions at this moment have prevented the conflict?