Today's Passage
This passage describes the immediate aftermath of Brasidas's capture of Amphipolis in 424 BCE, a critical turning point in the Archidamian War phase of the Peloponnesian conflict.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused great alarm at Athens. Not only was the town valuable for the timber it afforded for shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but also, although the escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedaemonians a means of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as long as they were not masters of the bridge but were watched on the side of Eion by the Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded by a large and extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it was impossible for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the path seemed open. There was also the fear of the allies revolting, owing to the moderation displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct, and to the declarations which he was everywhere making that he sent out to free Hellas. The towns subject to the Athenians, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and of the terms accorded to it, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, felt most strongly encouraged to change their condition, and sent secret messages to him, begging him to come on to them; each wishing to be the first to revolt. Indeed there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake in their estimate of the Athenian power was as great as that power afterwards turned out to be, and their judgment was based more upon blind wishing than upon any sound prevision; for it is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long for, and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not fancy. Besides the late severe blow which the Athenians had met with in Boeotia, joined to the seductive, though untrue, statements of Brasidas, about the Athenians not having ventured to engage his single army at Nisaea, made the allies confident, and caused them to believe that no Athenian force would be sent against them. Above all the wish to do what was agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood that they should find the Lacedaemonians full of zeal at starting, made them eager to venture. Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the different towns, as far as was possible at such short notice and in winter; while Brasidas sent dispatches to Lacedaemon asking for reinforcements, and himself made preparations for building galleys in the Strymon. The Lacedaemonians however did not send him any, partly through envy on the part of their chief men, partly because they were more bent on recovering the prisoners of the island and ending the war.
Modern Translation
The news that Amphipolis had fallen to the enemy struck Athens with profound alarm. The city was valuable not merely for its timber supplies essential to shipbuilding and the revenue it generated, but for strategic reasons as well. Previously, although the Thessalians' cooperation allowed the Spartans to reach Athens' allies up to the Strymon river, the Spartans could advance no further. They lacked control of the bridge, were under surveillance by Athenian warships stationed at Eion, and faced the barrier of an extensive lake created by the river's waters on the landward approach. Now, however, the route lay open. Athens also feared that their allied cities might defect, encouraged by Brasidas's remarkably moderate conduct and his persistent proclamations that he had come to liberate Greece. The subject cities, learning of Amphipolis's capture, the generous terms granted, and Brasidas's mild temperament, felt powerfully motivated to alter their allegiance. They sent him secret communications, each urging him to advance to their territory, each wanting the distinction of being first to revolt. They perceived no risk in this course—their miscalculation of Athenian strength proved as grave as that strength ultimately demonstrated itself to be. Their judgment rested more on wishful thinking than careful analysis, for humans habitually entrust their desires to reckless optimism while employing logic only to dismiss unwelcome realities. The recent devastating defeat Athens had suffered in Boeotia, combined with Brasidas's persuasive but false claims that the Athenians had not dared face his lone army at Nisaea, emboldened the allies. They convinced themselves no Athenian force would march against them. Most crucially, the appeal of immediate gratification and the expectation of enthusiastic Spartan support made them eager to take risks. Recognizing this situation, Athens dispatched garrisons to various cities as quickly as winter conditions and short notice permitted. Meanwhile, Brasidas sent messages to Sparta requesting reinforcements and began preparations for constructing warships on the Strymon. The Spartans, however, sent no aid—partly due to jealousy among their leaders, partly because they prioritized recovering the prisoners from Sphacteria and ending the war.
Historical Context
This passage describes the immediate aftermath of Brasidas's capture of Amphipolis in 424 BCE, a critical turning point in the Archidamian War phase of the Peloponnesian conflict. Brasidas, the innovative Spartan commander, had successfully taken this vital Athenian colony through a combination of speed and diplomacy. The loss shocked Athens not only for economic reasons—Amphipolis controlled timber resources and mining revenues—but because it exposed the vulnerability of their northern empire. Brasidas's moderate policies and liberation rhetoric contrasted sharply with typical Spartan harshness, making him dangerously attractive to Athens' subject allies. The passage reveals the psychological dimension of imperial control: Athens' subjects, emboldened by recent Athenian setbacks and Brasidas's propaganda, began contemplating revolt despite their military weakness.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Amphipolis Strategic Importance
Amphipolis controlled access to Thracian timber essential for Athens' naval supremacy and generated significant revenue from local gold and silver mines. Its position on the Strymon River made it a crucial strategic gateway to Athens' northern allies and possessions.
Learn more →Brasidas's Northern Campaign
Brasidas's expedition to Thrace (424-422 BCE) represented an innovative Spartan strategy, targeting Athens' vulnerable colonial possessions rather than engaging in traditional hoplite warfare. His diplomatic skills and moderate policies won over many cities traditionally hostile to Sparta.
Learn more →Psychology of Imperial Revolt
Thucydides analyzes how subject states miscalculate power dynamics during imperial crises. The combination of wishful thinking, recent imperial setbacks, and charismatic enemy leadership creates conditions for widespread revolt, even when objective military realities favor the imperial power.
Learn more →Battle of Delium Reference
The 'severe blow in Boeotia' refers to Athens' defeat at Delium (424 BCE), where innovative Theban tactics crushed an Athenian army. This defeat, occurring shortly before Amphipolis's fall, shattered Athens' reputation for military invincibility.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.68)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of Brasidas's capture of Amphipolis, emphasizing the speed of his march and the divided loyalties within the city, complementing Thucydides' focus on the aftermath.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (6-7)
Plutarch describes Athenian reactions to military setbacks during this period, particularly emphasizing how defeats undermined confidence in imperial control and encouraged allied defections.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.35-36)
Though describing later events, Xenophon illustrates similar patterns of allied revolt when Athens showed weakness, demonstrating the recurring nature of imperial instability Thucydides identifies.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Thucydides' analysis of wishful thinking versus rational calculation apply to modern political decision-making?
- What does this passage reveal about the fragility of imperial power when based primarily on fear rather than genuine loyalty?
- Why might Spartan leaders have been envious of Brasidas's success, and what does this suggest about the internal politics of Sparta?
- How does Brasidas's strategy of presenting himself as a 'liberator' compare to similar rhetoric used by powers throughout history?