Today's Passage
This passage describes Brasidas's capture of Lecythus in Chalcidice (winter 424/3 BCE) and the subsequent one-year armistice between Athens and Sparta.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Having encouraged them with this address, as soon as the truce expired he made his attack upon Lecythus; the Athenians defending themselves from a poor wall and from some houses with parapets. One day they beat him off; the next the enemy were preparing to bring up an engine against them from which they meant to throw fire upon the wooden defences, and the troops were already coming up to the point where they fancied they could best bring up the engine, and where place was most assailable; meanwhile the Athenians put a wooden tower upon a house opposite, and carried up a quantity of jars and casks of water and big stones, and a large number of men also climbed up. The house thus laden too heavily suddenly broke down with a loud crash; at which the men who were near and saw it were more vexed than frightened; but those not so near, and still more those furthest off, thought that the place was already taken at that point, and fled in haste to the sea and the ships.
Brasidas, perceiving that they were deserting the parapet, and seeing what was going on, dashed forward with his troops, and immediately took the fort, and put to the sword all whom he found in it. In this way the place was evacuated by the Athenians, who went across in their boats and ships to Pallene. Now there is a temple of Athene in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed in the moment of making the assault that he would give thirty silver minae to the man first on the wall. Being now of opinion that the capture was scarcely due to human means, he gave the thirty minae to the goddess for her temple, and razed and cleared Lecythus, and made the whole of it consecrated ground. The rest of the winter he spent in settling the places in his hands, and in making designs upon the rest; and with the expiration of the winter the eighth year of this war ended.
In the spring of the summer following, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made an armistice for a year; the Athenians thinking that they would thus have full leisure to take their precautions before Brasidas could procure the revolt of any more of their towns, and might also, if it suited them, conclude a general peace; the Lacedaemonians divining the actual fears of the Athenians, and thinking that after once tasting a respite from trouble and misery they would be more disposed to consent to a reconciliation, and to give back the prisoners, and make a treaty for the longer period. The great idea of the Lacedaemonians was to get back their men while Brasidas’s good fortune lasted: further successes might make the struggle a less unequal one in Chalcidice, but would leave them still deprived of their men, and even in Chalcidice not more than a match for the Athenians and by no means certain of victory. An armistice was accordingly concluded by Lacedaemon and her allies upon the terms following:
Modern Translation
After delivering this encouraging speech, Brasidas launched his assault on Lecythus as soon as the truce expired. The Athenians defended themselves from a poorly constructed wall and some houses equipped with defensive parapets. On the first day, they successfully repelled his attack. The following day, however, the enemy prepared to deploy a siege engine designed to hurl fire at the wooden fortifications. As troops moved up to position the engine at what they considered the most vulnerable point, the Athenians responded by erecting a wooden tower on an opposing house. They hauled up numerous water-filled jars and casks, heavy stones, and stationed many men on top. The structure, overburdened by this excessive weight, suddenly collapsed with a tremendous crash. Those nearby who witnessed the collapse were more frustrated than alarmed, but the soldiers stationed farther away—especially those at the greatest distance—assumed the position had fallen and fled in panic toward the sea and their ships.
Brasidas, observing the defenders abandoning their posts and recognizing the opportunity, charged forward with his forces. He swiftly captured the fortification and killed everyone found inside. The surviving Athenians evacuated the position, crossing to Pallene in their boats and ships. Now, there stood a temple of Athena within Lecythus, and during the assault, Brasidas had announced he would award thirty silver minae to the first man to scale the wall. Convinced that the victory owed more to divine intervention than human effort, he dedicated the thirty minae to the goddess for her temple. He then demolished and cleared Lecythus entirely, consecrating the whole area as sacred ground. He spent the remainder of winter consolidating his captured territories and planning operations against other positions. With winter's end, the eighth year of the war concluded.
When spring arrived in the following summer, the Spartans and Athenians negotiated a one-year armistice. The Athenians calculated this would provide necessary time to strengthen their defenses before Brasidas could incite further revolts among their subject cities, and might also facilitate negotiations for a comprehensive peace. The Spartans correctly perceived Athenian anxieties and believed that once the Athenians experienced relief from constant warfare and hardship, they would prove more amenable to reconciliation, willing to return prisoners and establish a longer-term treaty. The Spartans' primary objective was recovering their captured soldiers while Brasidas maintained his successful momentum. They recognized that while additional victories might balance the conflict in Chalcidice, they would remain without their men and still face uncertain prospects against Athens, even in that theater. Consequently, Sparta and her allies concluded an armistice on the following terms:
Historical Context
This passage describes Brasidas's capture of Lecythus in Chalcidice (winter 424/3 BCE) and the subsequent one-year armistice between Athens and Sparta. Brasidas, Sparta's most successful general, had been campaigning in northern Greece, threatening Athens's vital grain supply routes and encouraging revolts among Athenian subject cities. The dramatic collapse of the Athenian defensive position at Lecythus—caused by structural failure rather than enemy action—demonstrates the precarious nature of Athens's imperial holdings. The armistice negotiations reveal both sides' war-weariness after eight years of conflict, with Sparta particularly anxious to recover the hoplites captured at Sphacteria (425 BCE), while Athens sought breathing space to address Brasidas's threat to their empire.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Siege Warfare
Ancient siege engines included devices for hurling fire, stones, or other projectiles. The fire-throwing engine mentioned here was likely similar to later Byzantine Greek fire projectors. Wooden fortifications were particularly vulnerable to incendiary attacks, making water storage crucial for defense.
Learn more →Sacred Spaces in Warfare
Brasidas's dedication of the captured territory to Athena reflects Greek religious customs regarding warfare. Consecrating conquered land prevented its military use and demonstrated piety. His attribution of victory to divine intervention rather than human skill was both diplomatically shrewd and religiously appropriate.
Learn more →Spartan Prisoners at Sphacteria
The capture of 292 Spartan hoplites (including 120 Spartiates) at Sphacteria in 425 BCE was unprecedented. Spartans traditionally died rather than surrender. These prisoners became crucial leverage for Athens and recovering them dominated Spartan strategic thinking throughout this period.
Learn more →Chalcidice Campaign
Brasidas's northern campaign threatened Athens's grain supply from the Black Sea region and encouraged revolts among tribute-paying allies. His success in winning over Greek cities through diplomacy and military skill made him Sparta's most effective commander against the Athenian empire.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 9-10)
Plutarch describes the same period, emphasizing Nicias's role in promoting the armistice and his desire for peace, providing insight into Athenian motivations beyond Thucydides's strategic analysis.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.73)
Diodorus provides a condensed account of Brasidas's Thracian campaigns and the armistice, though with less detail than Thucydides, offering a later historical perspective on these events.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.1)
Though Xenophon begins his narrative after this period, he references the impact of Brasidas's campaigns and the pattern of truces and renewed conflicts that characterized the later Peloponnesian War.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the accidental collapse of the Athenian defensive position illustrate Thucydides's views on the role of chance (tyche) versus human planning in warfare?
- What does Brasidas's dedication of the prize money to Athena reveal about the intersection of religion, warfare, and political leadership in ancient Greece?
- How do the different motivations for the armistice reveal the strategic situations of Athens and Sparta at this point in the war?
- Why might Thucydides include such specific details about the siege preparations and defensive measures? What does this tell us about his intended audience?