Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 266 of 506 Book 4, Chapter 14 August 17, 2026
53% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage describes Brasidas's successful surprise attack on Torone in 424 BCE, during his brilliant campaign through Thrace.

Crawley Translation (1910)

Brasidas seeing the signal told the troops to rise, and dashed forward amid the loud hurrahs of his men, which carried dismay among the astonished townspeople. Some burst in straight by the gate, others over some square pieces of timber placed against the wall (which has fallen down and was being rebuilt) to draw up stones; Brasidas and the greater number making straight uphill for the higher part of the town, in order to take it from top to bottom, and once for all, while the rest of the multitude spread in all directions.

The capture of the town was effected before the great body of the Toronaeans had recovered from their surprise and confusion; but the conspirators and the citizens of their party at once joined the invaders. About fifty of the Athenian heavy infantry happened to be sleeping in the market-place when the alarm reached them. A few of these were killed fighting; the rest escaped, some by land, others to the two ships on the station, and took refuge in Lecythus, a fort garrisoned by their own men in the corner of the town running out into the sea and cut off by a narrow isthmus; where they were joined by the Toronaeans of their party.

Day now arrived, and the town being secured, Brasidas made a proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, to come out, as many as chose, to their homes without fearing for their rights or persons, and sent a herald to invite the Athenians to accept a truce, and to evacuate Lecythus with their property, as being Chalcidian ground. The Athenians refused this offer, but asked for a truce for a day to take up their dead. Brasidas granted it for two days, which he employed in fortifying the houses near, and the Athenians in doing the same to their positions. Meanwhile he called a meeting of the Toronaeans, and said very much what he had said at Acanthus, namely, that they must not look upon those who had negotiated with him for the capture of the town as bad men or as traitors, as they had not acted as they had done from corrupt motives or in order to enslave the city, but for the good and freedom of Torone; nor again must those who had not shared in the enterprise fancy that they would not equally reap its fruits, as he had not come to destroy either city or individual. This was the reason of his proclamation to those that had fled for refuge to the Athenians: he thought none the worse of them for their friendship for the Athenians; he believed that they had only to make trial of the Lacedaemonians to like them as well, or even much better, as acting much more justly: it was for want of such a trial that they were now afraid of them. Meanwhile he warned all of them to prepare to be staunch allies, and for being held responsible for all faults in future: for the past, they had not wronged the Lacedaemonians but had been wronged by others who were too strong for them, and any opposition that they might have offered him could be excused.

Modern Translation

When Brasidas saw the signal, he ordered his troops to rise up and charged forward. His men raised a tremendous battle cry that struck terror into the hearts of the bewildered townspeople. Some soldiers burst straight through the gate, while others climbed over wooden beams that had been propped against a section of wall that had collapsed and was under reconstruction—these beams were being used to hoist stones for the repairs. Brasidas himself, along with the majority of his force, rushed directly uphill toward the upper part of the city. His goal was to capture it completely from the highest point downward, securing it once and for all, while the rest of his troops scattered throughout the town in every direction.

The city fell before most of the Toroneans could shake off their shock and confusion. However, the conspirators and those citizens sympathetic to their cause immediately joined forces with the invaders. Around fifty Athenian hoplites happened to be sleeping in the marketplace when the alarm sounded. A handful died fighting; the survivors fled—some escaping overland, others reaching the two ships stationed nearby—and found sanctuary in Lecythus. This was a fortified position held by Athenian forces, located on a promontory jutting into the sea and connected to the mainland by only a narrow strip of land. They were joined there by those Toroneans who supported Athens.

By daybreak, with the city firmly under his control, Brasidas issued a proclamation to those Toroneans who had sought refuge with the Athenians: they could return to their homes whenever they wished, with full guarantee of their safety and civil rights. He also dispatched a herald to the Athenians with an offer—they should agree to a truce and evacuate Lecythus with all their possessions, since it was rightfully Chalcidian territory. The Athenians rejected this proposal but requested a one-day truce to retrieve their dead. Brasidas granted them two days instead. During this period, he set about fortifying the buildings nearest to Lecythus, while the Athenians strengthened their own defensive positions.

Meanwhile, Brasidas convened an assembly of the Toroneans and delivered essentially the same message he had given at Acanthus. He insisted they should not view those who had conspired with him to capture the city as evil men or traitors. These conspirators had not acted from selfish motives or with any intention of enslaving their fellow citizens; rather, they had acted for Torone's benefit and liberation. Similarly, those who had not participated in the plot should not imagine they would be excluded from its benefits—he had come neither to destroy the city nor to harm any individual. This explained his proclamation to those who had fled to the Athenians: he bore them no ill will for their pro-Athenian sympathies. He was confident that once they experienced Spartan rule, they would find it equally agreeable, perhaps even preferable, since the Spartans governed more justly. Their current fear stemmed simply from lack of experience with Spartan ways. However, he cautioned everyone to prepare themselves to be loyal allies going forward, as they would be held accountable for any future disloyalty. As for past actions, the Toroneans had not wronged Sparta but had themselves been wronged by others more powerful than they. Any resistance they might have shown him earlier was therefore understandable and pardonable.

Historical Context

This passage describes Brasidas's successful surprise attack on Torone in 424 BCE, during his brilliant campaign through Thrace. Torone was an important city on the Chalcidice peninsula, allied to Athens. Brasidas, the most capable Spartan general of the war, had been systematically detaching cities from the Athenian empire through a combination of military prowess and diplomatic skill. The capture was facilitated by pro-Spartan conspirators within the city. The passage showcases Brasidas's characteristic approach: swift military action followed by conciliatory rhetoric aimed at winning hearts and minds. This campaign would ultimately force Athens to seek peace, leading to the Peace of Nicias in 421 BCE. The incident demonstrates how the war was fought not just through major battles but through the constant struggle for the allegiance of smaller allied cities.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Brasidas's Northern Campaign

Brasidas's expedition to Thrace (424-422 BCE) was a masterful strategic move that threatened Athens's vital grain supply routes and tribute-paying allies. His combination of military skill and diplomatic finesse made him uniquely dangerous to Athenian interests, as he could both capture cities and convince them to remain loyal to Sparta.

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Siege Warfare Tactics

The assault on Torone demonstrates typical Greek siege tactics: surprise attacks at dawn, exploitation of weak points in fortifications (here, a collapsed wall under repair), and the importance of controlling high ground within a city. The wooden beams mentioned were construction equipment repurposed as assault ladders.

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Greek City Loyalty

The divided loyalties within Torone reflect a common pattern in the Peloponnesian War. Most cities contained both pro-Athenian (usually democratic) and pro-Spartan (usually oligarchic) factions. Brasidas's speech attempts to reassure both groups, promising neither revenge nor political revolution.

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Military Conventions

The truce to recover dead bodies was a sacred custom in Greek warfare. Even bitter enemies would pause hostilities to allow proper burial of the fallen. Brasidas's granting of two days instead of the requested one shows both his strong position and his desire to appear magnanimous.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Nicias (6.1-2)

Plutarch describes how Brasidas's successes in Thrace, including the capture of cities like Torone, created panic in Athens and contributed to Nicias's desire for peace negotiations.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.68)

Diodorus provides a condensed account of Brasidas's Thracian campaign, confirming the strategic importance of winning over Chalcidian cities through both force and persuasion.

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Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.12)

Though dealing with a later period, Xenophon describes similar patterns of cities switching sides through internal conspiracy, showing this remained a common feature of Greek warfare.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does Brasidas's treatment of the defeated Toroneans reflect Spartan strategy versus Athenian imperial practice? What are the advantages and risks of his conciliatory approach?
  2. Analyze the role of internal conspiracy in the fall of Torone. What does this suggest about the stability of alliance systems in the Greek world?
  3. Compare Brasidas's rhetoric about 'liberation' with modern military interventions. How do powerful states justify interference in smaller nations' affairs?
  4. Why might Thucydides include the detail about Athenian soldiers sleeping in the marketplace? What does this suggest about Athenian preparedness and expectations?