Today's Passage
This passage describes the Battle of Sybota (433 BCE), a crucial naval engagement between Corinth and Corcyra that helped precipitate the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three days’ provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for action. Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both sides formed in order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay the Athenian ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their own vessels formed in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by one of the three admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The Corinthian was as follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the centre the rest of the allies in order. But the left was composed of the best sailers in the Corinthian navy, to encounter the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle. Both sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and a large number of archers and darters, the old imperfect armament still prevailing. The sea-fight was an obstinate one, though not remarkable for its science; indeed it was more like a battle by land. Whenever they charged each other, the multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no means easy to get loose; besides, their hopes of victory lay principally in the heavy infantry on the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary. The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried; in short, strength and pluck had more share in the fight than science. Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders could not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened by the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the Corinthians were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set to, and all distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, that the Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each other.
Modern Translation
After completing their preparations, the Corinthians provisioned themselves for three days and set sail from Chimerium under cover of darkness, ready for battle. As dawn broke, they caught sight of the Corcyraean fleet at sea, advancing toward them. When the two fleets spotted each other, both immediately arranged themselves in battle formation. The Athenian ships held the right wing of the Corcyraean line, while the remainder consisted of their own vessels organized into three squadrons, each commanded by one of their three admirals. This was the Corcyraean arrangement. The Corinthians positioned themselves as follows: the Megarian and Ambraciot vessels occupied the right wing, the remaining allies held the center in their assigned positions, while the left wing consisted of the Corinthians' finest ships, positioned to face the Athenians and the Corcyraean right. Once battle signals were raised on both sides, they engaged. Both fleets carried numerous heavy infantry on their decks, along with many archers and javelin-throwers, reflecting the outdated tactical approach still prevalent at the time. The naval engagement proved fierce, though it lacked sophistication—it resembled a land battle more than a sea fight. When ships collided, the sheer number and density of vessels made disengagement extremely difficult. Moreover, victory depended primarily on the deck-fighting infantry, who maintained formation while the ships remained motionless. No one attempted the maneuver of breaking through the enemy line; brute force and courage counted for more than tactical skill. Chaos prevailed throughout, with the battle degenerating into complete disorder. Meanwhile, the Athenian ships alarmed the enemy by supporting the Corcyraeans whenever they came under pressure, though their commanders avoided direct engagement, mindful of their orders. The Corinthian right wing suffered the worst defeat. The Corcyraeans routed them and pursued them in disarray to the mainland with twenty ships, reached their camp, burned the abandoned tents, and looted their supplies. Thus, in this sector, the Corinthians and their allies suffered defeat while the Corcyraeans claimed victory. However, on the left where the Corinthians themselves fought, they achieved a clear victory. The already limited Corcyraean forces were further weakened by the absence of the twenty ships engaged in pursuit. Observing the Corcyraeans under severe pressure, the Athenians finally began providing more direct assistance. Initially, they had avoided attacking enemy vessels, but as the rout became obvious and the Corinthians pressed their advantage, the moment arrived when everyone engaged fully. All restraint vanished, and the situation deteriorated to the point where Corinthians and Athenians were fighting each other directly.
Historical Context
This passage describes the Battle of Sybota (433 BCE), a crucial naval engagement between Corinth and Corcyra that helped precipitate the Peloponnesian War. Corcyra, though traditionally neutral, had sought alliance with Athens against Corinth, their former colony. Athens sent a small defensive squadron with strict orders to avoid initiating combat unless Corcyra faced invasion. The battle's significance lies in its violation of the Thirty Years' Peace between Athens and Sparta, as Corinth was a Spartan ally. When Athenian ships ultimately engaged Corinthian forces directly, it provided Corinth with grounds to claim Athens had broken the peace. This incident, combined with the Potidaea affair, would lead Corinth to pressure Sparta into declaring war on Athens, marking a critical step toward the great conflict that would consume Greece for nearly three decades.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Ancient Naval Warfare
This battle exemplifies early 5th-century BCE naval tactics, where ships served primarily as fighting platforms for infantry rather than employing ramming tactics. The 'old imperfect armament' Thucydides mentions would soon be replaced by more sophisticated trireme warfare emphasizing speed and maneuverability.
Learn more →Athenian Foreign Policy
The Athenian commanders' hesitation reflects the delicate diplomatic situation. Athens provided only defensive assistance (epimachia) rather than full alliance (symmachia), attempting to support Corcyra without technically violating the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta.
Learn more →Battle of Sybota
This engagement near the Sybota islands was one of the largest naval battles in Greek history to that point, involving over 250 ships. Despite its tactical indecisiveness, it had profound strategic consequences for Greek interstate relations.
Learn more →Corcyra
Modern Corfu, Corcyra was a wealthy naval power controlling the coastal route to Italy and Sicily. Its strategic location and powerful fleet made it a valuable but dangerous ally for Athens, as securing it meant antagonizing Corinth.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.33)
Diodorus provides a briefer account of the Battle of Sybota, emphasizing the unprecedented scale of the engagement and confirming the Athenian intervention.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29)
Plutarch discusses Pericles' cautious policy regarding Corcyra, highlighting the political debates in Athens about whether to risk war with Corinth over this alliance.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.18)
While describing later naval battles, Xenophon contrasts the sophisticated ramming tactics of his era with the boarding-focused combat style seen at Sybota.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Thucydides' description of the battle as 'more like a battle by land' reflect the transitional nature of Greek naval warfare in this period?
- What does the Athenian commanders' initial restraint and eventual intervention reveal about the complexities of alliance obligations versus treaty commitments?
- How might the outcome have differed if the Corcyraeans had maintained better tactical discipline instead of pursuing the fleeing enemy?
- To what extent was direct Athenian-Corinthian combat inevitable given the battle's dynamics, regardless of diplomatic instructions?