Today's Passage
This passage describes the aftermath of the Battle of Sybota (433 BCE), a major naval engagement between Corinth and Corcyra that helped precipitate the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as they sailed through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of their own friends were slain by them, by mistake, in their ignorance of the defeat of the right wing For the number of the ships on both sides, and the distance to which they covered the sea, made it difficult, after they had once joined, to distinguish between the conquering and the conquered; this battle proving far greater than any before it, any at least between Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged. After the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the wrecks and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of and conveying to Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by their barbarian allies. Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour of Thesprotis. This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who on their part advanced to meet them with all their ships that were fit for service and remaining to them, accompanied by the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing in their territory. It was by this time getting late, and the paean had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians, who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans and the inability of their handful of ships to protect them. These ships were thus seen by the Corinthians first. They suspected that they were from Athens, and that those which they saw were not all, but that there were more behind; they accordingly began to retire. The Corcyraeans meanwhile had not sighted them, as they were advancing from a point which they could not so well see, and were wondering why the Corinthians were backing water, when some caught sight of them, and cried out that there were ships in sight ahead. Upon this they also retired; for it was now getting dark, and the retreat of the Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night. The Corcyraeans were in their camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and Andocides, son of Leogoras, bore on through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed up to the camp, not long after they were sighted. It was now night, and the Corcyraeans feared that they might be hostile vessels; but they soon knew them, and the ships came to anchor.
Modern Translation
Following their victory, the Corinthians neglected to secure the disabled enemy vessels by lashing them together and towing them away. Instead, they focused on slaughtering the men in the water, sailing among them and butchering rather than taking prisoners. In the confusion, they even killed some of their own allies by mistake, unaware that their right wing had been defeated. The sheer number of ships engaged on both sides and the vast area they covered made it impossible, once battle was joined, to distinguish friend from foe. This naval engagement exceeded all previous battles between Greek states in the number of vessels involved. After pursuing the Corcyraeans to shore, the Corinthians turned their attention to recovering wreckage and bodies, managing to collect most of their dead and transport them to Sybota, where their barbarian allies' land forces had assembled. Sybota, it should be noted, is a desolate harbor in Thesprotis. Having completed this grim task, they regrouped and advanced again toward the Corcyraeans, who sailed out to meet them with all their serviceable ships, now accompanied by the Athenian vessels, fearing the Corinthians might attempt to land on their territory. By now it was growing late, and just as the battle hymn was being sung for the attack, the Corinthians suddenly began backing away. They had spotted twenty Athenian ships approaching—reinforcements that Athens had dispatched after the original ten, correctly anticipating that the Corcyraeans might be defeated and their small squadron prove insufficient protection. The Corinthians saw these ships first and, suspecting they were from Athens and that more might follow, began to withdraw. The Corcyraeans had not yet spotted the newcomers, approaching as they were from a blind angle, and were puzzled by the Corinthian retreat until someone caught sight of the ships and shouted the alarm. Then they too withdrew, for darkness was falling and the Corinthian retreat had effectively ended hostilities. Thus the forces separated, and nightfall concluded the battle. While the Corcyraeans were encamped at Leukimme, the twenty Athenian ships under Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras sailed through the floating corpses and wreckage to reach the camp shortly after being spotted. In the darkness, the Corcyraeans initially feared these might be enemy vessels, but soon recognized them as allies, and the ships anchored safely.
Historical Context
This passage describes the aftermath of the Battle of Sybota (433 BCE), a major naval engagement between Corinth and Corcyra that helped precipitate the Peloponnesian War. The battle occurred when Corinth attempted to recapture its colony Epidamnus, which had allied with Corcyra. Athens had sent a small defensive squadron to support Corcyra without directly engaging Corinth, hoping to prevent Corcyra's powerful navy from falling into enemy hands. The arrival of Athenian reinforcements at the crucial moment prevented a Corinthian victory and demonstrated Athens' growing involvement in conflicts outside its immediate sphere. This intervention violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the Thirty Years' Peace between Athens and Sparta, contributing to the deteriorating relations that would soon erupt into full-scale war.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Naval Warfare in Classical Greece
Greek naval battles typically involved ramming tactics with triremes. The confusion described here illustrates the chaos of ancient naval combat, where hundreds of ships maneuvered in close quarters without modern communication systems. The practice of killing rather than capturing enemies reflects the brutal nature of such engagements.
Learn more →Barbarian Allies
Thucydides uses 'barbarian' to denote non-Greek peoples. The Corinthians' allies here were likely Illyrian or Epirote tribes from the mainland. Greek states frequently employed such allies, though they were considered culturally inferior. This reflects the complex ethnic dynamics of the ancient Mediterranean.
Learn more →The Paean
The paean was a ritual battle hymn sung to Apollo before combat. Its mention here emphasizes the religious dimension of Greek warfare and the dramatic timing of the Corinthian withdrawal—just as battle was about to resume, the arrival of Athenian reinforcements changed everything.
Learn more →Athenian Imperialism
Athens' intervention demonstrates its policy of preventing any rival naval power from emerging. Though technically neutral, Athens acted to preserve the balance of power, showing how its empire functioned through strategic interventions rather than just direct control.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.33)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the Battle of Sybota, though with less detail than Thucydides. He emphasizes the role of the Athenian intervention in preventing Corinthian victory.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29)
Plutarch discusses Pericles' strategy in sending limited aid to Corcyra, showing how Athens tried to weaken its rivals without formally breaking the peace treaty with Sparta.
Read passage →Herodotus: Histories (7.184)
Though describing the earlier Persian Wars, Herodotus' account of naval confusion at Artemisium provides a comparable example of the chaos in large-scale ancient naval battles, where friend and foe became indistinguishable.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the confusion and friendly fire in this battle reflect the limitations of ancient warfare? What does this tell us about the nature of military technology and communication in the classical period?
- Why might the Corinthians have prioritized killing enemies over taking prisoners? What does this suggest about the economics and ethics of ancient Greek warfare?
- How does the arrival of the twenty Athenian ships function as a 'deus ex machina' in the narrative? What might Thucydides be suggesting about the role of timing and perception in international relations?
- Consider the Corcyraeans' initial fear that the arriving ships might be enemies. How does this uncertainty reflect larger themes about knowledge, perception, and decision-making in Thucydides' work?