Today's Passage
This passage occurs in 421 BCE, immediately after the Peace of Nicias ended the first phase of the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it fell to begin the work of restitution, immediately set free all the prisoners of war in their possession, and sent Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to the towns in the direction of Thrace, to order Clearidas to hand over Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of their allies each to accept the treaty as it affected them. They, however, did not like its terms, and refused to accept it; Clearidas also, willing to oblige the Chalcidians, would not hand over the town, averring his inability to do so against their will. Meanwhile he hastened in person to Lacedaemon with envoys from the place, to defend his disobedience against the possible accusations of Ischagoras and his companions, and also to see whether it was too late for the agreement to be altered; and on finding the Lacedaemonians were bound, quickly set out back again with instructions from them to hand over the place, if possible, or at all events to bring out the Peloponnesians that were in it.
The allies happened to be present in person at Lacedaemon, and those who had not accepted the treaty were now asked by the Lacedaemonians to adopt it. This, however, they refused to do, for the same reasons as before, unless a fairer one than the present were agreed upon; and remaining firm in their determination were dismissed by the Lacedaemonians, who now decided on forming an alliance with the Athenians, thinking that Argos, who had refused the application of Ampelidas and Lichas for a renewal of the treaty, would without Athens be no longer formidable, and that the rest of the Peloponnese would be most likely to keep quiet, if the coveted alliance of Athens were shut against them. Accordingly, after conference with the Athenian ambassadors, an alliance was agreed upon and oaths were exchanged, upon the terms following:
1. The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years.
2. Should any enemy invade the territory of Lacedaemon and injure the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall help in such way as they most effectively can, according to their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the country, that city shall be the enemy of Lacedaemon and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and one shall not make peace without the other. This to be honestly, loyally, and without fraud.
3. Should any enemy invade the territory of Athens and injure the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall help them in such way as they most effectively can, according to their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the country, that city shall be the enemy of Lacedaemon and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and one shall not make peace without the other. This to be honestly, loyally, and without fraud.
Modern Translation
The Spartans, whose responsibility it was to begin implementing the treaty's terms, immediately released all their prisoners of war and dispatched Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as ambassadors to the Thracian region. Their mission was to instruct Clearidas to surrender Amphipolis to Athens and to ensure that each of their allies complied with the treaty provisions affecting them. However, these allies found the terms unacceptable and refused to ratify the agreement. Clearidas himself, sympathetic to the Chalcidians' position, declined to surrender the city, claiming he lacked the power to do so against their wishes. He hurried personally to Sparta with local envoys to defend his refusal against potential charges from Ischagoras and his colleagues, and also to determine whether the treaty might still be modified. Upon discovering that the Spartans were committed to the agreement, he quickly returned with orders to surrender the city if possible, or at minimum to evacuate all Peloponnesian forces stationed there.
As it happened, the allies were present in Sparta at this time, and the Spartans pressed those who had rejected the treaty to accept it. They refused once again, citing the same objections as before and demanding more equitable terms. Maintaining their position firmly, they were dismissed by the Spartans, who then resolved to forge an alliance with Athens. They calculated that Argos—which had rejected the overtures of Ampelidas and Lichas for treaty renewal—would pose little threat without Athenian support, and that the rest of the Peloponnese would likely remain peaceful if denied the attractive prospect of Athenian alliance. Following negotiations with the Athenian ambassadors, they concluded an alliance and exchanged oaths on these terms:
1. Sparta and Athens shall maintain their alliance for fifty years.
2. If any enemy invades Spartan territory and harms the Spartans, Athens shall provide the most effective assistance within their power. Should the invader withdraw after ravaging the land, that state shall become the enemy of both Sparta and Athens, face punishment from both, and neither ally may make separate peace. This commitment shall be upheld honestly, faithfully, and without deception.
3. If any enemy invades Athenian territory and harms the Athenians, Sparta shall provide the most effective assistance within their power. Should the invader withdraw after ravaging the land, that state shall become the enemy of both Sparta and Athens, face punishment from both, and neither ally may make separate peace. This commitment shall be upheld honestly, faithfully, and without deception.
Historical Context
This passage occurs in 421 BCE, immediately after the Peace of Nicias ended the first phase of the Peloponnesian War. The treaty required both sides to return captured territories and prisoners, but implementation proved difficult. Sparta's allies, particularly those in Chalcidice near Amphipolis, rejected the peace terms that would return strategic locations to Athens. The failure to implement the treaty fully led Sparta to pursue a separate defensive alliance with Athens, hoping to isolate potential troublemakers like Argos and maintain stability in the Peloponnese. This alliance represents a dramatic reversal—former enemies becoming allies—but it would prove fragile, as neither side trusted the other and their fundamental conflicts of interest remained unresolved.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Amphipolis
A strategic Greek colony in Thrace, originally Athenian, captured by the Spartan general Brasidas in 424 BCE. Its loss was a major blow to Athens, and its recovery was a key Athenian demand in the Peace of Nicias. The city controlled access to timber and precious metals vital for naval power.
Learn more →Peace of Nicias
The treaty of 421 BCE that temporarily ended hostilities between Athens and Sparta. Named after the Athenian general who negotiated it, the peace was meant to last fifty years but broke down within a few years due to non-compliance by various parties and unresolved tensions.
Learn more →Chalcidice
A peninsula in northern Greece where many cities had revolted from Athens with Spartan encouragement. These Chalcidian cities feared Athenian retribution if returned to Athenian control under the peace treaty, explaining their resistance to its implementation.
Learn more →Argos
A major Peloponnesian city that had remained neutral during the war due to a thirty-year peace with Sparta. As this treaty neared expiration, Argos emerged as a potential rival to Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnese, making Sparta eager to secure Athenian support.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 10)
Plutarch describes the negotiations leading to the Peace of Nicias and the subsequent alliance, providing biographical context about Nicias's role and motivations in securing both agreements.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.75-76)
Offers a condensed account of the Peace of Nicias and its immediate aftermath, including the difficulties in implementation and the separate Spartan-Athenian alliance.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.1.1-23)
While focusing on later events, Xenophon's opening references the breakdown of the Peace of Nicias and provides context for understanding why the alliance described here ultimately failed.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- Why might Sparta's allies have rejected the Peace of Nicias? What does their refusal reveal about the nature of hegemonic alliances in ancient Greece?
- How does the Spartan-Athenian alliance represent both realpolitik and a betrayal of each side's traditional allies? What does this suggest about the priority of self-interest over ideology?
- What are the implications of Clearidas's refusal to follow Spartan orders? How does this incident illustrate the limits of Spartan power over its supposed subordinates?
- The alliance terms emphasize acting 'honestly, loyally, and without fraud.' Why might such language be necessary, and what does it suggest about Greek diplomatic culture?