Today's Passage
This passage occurs in 421 BCE, immediately after the Peace of Nicias ended the first phase of the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
After the conclusion of the fifty years’ truce and of the subsequent alliance, the embassies from Peloponnese which had been summoned for this business returned from Lacedaemon. The rest went straight home, but the Corinthians first turned aside to Argos and opened negotiations with some of the men in office there, pointing out that Lacedaemon could have no good end in view, but only the subjugation of Peloponnese, or she would never have entered into treaty and alliance with the once detested Athenians, and that the duty of consulting for the safety of Peloponnese had now fallen upon Argos, who should immediately pass a decree inviting any Hellenic state that chose, such state being independent and accustomed to meet fellow powers upon the fair and equal ground of law and justice, to make a defensive alliance with the Argives; appointing a few individuals with plenipotentiary powers, instead of making the people the medium of negotiation, in order that, in the case of an applicant being rejected, the fact of his overtures might not be made public. They said that many would come over from hatred of the Lacedaemonians. After this explanation of their views, the Corinthians returned home.
The persons with whom they had communicated reported the proposal to their government and people, and the Argives passed the decree and chose twelve men to negotiate an alliance for any Hellenic state that wished it, except Athens and Lacedaemon, neither of which should be able to join without reference to the Argive people. Argos came into the plan the more readily because she saw that war with Lacedaemon was inevitable, the truce being on the point of expiring; and also because she hoped to gain the supremacy of Peloponnese. For at this time Lacedaemon had sunk very low in public estimation because of her disasters, while the Argives were in a most flourishing condition, having taken no part in the Attic war, but having on the contrary profited largely by their neutrality. The Argives accordingly prepared to receive into alliance any of the Hellenes that desired it.
Modern Translation
After the fifty-year peace treaty and the subsequent alliance were finalized, the embassies from the Peloponnese that had been called to participate in these negotiations departed from Sparta. While the others returned directly to their cities, the Corinthians made a detour to Argos and initiated discussions with certain officials there. They argued that Sparta could have no honorable intentions but must be plotting to enslave the Peloponnese, since why else would they form a treaty and alliance with the Athenians, whom they had previously despised? They insisted that the responsibility for protecting Peloponnesian security had now shifted to Argos, which should immediately decree that any Greek state desiring to do so—provided it was autonomous and committed to resolving disputes through fair and impartial legal proceedings—could enter into a defensive alliance with Argos. They recommended appointing a small group with full negotiating authority rather than conducting diplomacy through the popular assembly, ensuring that if any state's application were rejected, their approach would remain confidential. They predicted many states would join out of animosity toward Sparta. Having presented these arguments, the Corinthians went home.
Those with whom they had spoken presented the proposal to their government and assembly. The Argives approved the decree and selected twelve men to negotiate alliances with any Greek state that desired one, excluding Athens and Sparta, neither of which could join without the explicit consent of the Argive people. Argos embraced this plan eagerly, recognizing that conflict with Sparta was unavoidable since their truce was nearly expired, and hoping to achieve hegemony over the Peloponnese. At this juncture, Sparta's reputation had plummeted due to recent military failures, while Argos enjoyed exceptional prosperity, having avoided involvement in the Athenian war and instead profiting considerably from neutrality. The Argives thus prepared to welcome into their alliance any Greeks who sought membership.
Historical Context
This passage occurs in 421 BCE, immediately after the Peace of Nicias ended the first phase of the Peloponnesian War. Despite the peace treaty between Athens and Sparta, many of Sparta's allies were dissatisfied with the terms. Corinth, particularly aggrieved by territorial losses, begins undermining the peace by encouraging Argos to form a rival alliance system. Argos, Sparta's traditional enemy in the Peloponnese, had remained neutral during the war and emerged prosperous and ambitious. The Corinthians cleverly appeal to Argive ambitions while presenting their proposal as defensive and principled. This diplomatic maneuvering represents the beginning of a complex period of shifting alliances that would ultimately lead to renewed warfare. The passage demonstrates how quickly the fragile peace began to unravel and how smaller powers attempted to exploit the changing balance of power between Athens and Sparta.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Peace of Nicias
The fifty-year peace treaty mentioned here was signed in 421 BCE between Athens and Sparta, ending the first decade of the Peloponnesian War. Named after the Athenian general who negotiated it, the peace proved fragile due to dissatisfied allies and unresolved disputes. Many of Sparta's allies, especially Corinth, felt betrayed by the terms.
Learn more →Argive Neutrality
Argos had maintained neutrality during the Archidamian War (431-421 BCE) due to a thirty-year peace with Sparta. This neutrality allowed Argos to prosper economically while other states exhausted themselves in warfare. As the peace expired, Argos sought to reassert its traditional claim to Peloponnesian leadership.
Learn more →Corinthian Diplomacy
Corinth's approach here exemplifies Greek diplomatic practice: secret negotiations with select officials, appeals to shared interests and fears, and the strategic use of anti-Spartan sentiment. Their proposal for a small negotiating committee rather than public debate shows sophisticated understanding of diplomatic discretion.
Learn more →Peloponnesian League
The Spartan-led alliance system that Corinth seeks to undermine. Members were autonomous but bound to follow Sparta in war. The Peace of Nicias created tensions within this system, as Sparta made peace without fully consulting or satisfying all allies' interests, particularly Corinth's territorial claims.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (10.1-4)
Plutarch describes the aftermath of the Peace of Nicias and how various allies, especially Corinth and Boeotia, immediately began working to undermine it, corroborating Thucydides' account of post-treaty maneuvering.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.75-76)
Diodorus provides a condensed account of the formation of the Argive alliance, though with less detail about Corinthian motivations. He emphasizes Argos's ambitions for Peloponnesian hegemony.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (5.2.1-7)
Though describing later events, Xenophon's account of Corinthian diplomatic initiatives against Sparta in the 390s BCE shows similar patterns of coalition-building through bilateral negotiations and appeals to autonomy.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Corinth's characterization of the Spartan-Athenian peace as a threat to Peloponnesian freedom reflect the rhetoric of power politics versus genuine concern for autonomy?
- What does the Argive stipulation excluding Athens and Sparta without popular approval reveal about the balance between diplomatic flexibility and democratic accountability?
- How does Thucydides' presentation of Argive motivations (inevitability of war, ambition for hegemony, current prosperity) illustrate his views on the relationship between power and policy?
- Why might Corinth prefer secret negotiations through selected officials rather than public diplomatic approaches, and what does this suggest about the nature of alliance-building in classical Greece?