Today's Passage
This passage occurs in 420 BCE, during the uneasy Peace of Nicias between Athens and Sparta.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Next winter, however, the ephors under whom the treaty had been made were no longer in office, and some of their successors were directly opposed to it. Embassies now arrived from the Lacedaemonian confederacy, and the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians also presented themselves at Lacedaemon, and after much discussion and no agreement between them, separated for their several homes; when Cleobulus and Xenares, the two ephors who were the most anxious to break off the treaty, took advantage of this opportunity to communicate privately with the Boeotians and Corinthians, and, advising them to act as much as possible together, instructed the former first to enter into alliance with Argos, and then try and bring themselves and the Argives into alliance with Lacedaemon. The Boeotians would so be least likely to be compelled to come into the Attic treaty; and the Lacedaemonians would prefer gaining the friendship and alliance of Argos even at the price of the hostility of Athens and the rupture of the treaty. The Boeotians knew that an honourable friendship with Argos had been long the desire of Lacedaemon; for the Lacedaemonians believed that this would considerably facilitate the conduct of the war outside Peloponnese. Meanwhile they begged the Boeotians to place Panactum in her hands in order that she might, if possible, obtain Pylos in exchange for it, and so be more in a position to resume hostilities with Athens.
After receiving these instructions for their governments from Xenares and Cleobulus and their friends at Lacedaemon, the Boeotians and Corinthians departed. On their way home they were joined by two persons high in office at Argos, who had waited for them on the road, and who now sounded them upon the possibility of the Boeotians joining the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans in becoming the allies of Argos, in the idea that if this could be effected they would be able, thus united, to make peace or war as they pleased either against Lacedaemon or any other power. The Boeotian envoys were were pleased at thus hearing themselves accidentally asked to do what their friends at Lacedaemon had told them; and the two Argives perceiving that their proposal was agreeable, departed with a promise to send ambassadors to the Boeotians. On their arrival the Boeotians reported to the Boeotarchs what had been said to them at Lacedaemon and also by the Argives who had met them, and the Boeotarchs, pleased with the idea, embraced it with the more eagerness from the lucky coincidence of Argos soliciting the very thing wanted by their friends at Lacedaemon. Shortly afterwards ambassadors appeared from Argos with the proposals indicated; and the Boeotarchs approved of the terms and dismissed the ambassadors with a promise to send envoys to Argos to negotiate the alliance.
Modern Translation
The following winter, however, the ephors who had overseen the treaty were no longer in office, and some of their replacements actively opposed it. Delegations arrived from Sparta's allies, while representatives from Athens, Boeotia, and Corinth also appeared at Sparta. After extensive negotiations that produced no consensus, they departed for their respective cities. At this point, Cleobulus and Xenares—the two ephors most determined to dissolve the treaty—seized the moment to hold secret discussions with the Boeotian and Corinthian representatives. They urged them to coordinate their actions closely and advised the Boeotians to first establish an alliance with Argos, then attempt to bring both themselves and Argos into alliance with Sparta. This strategy would minimize the likelihood of Boeotia being forced into the Athenian treaty, and the Spartans would value securing Argos's friendship and alliance even if it meant antagonizing Athens and breaking the existing treaty. The Boeotians understood that Sparta had long desired an honorable alliance with Argos, believing such a relationship would significantly ease military operations beyond the Peloponnese. Meanwhile, the ephors requested that Boeotia transfer control of Panactum to Sparta, hoping to exchange it for Pylos and thereby strengthen their position for renewed conflict with Athens.
After receiving these directives from Xenares, Cleobulus, and their associates in Sparta, the Boeotian and Corinthian envoys departed. During their journey home, two high-ranking Argive officials who had been waiting along the route intercepted them to explore whether Boeotia might join Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea in allying with Argos. Their reasoning was that such a coalition would enable them to collectively decide on war or peace with Sparta or any other state. The Boeotian representatives were delighted to find themselves spontaneously approached with the very proposal their Spartan contacts had suggested. The Argives, noting the favorable reception, departed after promising to send formal ambassadors to Boeotia. Upon returning home, the Boeotians briefed the Boeotarchs on both the Spartan instructions and the Argive overture. The Boeotarchs, pleased by the proposal, embraced it all the more enthusiastically given the fortuitous alignment between Argos's request and their Spartan allies' wishes. Soon after, Argive ambassadors arrived with formal proposals. The Boeotarchs endorsed the terms and sent the ambassadors home with assurances that Boeotian envoys would visit Argos to finalize the alliance.
Historical Context
This passage occurs in 420 BCE, during the uneasy Peace of Nicias between Athens and Sparta. The peace treaty, signed in 421 BCE, had failed to resolve underlying tensions, and various allies on both sides remained dissatisfied. The new ephors at Sparta, particularly Cleobulus and Xenares, actively worked to undermine the treaty by orchestrating a complex diplomatic maneuver. They secretly encouraged Boeotia and Corinth to form an alliance with Argos, hoping to eventually bring this coalition into Sparta's orbit. This would strengthen Sparta's position against Athens while technically avoiding direct violation of the peace. The passage reveals the intricate diplomatic maneuvering characteristic of this period, where multiple powers sought advantageous alignments while maintaining plausible deniability.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Spartan Ephors
The ephors were five annually elected magistrates in Sparta who wielded significant executive power, including foreign policy. Their annual rotation meant policy could shift dramatically, as seen here where new ephors actively worked against their predecessors' treaty.
Learn more →Boeotarchs
The Boeotarchs were the chief magistrates of the Boeotian League, a federal state dominated by Thebes. They commanded military forces and conducted foreign policy for the confederation, making them key players in Greek interstate relations.
Learn more →Peace of Nicias
The Peace of Nicias (421 BCE) was meant to end the Archidamian War, the first phase of the Peloponnesian War. However, it failed to address core issues and many allies refused to sign, leading to the diplomatic maneuvering described in this passage.
Learn more →Panactum
Panactum was a border fortress between Attica and Boeotia, captured by Boeotia during the war. Its return to Athens was stipulated in the Peace of Nicias, but Boeotia's reluctance to comply became a major source of tension and diplomatic leverage.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (10.1-4)
Plutarch describes the aftermath of the Peace of Nicias and the various violations and diplomatic intrigues that followed, providing a biographical perspective on these events.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.75-76)
Diodorus provides an alternative account of the diplomatic negotiations following the Peace of Nicias, though with less detail than Thucydides about the secret machinations.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (5.2.1-7)
While describing later events, Xenophon illustrates similar patterns of Spartan diplomatic manipulation and the use of proxies to achieve strategic goals without direct confrontation.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the annual rotation of ephors affect Spartan foreign policy continuity, and what does this suggest about the strengths and weaknesses of their political system?
- Analyze the role of secret diplomacy in this passage. Is there a moral distinction between the ephors' private negotiations and official state policy?
- Why might Argos be such a valuable ally for Sparta, even at the cost of breaking the peace with Athens? Consider both strategic and psychological factors.
- How does Thucydides' presentation of these negotiations reflect his views on the relationship between chance (tyche) and human planning in history?