Today's Passage
This passage describes the Athenian response to the revolt of Potidaea and other cities in 432 BCE, a crucial event leading to the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of the cities. On being informed that Aristeus and his reinforcements were on their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens and forty ships against the places in revolt, under the command of Callias, son of Calliades, and four colleagues. They arrived in Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men that had been first sent out, just become masters of Therme and besieging Pydna. Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and besieged Pydna for a while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a forced alliance with Perdiccas, hastened by the calls of Potidæa and by the arrival of Aristeus at that place. They withdrew from Macedonia, going to Beroea and thence to Strepsa, and, after a futile attempt on the latter place, they pursued by land their march to Potidæa with three thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens, besides a number of their allies, and six hundred Macedonian horsemen, the followers of Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed seventy ships along the coast. Advancing by short marches, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus, where they encamped.
Modern Translation
The Athenians promptly learned of the cities' rebellion. When they discovered that Aristeus and his reinforcements were advancing, they dispatched two thousand of their own heavy infantry and forty ships to the rebellious territories, commanded by Callias, son of Calliades, along with four fellow generals. Reaching Macedonia first, they found their initial expeditionary force of a thousand soldiers had just captured Therme and was now besieging Pydna. They joined this siege and invested Pydna briefly. However, they soon negotiated terms and formed a compulsory alliance with Perdiccas, pressed by urgent appeals from Potidaea and news of Aristeus's arrival there. Departing Macedonia, they marched to Beroea, then to Strepsa, where an assault failed. They continued overland toward Potidaea with three thousand Athenian heavy infantry, numerous allied troops, and six hundred Macedonian cavalry under Philip and Pausanias. Seventy ships sailed alongside the coast. Proceeding in measured stages, they reached Gigonus on the third day and established camp.
Historical Context
This passage describes the Athenian response to the revolt of Potidaea and other cities in 432 BCE, a crucial event leading to the Peloponnesian War. The revolt threatened Athens' control over its tribute-paying allies in the Chalcidice region. The Athenians mobilize significant forces but face complications in Macedonia, where King Perdiccas has been playing both sides. The forced alliance with Perdiccas represents diplomatic necessity overriding strategic preference. The march to Potidaea shows Athens projecting power to maintain its empire, while the coordination of land and naval forces demonstrates their military sophistication. This campaign would culminate in the costly siege of Potidaea, draining Athenian resources just as the larger war with Sparta began.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Potidaea
A Corinthian colony on the Chalcidice peninsula that paid tribute to Athens. Its strategic location controlling access to Thrace made it valuable. The city's revolt in 432 BCE, encouraged by Corinth and Perdiccas of Macedon, became one of the immediate causes of the Peloponnesian War.
Learn more →Perdiccas II of Macedon
The Macedonian king (r. 454-413 BCE) who skillfully maneuvered between Athens, Sparta, and local powers. His shifting alliances exemplified the complex diplomacy of smaller states caught between great powers. His 'forced alliance' with Athens here was temporary and opportunistic.
Learn more →Athenian Military Organization
Athens could rapidly deploy combined arms forces: heavy infantry (hoplites), naval power, and allied cavalry. The command structure with multiple generals (strategoi) reflected democratic principles but could complicate military decision-making. The integration of Macedonian cavalry shows Athens' ability to incorporate allied forces.
Learn more →Chalcidice Campaign
The region's revolt threatened Athens' northern empire and grain supplies. The campaign required extensive resources and became a financial drain. The siege of Potidaea alone would cost 2,000 talents, contributing to tensions that sparked the wider war.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.34)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the Potidaean revolt and Athenian response, offering additional details about the financial costs and the role of Corinthian support for the rebels.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29-30)
Describes the political context in Athens during this crisis, including opposition to Pericles' strategy and the financial strain of maintaining the empire while preparing for war with Sparta.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (5.2.12-24)
Though describing later events, Xenophon's account of Chalcidian politics and military organization helps understand the region's strategic importance and why Athens invested such resources in controlling it.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the 'forced alliance' with Perdiccas illustrate the complexities of interstate relations in classical Greece? What does this suggest about the limits of Athenian power?
- Why might Thucydides include such specific details about troop numbers, march routes, and timing? What does this tell us about his historical method?
- How does the coordination of land and naval forces in this campaign reflect Athens' strategic advantages and imperial character?
- What does the rapid Athenian response to the revolt suggest about their intelligence network and administrative capacity in managing their empire?