Today's Passage
This passage describes the Battle of Potidaea (432 BCE), one of the opening conflicts of the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Meanwhile the Potidæans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were encamped on the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in expectation of the Athenians, and had established their market outside the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry; while the command of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas, who had at once left the alliance of the Athenians and gone back to that of the Potidæans, having deputed Iolaus as his general: The plan of Aristeus was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the attack of the Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies outside the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas in Olynthus to act upon the Athenian rear, on the occasion of their advancing against him; and thus to place the enemy between two fires. While Callias the Athenian general and his colleagues dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of the allies to Olynthus, to prevent any movement being made from that quarter, the Athenians themselves broke up their camp and marched against Potidæa. After they had arrived at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they formed against him, and soon afterwards engaged. The wing of Aristeus, with the Corinthians and other picked troops round him, routed the wing opposed to it, and followed for a considerable distance in pursuit. But the rest of the army of the Potidæans and of the Peloponnesians was defeated by the Athenians, and took refuge within the fortifications. Returning from the pursuit, Aristeus perceived the defeat of the rest of the army. Being at a loss which of the two risks to choose, whether to go to Olynthus or to Potidæa, he at last determined to draw his men into as small a space as possible, and force his way with a run into Potidæa. Not without difficulty, through a storm of missiles, he passed along by the breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe, though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidæans from Olynthus, which is about seven miles off and in sight of Potidæa, when the battle began and the signals were raised, advanced a little way to render assistance; and the Macedonian horse formed against them to prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring for the Athenians and the signals being taken down, they retired back within the wall; and the Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Thus there were no cavalry present on either side. After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidæans under truce. The Potidæans and their allies had close upon three hundred killed; the Athenians a hundred and fifty of their own citizens, and Callias their general.
Modern Translation
During this time, the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesian forces under Aristeus had taken up positions on the isthmus facing Olynthus, awaiting the Athenian attack, and had set up their supply market outside the city walls. The allied forces had appointed Aristeus as commander-in-chief of the infantry, while Perdiccas, who had immediately abandoned his alliance with Athens and rejoined the Potidaeans, was given command of the cavalry, though he delegated operational command to Iolaus. Aristeus's strategy was to maintain his main force on the isthmus and wait for the Athenian assault, while positioning the Chalcidians and other allies beyond the isthmus, along with Perdiccas's two hundred cavalry at Olynthus. These forces would attack the Athenians from behind once they advanced, thus catching them between two hostile forces. In response, the Athenian general Callias and his fellow commanders sent the Macedonian cavalry and some allied troops to Olynthus to prevent any offensive from that direction, while the main Athenian force broke camp and marched on Potidaea. When they reached the isthmus and saw the enemy arrayed for battle, they deployed their forces and soon engaged. Aristeus's wing, comprising Corinthians and other elite troops under his direct command, overwhelmed the opposing Athenian wing and pursued them for a considerable distance. However, the remainder of the Potidaean and Peloponnesian army was routed by the Athenians and fled back to their fortifications. When Aristeus returned from his pursuit and saw that the rest of his army had been defeated, he faced a difficult choice: whether to attempt reaching Olynthus or to return to Potidaea. He ultimately decided to concentrate his men as tightly as possible and make a desperate dash for Potidaea. Despite heavy enemy fire, he managed to lead his men along the sea-wall through the water, successfully bringing most of them to safety, though some were killed. Meanwhile, when the battle commenced and signal fires were raised, the Potidaean reinforcements from Olynthus—located about seven miles away and within sight of Potidaea—advanced slightly to provide support, while the Macedonian cavalry moved to block them. But when it became clear that the Athenians were victorious and the signals were lowered, these forces retreated behind their walls, and the Macedonians returned to the Athenian lines. Consequently, neither side had cavalry support during the actual battle. Following their victory, the Athenians erected a trophy and returned the enemy dead under a truce. The Potidaeans and their allies suffered nearly three hundred casualties, while the Athenians lost one hundred and fifty citizens, including their general Callias.
Historical Context
This passage describes the Battle of Potidaea (432 BCE), one of the opening conflicts of the Peloponnesian War. Potidaea, a Corinthian colony but member of the Athenian Empire, had revolted with Peloponnesian support. The battle showcases typical Greek hoplite warfare tactics, with Aristeus attempting a double envelopment strategy. Despite his personal success in routing one wing, the overall Potidaean defeat led to a prolonged siege. The death of the Athenian general Callias and significant casualties on both sides foreshadowed the war's devastating nature. This engagement directly contributed to escalating tensions between Athens and Corinth, ultimately drawing Sparta into the conflict.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Greek Hoplite Warfare
The battle exemplifies classical Greek infantry tactics, with opposing phalanxes meeting on chosen ground. Aristeus's breakthrough on one wing while losing elsewhere demonstrates both the strengths and vulnerabilities of hoplite formations, where local success didn't guarantee overall victory.
Learn more →Perdiccas II of Macedon
The Macedonian king's rapid switching of alliances—from Athens to Potidaea—illustrates the opportunistic diplomacy of smaller powers caught between major states. His provision of cavalry while avoiding personal involvement typifies his cautious political maneuvering throughout the war.
Learn more →Siege of Potidaea
This battle initiated a costly two-year siege (432-430 BCE) that drained Athenian resources. The siege's expense—over 2,000 talents—and the loss of prominent citizens like Callias made it a pyrrhic victory that weakened Athens at the war's outset.
Learn more →Trophy and Truce Customs
The post-battle rituals—erecting a trophy and returning dead under truce—reflect fundamental Greek military customs. These practices acknowledged victory while maintaining religious obligations and allowing proper burial rites, demonstrating how warfare operated within established cultural norms.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.34)
Diodorus provides a condensed account of the Potidaea campaign, emphasizing the siege's cost to Athens and its role in precipitating the larger war with Sparta.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29-30)
Plutarch discusses Pericles' role in the Potidaean affair and how the conflict contributed to criticism of his policies, connecting the military campaign to Athenian domestic politics.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.1)
While Xenophon begins where Thucydides ends, his methodological approach to battle narratives provides interesting contrast to Thucydides' detailed tactical descriptions seen in the Potidaea account.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Aristeus's tactical plan reflect both the possibilities and limitations of ancient Greek warfare? What does his personal success but overall defeat tell us about leadership in hoplite battles?
- Analyze Perdiccas's behavior in this conflict. What does his rapid alliance-switching suggest about the position of smaller powers in great power conflicts?
- Why might Thucydides include such specific details about troop movements and battle tactics? How does this level of detail serve his larger historical purposes?
- Consider the role of signaling and communication in this battle. How did the limitations of ancient communication technology affect military outcomes?