Today's Passage
This passage is from the famous Melian Dialogue (416 BCE), where Athenian envoys negotiate with the leaders of Melos, a small island that had remained neutral in the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both.
Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?
Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.
Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.
Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power.
Melians. Is that your subjects’ idea of equity, to put those who have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?
Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea.
Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?
Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger.
Modern Translation
Athenians: We are not afraid of our empire ending, even if it must. A rival power like Sparta—assuming Sparta were truly our adversary—is not as terrifying to the defeated as the prospect of subjects who independently rise up and overthrow their masters. However, this is a risk we are prepared to accept. We will now demonstrate that we have come here for the sake of our empire, and what we are about to propose serves to preserve your country. We wish to rule over you without difficulty and see you survive for our mutual benefit.
Melians: How exactly could serving you be as advantageous for us as ruling is for you?
Athenians: Because you would benefit by surrendering before experiencing the worst consequences, and we would profit by not having to destroy you.
Melians: So you would not accept our neutrality—being friends rather than enemies, but allied to neither side?
Athenians: No. Your hostility causes us less harm than your friendship would. To our subjects, your friendship would signal our weakness, while your enmity demonstrates our power.
Melians: Do your subjects consider it fair to treat those who have no connection to you the same as those who are mostly your own colonists or conquered rebels?
Athenians: Regarding justice, they believe everyone has equal claim to it. They think that those who maintain independence do so through strength, and if we don't attack them, it's from fear. Therefore, subjugating you would not only expand our empire but increase our security. As islanders weaker than others, it's crucial that you don't successfully defy the masters of the sea.
Melians: But don't you see there's no security in your approach? Since you prevent us from appealing to justice and demand we submit to your interests, we must explain our own interests and try to convince you where they align. How can you avoid making enemies of all current neutrals who will conclude from our fate that you'll eventually attack them? Doesn't this simply multiply your existing enemies and force others who never considered hostility to become your foes?
Athenians: Continental powers rarely concern us. Their freedom will long delay any precautions against us. Rather, it's islanders like you—outside our empire—and subjects chafing under our rule who are most likely to act rashly and create obvious dangers for both themselves and us.
Historical Context
This passage is from the famous Melian Dialogue (416 BCE), where Athenian envoys negotiate with the leaders of Melos, a small island that had remained neutral in the Peloponnesian War. Athens, at the height of its imperial power, demands that Melos surrender and become a tribute-paying subject. The Melians resist, hoping to maintain their independence. This dialogue represents one of the starkest expressions of realpolitik in ancient literature, as the Athenians explicitly reject appeals to justice and openly discuss power politics. The conversation occurs during a brief peace between Athens and Sparta, allowing Athens to consolidate its empire. This episode becomes a turning point in Thucydides' narrative, as Athens' brutal treatment of Melos (eventually killing all men and enslaving women and children) exemplifies the moral corruption of empire and foreshadows Athens' disastrous Sicilian expedition.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Empire
By 416 BCE, Athens controlled over 150 subject cities that paid tribute. The empire began as the Delian League (478 BCE) to fight Persia but transformed into Athenian hegemony. Athens used its naval supremacy to enforce compliance and prevent defections.
Learn more →Realpolitik
The Melian Dialogue exemplifies political realism, where moral considerations are subordinated to power calculations. The Athenians' frank admission that 'might makes right' shocked ancient audiences and continues to influence international relations theory.
Learn more →Island Strategy
Athens particularly focused on controlling islands because naval power could easily enforce compliance. Islands couldn't rely on land-based allies for protection, making them vulnerable to siege and blockade. This strategic reality underlies the Athenians' confidence.
Learn more →Neutrality in Ancient Warfare
Neutrality was precarious in the ancient Greek world. Small states often tried to avoid choosing sides in conflicts between major powers, but as this dialogue shows, powerful states frequently forced them into submission, viewing neutrality as potential hostility.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 2, Chapter 2.3)
Describes Athens' harsh treatment of rebellious allies after the Peloponnesian War, showing the consistency of Athenian imperial policy regarding subject states who resisted their authority.
Read passage →Herodotus: Histories (Book 7.8)
Xerxes' speech before invading Greece similarly presents empire as a natural law where the strong must dominate the weak, providing a Persian parallel to Athenian imperial ideology.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapter 11)
Discusses the moral debates in Athens about imperial policy, including opposition to harsh treatment of subjects, providing context for the type of thinking displayed in the Melian Dialogue.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How do the Athenians' arguments about the relationship between friendship and weakness reflect the dynamics of international relations today?
- What is the significance of the Athenians' claim that their subjects judge neutrality as evidence of Athenian fear rather than respect for independence?
- How might the dialogue have proceeded differently if the Melians had possessed a powerful navy or strong allies?
- Does the Athenians' frank acknowledgment of power politics make their position more or less morally defensible than if they had used pretexts of justice?