Today's Passage
This passage comes from the famous Melian Dialogue (416 BCE), where Athenian envoys negotiate with the leaders of Melos, a small island colony of Sparta that had remained neutral in the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests or their country’s laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon.
Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in Hellas and helping their enemies.
Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger; and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible.
Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood ensures our fidelity.
Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an island?
Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for your own country and your own confederacy.
Modern Translation
Athenians: When you speak of divine favor, we have just as much reason to expect it as you do. Our claims and actions violate neither religious belief nor human practice. We believe the gods, like men, follow a natural law: they rule wherever they have the power to do so. We didn't create this law, nor were we the first to act on it. We inherited it from the past and will pass it on to future generations. We simply use it, knowing that you and everyone else would do exactly the same if you had our power. So regarding the gods, we have no fear of being at a disadvantage. But your notion about the Spartans—your belief that shame will compel them to help you—we admire your innocence but pity your foolishness. The Spartans, when their own interests or laws are at stake, are the most virtuous people alive. But their behavior toward others? Much could be said, but put simply: of all people we know, they most blatantly equate pleasure with honor and advantage with justice. This mindset hardly supports the salvation you're counting on.
Melians: But that's precisely why we trust them. Their self-interest will prevent them from betraying us, their colonists, which would lose them the trust of their Greek allies and help their enemies.
Athenians: So you don't understand that expediency accompanies security, while justice and honor involve danger—and the Spartans avoid danger whenever possible?
Melians: We believe they'd be more willing to face danger for us than for others. Our proximity to the Peloponnese makes military action easier, and our kinship ensures our loyalty.
Athenians: Yes, but potential allies trust not in goodwill but in clear military superiority—and the Spartans understand this better than anyone. They so distrust their own resources that they only attack neighbors with numerous allies. Is it likely that while we control the sea, they'll cross to an island?
Melians: They could send others. The Cretan Sea is vast—it's harder for those controlling it to intercept ships than for others to slip through safely. If this fails, they'd attack your territory and your allies whom Brasidas didn't reach. Then you'd fight not for foreign territories but for your own homeland and confederation.
Historical Context
This passage comes from the famous Melian Dialogue (416 BCE), where Athenian envoys negotiate with the leaders of Melos, a small island colony of Sparta that had remained neutral in the Peloponnesian War. Athens has sent an expedition to force Melos into their empire. The dialogue represents one of history's most brutal expressions of realpolitik, as the Athenians dismiss appeals to justice, divine favor, and Spartan intervention. They argue that power alone determines outcomes in international relations. The Melians desperately argue that Sparta will protect them out of self-interest and kinship, but the Athenians systematically demolish each hope. This dialogue occurs during Athens' aggressive imperial phase and illustrates Thucydides' analysis of how power corrupts moral reasoning. The passage showcases the clash between idealism and cynical pragmatism that runs throughout Thucydides' work.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Imperialism
By 416 BCE, Athens had transformed the Delian League into an empire, using naval supremacy to control the Aegean. The Melian expedition represents the empire at its most aggressive, attacking a neutral state simply because it could. This imperialism would ultimately contribute to Athens' downfall.
Learn more →Natural Law Theory
The Athenians articulate an early version of 'might makes right,' arguing that gods and men naturally rule wherever they can. This cynical view of power relations influenced later political philosophy, from Machiavelli to modern realist international relations theory.
Learn more →Spartan Foreign Policy
The Athenians accurately characterize Spartan conservatism in foreign affairs. Sparta typically avoided distant expeditions and acted primarily to preserve its regional hegemony. Their eventual failure to help Melos validates the Athenian analysis of Spartan self-interest over honor.
Learn more →Brasidas' Campaign
The reference to Brasidas recalls the brilliant Spartan general who campaigned in northern Greece (424-422 BCE), capturing several Athenian allies. His success demonstrated Sparta's ability to threaten Athens' empire on land, foreshadowing the strategy that would eventually defeat Athens.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 2.2.3)
Xenophon describes Athens' own fate in 404 BCE when defeated by Sparta. The Spartans notably did not destroy Athens as Athens had destroyed Melos, showing more restraint than Athenian 'realism' predicted.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Lysander (Chapter 14)
Plutarch records the debate over Athens' fate after its defeat, with some allies demanding its destruction. This parallels the Melian situation but with reversed roles, showing how power dynamics shift in international relations.
Read passage →Herodotus: Histories (Book 7.8-11)
Xerxes' debate with Artabanus about invading Greece presents similar themes of power, expedience, and divine favor. Like the Athenians at Melos, Xerxes dismisses warnings and relies on superior force.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- Is the Athenian argument about the 'natural law' of power descriptive (how things are) or prescriptive (how they should be)? What are the implications of each interpretation?
- How does the Athenians' characterization of Spartan foreign policy reflect on the nature of alliances and international trust?
- What role does the concept of kinship (the Melians being Spartan colonists) play in international relations, according to both parties?
- How might this dialogue read differently if we knew the Athenians ultimately lost the war? Does hindsight change our evaluation of their 'realism'?