Today's Passage
This passage presents Nicias's speech to the Athenian assembly in 415 BCE, opposing the proposed Sicilian Expedition.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to be made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we have still this question to examine, whether it be better to send out the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do. And yet, individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as little as other men for my person—not that I think a man need be any the worse citizen for taking some thought for his person and estate; on the contrary, such a man would for his own sake desire the prosperity of his country more than others—nevertheless, as I have never spoken against my convictions to gain honour, I shall not begin to do so now, but shall say what I think best. Against your character any words of mine would be weak enough, if I were to advise your keeping what you have got and not risking what is actually yours for advantages which are dubious in themselves, and which you may or may not attain. I will, therefore, content myself with showing that your ardour is out of season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment.
“I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go yonder and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet—for nominal it has become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta—but which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than to us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are many points that are still disputed. Again, some of the most powerful states have never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are restrained by truces renewed every ten days, and it is only too probable that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past valued as they would that of few others. A man ought, therefore, to consider these points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so critically, or of grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years in revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment.
Modern Translation
Though this assembly was called to discuss preparations for our expedition to Sicily, I believe we must still examine whether we should send the fleet at all. We shouldn't make such a momentous decision hastily or let foreigners persuade us into a war that doesn't concern us. Now, I personally stand to gain honor from this venture and fear less than most for my safety—not that caring about one's life and property makes someone a worse citizen. In fact, such people desire their country's prosperity more than others, since their own welfare depends on it. Nevertheless, I've never spoken against my beliefs for personal gain, and I won't start now. I'll say what I think is best. Given your temperament, it would be futile to advise you to preserve what you have rather than risk it for uncertain gains. So I'll simply demonstrate that your enthusiasm is premature and your ambitions difficult to achieve.
I maintain that by going to Sicily, you leave many enemies behind while creating new ones there. Perhaps you trust the peace treaty we've signed—a treaty that exists only in name as long as we remain passive (for certain individuals here and in Sparta have reduced it to mere words). But if we suffer any serious setback, our enemies won't hesitate to attack. First, because we forced this agreement on them after their defeat, making it more shameful for them than honorable for us. Second, many provisions remain contested. Furthermore, some powerful states have never accepted the treaty at all. Some openly wage war against us; others, like the Spartans who haven't yet acted, are held back only by ten-day truces. If they found our forces divided—as we're rushing to divide them—they'd likely join with the Sicilians to attack us vigorously. They would value such an alliance as highly as any other. We must consider these factors carefully, not recklessly endanger our precariously positioned state or grasp for new territories before securing what we already control. The Chalcidians in Thrace have been in rebellion for years without being subdued, and others on the mainland offer only questionable loyalty. Yet we rush to help the Egestaeans who claim injury, while those who have long wronged us still await punishment.
Historical Context
This passage presents Nicias's speech to the Athenian assembly in 415 BCE, opposing the proposed Sicilian Expedition. Following appeals from Egesta (a Sicilian city) for help against Syracuse, Athens had already voted to send a fleet. Nicias, one of the appointed generals alongside Alcibiades and Lamachus, attempts to reverse this decision by highlighting the risks. He argues that Athens has unfinished business at home, including rebellious subjects and a fragile peace with Sparta (the Peace of Nicias, 421 BCE). His warnings proved prophetic—the expedition ended in complete disaster in 413 BCE, marking the beginning of Athens' decline. This speech exemplifies the tension between imperial ambition and prudent statecraft that characterized late fifth-century Athens.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Peace of Nicias
The treaty Nicias references was signed in 421 BCE between Athens and Sparta, supposedly ending the first phase of the Peloponnesian War. However, it was never fully implemented, with various allies refusing to accept its terms and both sides violating its provisions. Nicias, who negotiated this peace, understood its fragility better than most.
Learn more →Chalcidian Revolt
The Chalcidians of Thrace had revolted from Athenian control in 432 BCE, establishing Olynthus as their center. Despite various campaigns, Athens never fully subdued them. Nicias uses this ongoing rebellion to illustrate Athens' incomplete control over its existing empire.
Learn more →Athenian Assembly
The ekklesia was Athens' principal democratic institution where all male citizens could speak and vote on major decisions including war and peace. This speech shows how rhetorical skill could influence policy, though in this case Nicias failed to persuade the demos.
Learn more →Sicilian Expedition
The Athenian expedition to Sicily (415-413 BCE) was one of the largest military ventures of the ancient world, involving over 200 ships and 50,000 men. Its catastrophic failure decimated Athenian military power and marked a turning point in the Peloponnesian War.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (12.1-2)
Plutarch describes the same assembly, emphasizing Nicias's reluctance to lead the expedition and his attempts to dissuade the Athenians by exaggerating the difficulties and resources required.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Alcibiades (17.2-3)
Provides the opposing perspective, showing Alcibiades' ambition for the expedition and his rhetorical contest with Nicias in the assembly, highlighting the personal rivalry that influenced this crucial decision.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.83-84)
Offers an alternative account of the debate, providing additional details about the Egestaean appeal and the Athenian response, though with less rhetorical sophistication than Thucydides.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Nicias balance personal interest with public duty in his opening remarks? What does this reveal about Athenian political culture?
- Evaluate Nicias's argument about the fragility of the Peace of Nicias. How does incomplete peace affect strategic decision-making?
- Why might Nicias's warnings have failed to persuade the assembly? Consider both the content of his argument and his rhetorical strategy.
- How does the tension between securing existing possessions and acquiring new ones reflect broader themes in imperial management?