Today's Passage
This passage presents a speech by Hermocrates, a prominent Syracusan statesman, addressing the Syracusan assembly in 415 BCE.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see, and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together, or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch the whole of our actual navy with two months’ provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their passage across the Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for our defensive—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—while they have a wide sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to attack as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand, if they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate places, and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities would receive them. In my opinion this consideration alone would be sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts, they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We should also be reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men’s minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack, or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack, inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at present. They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not resist, having a right to judge us severely because we did not help the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would be more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be by our actual power. I could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if this cannot be, at all events lose not a moment in preparing generally for the war; and remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is best shown by bravery in action, but that for the present the best course is to accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving the surest promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That the Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the voyage, and all but here—this is what I am sure of.”
Modern Translation
Therefore, let us begin our preparations here with confidence. Let us send envoys to secure the loyalty of some Sicilian Greeks while winning over others as friends and allies. We must dispatch ambassadors throughout Sicily to demonstrate that this danger threatens everyone equally, and to Italy to gain their alliance or at least ensure they refuse to harbor the Athenians. I believe we should also reach out to Carthage. The Carthaginians are hardly unaware of the threat—they live in perpetual fear that Athens will one day assault their city. They may calculate that allowing Sicily to fall would endanger them too, and thus be willing to assist us, whether secretly or openly, by whatever means possible. If they choose to help, they are better positioned than anyone today, possessing vast reserves of gold and silver—the lifeblood of warfare and all other enterprises. We should likewise appeal to Sparta and Corinth, urging them to send immediate aid while maintaining pressure on Athens in mainland Greece. But above all else—and here I must speak plainly, though I know your temperament favors caution over action—we must consider what I believe to be our most effective strategy. If we Sicilians united our forces—all of us ideally, or at least as many as will join us—and launched our entire fleet provisioned for two months, we could intercept the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory. By demonstrating that they must fight for their very passage across the Ionian Sea before they can even contest Sicily, we would shatter their confidence and force them to reconsider. We would have Tarentum as our secure base—for that city stands ready to receive us—while they would face the daunting prospect of maintaining formation across vast stretches of open water. Their extended line would be vulnerable to our attacks as their ships arrived piecemeal and exhausted. Alternatively, if they stripped down their vessels and advanced with only their fastest warships, we could strike when their rowers were spent, or simply withdraw to Tarentum if we preferred. Having crossed with minimal supplies solely for battle, they would find themselves stranded in barren territory. They would face an impossible choice: remain and endure a blockade, or attempt to sail along the coast, abandoning their heavy transports and growing increasingly demoralized as they discovered which cities would or would not admit them. This dilemma alone, I believe, would suffice to prevent them from ever leaving Corcyra. While they deliberated and scouted our positions and strength, precious time would slip away until winter made the crossing impossible. Faced with such unexpected resistance, they might abandon the entire enterprise—especially since their most seasoned commander, I'm told, accepted his position reluctantly and would eagerly seize upon any legitimate reason to cancel the expedition. Reports of our numbers would surely be inflated, as always happens, and human psychology dictates that those who strike first or demonstrate clear defensive readiness inspire the greatest fear, showing they are prepared for conflict. This precisely describes Athens' current predicament. They attack believing we won't resist, justly condemning us for failing to support Sparta in their war. But witnessing unexpected courage from us would unnerve them far more than our actual military strength ever could. I wish I could convince you to display such boldness. But if not, then at the very least we must prepare for war without delay. Let every one of us remember that while contempt for an aggressor is best expressed through brave action, our immediate priority must be to embrace the preparations that prudent fear demands, as these offer our surest hope of survival. We must act as if the threat is imminent and real. Make no mistake—I am absolutely certain that the Athenians are coming to attack us, that they are already sailing, that they are practically at our shores.
Historical Context
This passage presents a speech by Hermocrates, a prominent Syracusan statesman, addressing the Syracusan assembly in 415 BCE. The Athenians have just launched their massive Sicilian Expedition, aiming to conquer Syracuse and dominate Sicily. Hermocrates, known for his intelligence and anti-Athenian stance, proposes a comprehensive defensive strategy involving diplomatic outreach to various powers including Carthage, Sparta, and other Sicilian cities. His most bold proposal is a preemptive naval interception at Tarentum. The speech reflects the gravity of the situation as Syracuse faces the greatest military threat in its history. Hermocrates attempts to overcome Syracusan complacency and mobilize resistance against what would become one of the most catastrophic military ventures in ancient history. His strategic thinking demonstrates sophisticated understanding of logistics, psychology, and coalition warfare.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Carthaginian-Greek Relations
Hermocrates' suggestion to seek Carthaginian aid was revolutionary. Carthage and the Sicilian Greeks had been traditional enemies, fighting over Sicily for centuries. His proposal shows pragmatic diplomacy, recognizing that shared fear of Athenian expansion could override historical animosity. This foreshadows later Carthaginian interventions in Sicilian affairs.
Learn more →Naval Strategy in Ancient Warfare
The proposal to intercept the Athenian fleet at Tarentum demonstrates sophisticated naval thinking. Ancient fleets required frequent stops for water and provisions, making long sea crossings vulnerable. Hermocrates understands that attacking during the crossing would neutralize Athens' superior seamanship and exploit their logistical vulnerabilities.
Learn more →The Sicilian Expedition
The Athenian invasion of Sicily (415-413 BCE) was one of antiquity's largest military operations. Athens committed vast resources to conquer Syracuse, seeing it as key to western expansion. The expedition's catastrophic failure marked the beginning of Athens' decline and demonstrated the limits of imperial overreach.
Learn more →Psychological Warfare
Hermocrates emphasizes the psychological dimension of warfare—how reputation, fear, and surprise can be more powerful than actual military strength. His understanding that 'men's minds are affected by what they hear' shows sophisticated appreciation for what modern strategists call information warfare and deterrence theory.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 13.1-2)
Diodorus provides an alternative account of Syracusan preparations against Athens, including details about Hermocrates' role and the city's diplomatic efforts. His version emphasizes Syracuse's initial disbelief about the invasion.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapters 12-14)
Plutarch describes the Athenian perspective, particularly Nicias' reluctance to lead the expedition. This complements Hermocrates' observation about the Athenian general's unwillingness and provides insight into Athenian internal debates.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.1.27-31)
Though focusing on later events, Xenophon describes how the Sicilian disaster affected Athenian strategic thinking and resources, validating Hermocrates' assessment of the expedition's importance to Athens.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Hermocrates balance idealistic proposals (uniting all Sicilians) with pragmatic considerations (seeking Carthaginian aid)? What does this tell us about effective wartime leadership?
- Analyze Hermocrates' understanding of psychological warfare. How do his insights about fear, reputation, and morale compare to modern military doctrine?
- Why might the Syracusans have been reluctant to adopt Hermocrates' bold interception strategy? What does this reveal about democratic decision-making in crises?
- Compare Hermocrates' proposed coalition (including traditional enemies like Carthage) to modern examples of wartime alliances. What makes such partnerships possible?