Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 356 of 506 Book 6, Chapter 19 November 15, 2026
70% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage occurs in 415 BCE as Syracuse debates how to respond to rumors of an impending Athenian invasion—the famous Sicilian Expedition.

Crawley Translation (1910)

Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians had no idea of coming and that there was no truth in what he said; some asking if they did come what harm they could do that would not be repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that believed Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras, the leader of the people and very powerful at that time with the masses, came forward and spoke as follows:

“For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as misguided as they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to become our subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his country; while as for those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much alarm, I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly if they flatter themselves that we do not see through them. The fact is that they have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the city into consternation to have their own terrors cast into the shade by the public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are worth; they do not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who are always causing agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are well advised, you will not be guided in your calculation of probabilities by what these persons tell you, but by what shrewd men and of large experience, as I esteem the Athenians to be, would be likely to do. Now it is not likely that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them, and before they have well ended the war in Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war quite as arduous in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment, they are only too glad that we do not go and attack them, being so many and so great cities as we are.

Modern Translation

This was the extent of Hermocrates' speech. Meanwhile, the Syracusans found themselves deeply divided: some insisted the Athenians had no intention of coming and that Hermocrates' warnings were baseless; others argued that even if Athens did attack, Syracuse could inflict ten times the damage in return; while still others dismissed the entire matter as laughable. In truth, only a handful believed Hermocrates and genuinely feared what might come. At this point, Athenagoras—the popular leader who held enormous influence over the masses at that time—stepped forward and delivered the following speech:

"Regarding the Athenians, anyone who doesn't hope they're as foolish as they're rumored to be—foolish enough to come here and deliver themselves into our hands—must be either a coward or a traitor to Syracuse. As for those spreading these alarming reports, I'm less amazed by their audacity than by their stupidity if they imagine we can't see through their scheme. The truth is, these men have personal reasons for fear and want to plunge our city into panic, hoping public terror will overshadow their private anxieties. That's all these rumors amount to—they don't arise naturally but are manufactured by those who constantly stir up trouble here in Sicily. However, if you're wise, you won't base your assessment of what's likely on what these agitators tell you, but rather on what intelligent and experienced leaders—which I consider the Athenians to be—would actually do. It's highly improbable they'd leave the Peloponnesians at their backs and, before properly finishing their war in Greece, recklessly pursue an equally demanding conflict in Sicily. In my view, they're simply relieved that we—with all our numerous and powerful cities—aren't attacking them."

Historical Context

This passage occurs in 415 BCE as Syracuse debates how to respond to rumors of an impending Athenian invasion—the famous Sicilian Expedition. Hermocrates, a conservative aristocrat, has just warned the assembly about the Athenian threat, but his speech has met with mixed reactions. Athenagoras, the democratic leader, now responds by dismissing these warnings as fearmongering by political opponents seeking to destabilize the democracy. His speech reveals the deep political divisions within Syracuse between democratic and oligarchic factions. This internal discord would prove nearly fatal when the Athenians actually arrived. The debate illustrates a recurring theme in Thucydides: how internal political conflicts can blind states to external threats, and how demagogues can exploit popular sentiment to dismiss inconvenient truths.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Syracusan Democracy

Syracuse, like Athens, was a democracy in this period, with popular leaders (demagogues) competing for influence. Athenagoras represents the democratic faction, using populist rhetoric to maintain power by dismissing aristocratic warnings as self-interested manipulation.

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The Sicilian Expedition

The Athenian invasion of Sicily (415-413 BCE) was one of the most ambitious and ultimately disastrous military campaigns in ancient history. Athens sent a massive force to conquer Syracuse, but the expedition ended in complete defeat, marking the beginning of Athens' decline.

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Political Rhetoric in Ancient Greece

Athenagoras employs classic demagogic techniques: questioning opponents' motives, appealing to popular prejudices, and dismissing warnings as conspiracy theories. His speech exemplifies how rhetoric could be used to manipulate democratic assemblies.

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Intelligence Failure in Warfare

Syracuse's failure to take the Athenian threat seriously represents a classic intelligence failure. Athenagoras' dismissal of credible warnings based on assumptions about enemy rationality demonstrates how cognitive biases can lead to strategic surprise.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Nicias (12-13)

Plutarch describes the Syracusan reaction to news of the Athenian expedition, corroborating Thucydides' account of their initial disbelief and internal divisions.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.83-13.1)

Diodorus provides an alternative account of Syracuse's preparations, suggesting they eventually took the threat more seriously than Thucydides implies.

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Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.27-31)

Though dealing with later events, Xenophon describes similar patterns of democratic decision-making and the dismissal of strategic warnings in Athens, showing this as a recurring problem in Greek democracies.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does Athenagoras use rhetorical techniques to discredit Hermocrates' warnings? What modern parallels can you identify?
  2. Why might the Syracusans have been so reluctant to believe in an Athenian attack? What cognitive biases are at play?
  3. Compare Athenagoras' assumptions about Athenian rationality with what we know about the actual Athenian decision-making process. What does this reveal about mirror imaging in strategic analysis?
  4. How does internal political conflict affect a state's ability to respond to external threats? Can you think of other historical examples?