Today's Passage
This passage features a Syracusan speaker (likely Hermocrates) addressing the assembly in Syracuse in 415 BCE, responding to news of the impending Athenian expedition to Sicily.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily better able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at all points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a match for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large again. I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which will already have enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores required against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity. In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well see how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with them another city as large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried on war from our frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched from the ships, and composed of tents and bare necessaries, from which they would not be able to stir far for fear of our cavalry.
Modern Translation
Nevertheless, even if they do come as reported, I believe Sicily is better equipped to endure this war than the Peloponnese, being superior in every aspect of preparation. Our city alone is far stronger than this alleged invasion force, even if it were doubled in size. I know they cannot bring cavalry with them, nor obtain any here except perhaps a few from the Egestaeans. They cannot transport heavy infantry equal to ours in ships that will already be strained just making the voyage, however lightly loaded—not to mention carrying all the supplies needed to attack a city of our magnitude, which would be considerable. Indeed, I am so convinced of this that I believe they would face certain destruction even if they brought another city as large as Syracuse and established it on our borders to wage war from there. How much less likely are they to succeed with all Sicily united against them, operating only from a naval camp of tents and basic necessities, unable to venture far from their ships for fear of our cavalry?
Historical Context
This passage features a Syracusan speaker (likely Hermocrates) addressing the assembly in Syracuse in 415 BCE, responding to news of the impending Athenian expedition to Sicily. The speaker dismisses the threat, arguing that Syracuse's military advantages—particularly its cavalry and the logistical challenges facing Athens—make Athenian success impossible. This overconfident assessment occurs just before Athens launches its massive Sicilian Expedition, which would ultimately end in catastrophic defeat for Athens in 413 BCE. The speech exemplifies the dangerous combination of hubris and strategic miscalculation that Thucydides often highlights, while also accurately identifying some of the real challenges Athens would face, particularly regarding cavalry and supply lines.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Sicilian Expedition
The Athenian expedition to Sicily (415-413 BCE) was Athens' largest military undertaking during the Peloponnesian War. Intended to conquer Syracuse and dominate Sicily, it ended in complete disaster with the loss of over 40,000 men and 200 ships.
Learn more →Ancient Greek Cavalry
Cavalry played a crucial role in ancient warfare, particularly for harassment and pursuit. Syracuse's cavalry advantage proved significant in the campaign, as Athens struggled to counter mobile forces without adequate horsemen of their own.
Learn more →Logistics in Ancient Warfare
The speaker correctly identifies logistics as a critical weakness. Ancient armies required massive supply trains, and operating far from home without secure supply lines was extremely dangerous, as Athens would discover.
Learn more →Syracuse in Antiquity
Syracuse was one of the most powerful Greek city-states, founded by Corinthian colonists in 734 BCE. By 415 BCE, it rivaled Athens in wealth and military power, making it the primary target of Athenian ambitions in the west.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (12-14)
Plutarch describes the debates in Athens before the expedition, showing similar overconfidence on the Athenian side and Nicias's warnings about the difficulties of conquering Sicily.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.83-13.33)
Provides an alternative account of the Sicilian Expedition, including Syracusan preparations and confidence, offering details not found in Thucydides.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.27-35)
Though focusing on later events, Xenophon references the impact of the Sicilian disaster on Athenian morale and resources, showing the ultimate consequences of underestimating Syracuse.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the speaker's confidence compare with Athenian confidence before the expedition? What does this suggest about the role of hubris in military decision-making?
- Which of the speaker's predictions proved accurate, and which did not? What factors did he fail to consider?
- How does Thucydides use speeches like this to illustrate the gap between perception and reality in warfare?
- What parallels can you draw between this ancient example of underestimating an enemy and modern military miscalculations?