Today's Passage
This passage comes from the Congress at Sparta in 432 BCE, where Corinthian envoys are addressing the Spartan assembly.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“For all this you are responsible. You it was who first allowed them to fortify their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect the long walls—you who, then and now, are always depriving of freedom not only those whom they have enslaved, but also those who have as yet been your allies. For the true author of the subjugation of a people is not so much the immediate agent, as the power which permits it having the means to prevent it; particularly if that power aspires to the glory of being the liberator of Hellas. We are at last assembled. It has not been easy to assemble, nor even now are our objects defined. We ought not to be still inquiring into the fact of our wrongs, but into the means of our defence. For the aggressors with matured plans to oppose to our indecision have cast threats aside and betaken themselves to action. And we know what are the paths by which Athenian aggression travels, and how insidious is its progress. A degree of confidence she may feel from the idea that your bluntness of perception prevents your noticing her; but it is nothing to the impulse which her advance will receive from the knowledge that you see, but do not care to interfere. You, Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend yourselves not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do something; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is becoming twice its original size, instead of crushing it in its infancy. And yet the world used to say that you were to be depended upon; but in your case, we fear, it said more than the truth. The Mede, we ourselves know, had time to come from the ends of the earth to Peloponnese, without any force of yours worthy of the name advancing to meet him. But this was a distant enemy. Well, Athens at all events is a near neighbour, and yet Athens you utterly disregard; against Athens you prefer to act on the defensive instead of on the offensive, and to make it an affair of chances by deferring the struggle till she has grown far stronger than at first. And yet you know that on the whole the rock on which the barbarian was wrecked was himself, and that if our present enemy Athens has not again and again annihilated us, we owe it more to her blunders than to your protection; Indeed, expectations from you have before now been the ruin of some, whose faith induced them to omit preparation.
Modern Translation
You are the ones responsible for all of this. You were the ones who first permitted them to fortify their city after the Persian War, and later to build the Long Walls. From that time until now, you have consistently deprived of freedom not only those whom Athens has enslaved, but also those who still remain your allies. For the real author of a people's subjugation is not so much the one who directly enslaves them, but rather the power that allows it to happen when it has the means to prevent it—especially when that power claims the glory of being Hellas's liberator. We have finally assembled here, though it has not been easy to do so, and even now our purposes remain unclear. We should no longer be investigating whether we have been wronged, but rather how we should defend ourselves. For the aggressors, with their carefully prepared plans to counter our indecision, have already set aside mere threats and taken action. We understand the routes by which Athenian aggression advances and how cunningly it proceeds. Athens may derive some confidence from believing that your obtuseness prevents you from noticing her actions, but this is nothing compared to the encouragement she will gain from knowing that you see what she does but choose not to intervene. You Spartans, alone among all the Greeks, remain passive, defending yourselves not through action but by merely appearing as though you might act. You alone wait until an enemy's power has doubled from its original strength instead of crushing it in its early stages. Yet people used to say you could be relied upon—though in your case, we fear, reputation exceeded reality. We ourselves witnessed how the Persian had time to march from the earth's farthest reaches to the Peloponnese without any significant force of yours advancing to confront him. But that was a distant enemy. Athens, however, is your close neighbor, and yet you completely ignore her. Against Athens you choose defensive rather than offensive action, leaving everything to chance by postponing the conflict until she has grown far more powerful than she was initially. You know perfectly well that the barbarian's destruction came primarily from his own mistakes, and that if our current enemy Athens has not repeatedly destroyed us, we owe our survival more to her errors than to your protection. Indeed, trust in your assistance has previously ruined some states whose faith in you led them to neglect their own preparations.
Historical Context
This passage comes from the Congress at Sparta in 432 BCE, where Corinthian envoys are addressing the Spartan assembly. The Corinthians, longtime rivals of Athens and allies of Sparta, are attempting to persuade the Spartans to take military action against growing Athenian power. They criticize Sparta's passive response to Athenian expansion, particularly the construction of the Long Walls connecting Athens to its port at Piraeus, which made the city virtually impregnable. The speech represents a crucial moment before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, as Sparta's allies pressure them to abandon their traditionally conservative foreign policy and confront Athens directly. The Corinthians employ sharp rhetoric to shame the Spartans into action, contrasting Spartan inaction with Athenian dynamism.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Long Walls
The Long Walls were parallel fortifications built around 461-456 BCE connecting Athens to Piraeus and Phalerum. These 4-mile walls created a secure corridor to the sea, making Athens effectively an island that could withstand sieges as long as it maintained naval supremacy. The Spartans had initially opposed their construction but failed to prevent it.
Learn more →The Persian Wars
The 'Median war' refers to the Persian invasions of Greece (490-479 BCE). The Corinthians invoke Sparta's delayed response to Xerxes' invasion as a historical parallel to their current inaction. This criticism stings because Sparta had arrived late to Marathon and nearly too late to Thermopylae.
Learn more →Spartan Foreign Policy
Traditional Spartan foreign policy was conservative and defensive, focused on maintaining the Peloponnesian League and their helot system. The Corinthians criticize this isolationist tendency, arguing that Sparta's reputation as 'liberator of Hellas' (earned during the Persian Wars) demands more active intervention against Athenian imperialism.
Learn more →Corinthian-Athenian Rivalry
Corinth and Athens were major commercial rivals, particularly over influence in the western Greek colonies. The conflict over Corcyra (modern Corfu) and Potidaea had recently brought them into direct confrontation, making Corinth the most vocal advocate for war among Sparta's allies.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Pericles (Chapter 17)
Plutarch describes the Spartan embassy that tried to prevent the rebuilding of Athens' walls after the Persian Wars, showing the long history of Spartan concern about Athenian fortifications that the Corinthians reference.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.39-40)
Provides an alternative account of the debates at Sparta before the war, including similar criticisms of Spartan inaction and the pressure from allies to confront Athens.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 2.2.20)
Describes the eventual destruction of the Long Walls at the end of the Peloponnesian War, showing the ultimate fulfillment of what the Corinthians advocated should have been done decades earlier.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the Corinthian speaker use historical examples (the Persian Wars) to shame Sparta into action? Is this an effective rhetorical strategy?
- What does this passage reveal about the nature of alliance systems in ancient Greece? How do smaller powers influence larger ones?
- The Corinthians argue that allowing injustice makes one complicit in it. How does this moral argument relate to modern debates about intervention versus isolationism?
- How does Thucydides use this speech to illustrate the tensions between different Greek conceptions of power, honor, and security?