Today's Passage
This passage occurs during the initial phase of the Sicilian Expedition (415 BCE), Athens' ambitious attempt to conquer Sicily.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the main object of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and the Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving their zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines, or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger the state by wasting its home resources.
Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and troops; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the passage and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and base for the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing who would be their allies in the war, they might at length attack Syracuse and Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta and the former ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.
Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the town while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its height. Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed time to run on without showing itself, men’s courage revived, and they saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers—which would never appear so considerable as at present—by the anticipation of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of the engagement. They might also count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the city. The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less disposed to enter into alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without waiting to see which were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval station as a place to retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was an uninhabited place at no great distance from Syracuse either by land or by sea.
Modern Translation
During this time, the generals deliberated about their course of action. Nicias believed they should sail with the entire fleet to Selinus—the primary objective of their expedition. If the Egestaeans could provide funding for the whole force, they would proceed accordingly. If not, they should demand provisions for the sixty ships the Egestaeans had originally requested, remain to resolve the conflict between Egesta and Selinus through force or negotiation, then sail along the coast past other cities. After demonstrating Athenian power and showing support for their friends and allies, they would return home—unless some unexpected opportunity arose to aid the Leontines or win over other cities—rather than risk the state's resources on a prolonged campaign.
Alcibiades argued that such a grand expedition must not return in disgrace having accomplished nothing. He proposed sending heralds to all cities except Selinus and Syracuse, working to incite some Sicels to rebel against Syracuse while securing others' friendship to obtain grain and troops. Most importantly, they should win over Messina, which controlled the strait and entrance to Sicily and would provide an excellent harbor and military base. After securing these alliances and knowing who would support them in war, they could finally attack Syracuse and Selinus—unless Selinus reached terms with Egesta and Syracuse stopped opposing Leontini's restoration.
Lamachus, however, insisted they should sail directly to Syracuse and engage immediately beneath the city walls while the inhabitants remained unprepared and panic-stricken. Every military force appears most formidable upon first arrival; delay allows the enemy's courage to recover, and they eventually view the threat with near indifference. By attacking suddenly while Syracuse still feared their arrival, they would maximize their chances of victory and utterly terrify the enemy through their apparent numbers—which would never seem as impressive as now—through the dread of impending disaster, and especially through the immediate threat of battle. They could likely catch many citizens outside the walls, disbelieving their arrival; as the enemy rushed to bring their property inside, the army positioned before the city would have ample opportunity for plunder. Other Sicilian cities would then be less inclined to ally with Syracuse and would join Athens without waiting to see who proved stronger. They should establish their naval base at Megara for retreat and as an attack position—an uninhabited location conveniently close to Syracuse by both land and sea.
Historical Context
This passage occurs during the initial phase of the Sicilian Expedition (415 BCE), Athens' ambitious attempt to conquer Sicily. The three Athenian generals—Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus—debate strategy after arriving in Sicily. Nicias, who had opposed the expedition, advocates a limited engagement focused on the stated objective of helping Egesta against Selinus. Alcibiades proposes a diplomatic approach to build alliances before attacking. Lamachus argues for immediate assault on Syracuse while surprise remains on their side. This strategic disagreement reflects deeper tensions within Athenian leadership and foreshadows the expedition's eventual disaster. The debate illustrates different approaches to imperial warfare: cautious limitation of objectives, diplomatic coalition-building, and aggressive direct action.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Sicilian Expedition
Athens' massive naval expedition to Sicily (415-413 BCE) aimed to conquer the island, particularly Syracuse. It ended in complete disaster, marking the beginning of Athens' decline. The expedition involved over 130 ships and thousands of soldiers, representing an enormous investment of Athenian resources.
Learn more →Athenian Command Structure
The three-general system (strategoi) reflected Athenian democratic principles but often led to divided command. Each general represented different political factions and strategic philosophies. This divided leadership contributed significantly to the expedition's failure.
Learn more →Syracuse
The most powerful Greek city in Sicily, Syracuse was a Dorian colony allied with Sparta. Its wealth and strategic location made it Athens' primary target. The city's successful defense against Athens marked a turning point in the Peloponnesian War.
Learn more →Greek Siege Warfare
Ancient Greek siege tactics involved blockading cities by land and sea, constructing siege walls, and attempting to starve defenders into submission. Direct assault was risky and rarely attempted. Lamachus's proposal for immediate attack was thus unconventional and bold.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (14-15)
Plutarch describes the same strategic debate, emphasizing Nicias's reluctance and Alcibiades' ambition. He provides additional character details and suggests the disagreement weakened Athenian unity from the start.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Alcibiades (18)
Offers Alcibiades' perspective on the strategic debate, portraying him as confident in his diplomatic abilities and critical of Nicias's overcaution. Shows how personal ambition influenced strategic decisions.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.83-13.2)
Provides an alternative account of the Sicilian expedition's opening phase. While less detailed than Thucydides, Diodorus emphasizes the expedition's grand scale and initial Sicilian reactions.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How do the three different strategies proposed reflect each general's personality and political position? What does this reveal about decision-making in democratic Athens?
- Which strategic approach would have been most likely to succeed, and why? Consider both immediate military factors and longer-term political implications.
- How does divided command affect military operations? Can you think of modern parallels to this situation?
- What role does timing play in each general's strategy? How do their different assessments of 'the right moment' reflect different theories of warfare?